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Public Evidence from Secret Ballots

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Book cover Electronic Voting (E-Vote-ID 2017)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 10615))

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Abstract

Elections seem simple—aren’t they just about counting? But they have a unique, challenging combination of security and privacy requirements. The stakes are high; the context is adversarial; the electorate needs to be convinced that the results are correct; and the secrecy of the ballot must be ensured. They also have practical constraints: time is of the essence, and voting systems need to be affordable and maintainable, as well as usable by voters, election officials, and pollworkers. It is thus not surprising that voting is a rich research area spanning theory, applied cryptography, practical systems analysis, usable security, and statistics. Election integrity involves two key concepts: convincing evidence that outcomes are correct and privacy, which amounts to convincing assurance that there is no evidence about how any given person voted. These are obviously in tension. We examine how current systems walk this tightrope.

A more in-depth version of this paper can be found at https://arxiv.org/abs/1707.08619.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Moreover, the systems that come closest are not readily usable by a typical voter.

  2. 2.

    The VVPAT consists of a cash-register style printout of each vote that the voter can check but cannot touch. Voter-marked paper ballots or ballots marked using a ballot-marking device are preferable to VVPAT because voters may not check the VVPAT record.

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Acknowledgments

This work was supported in part by the U.S. National Science Foundation awards CNS-1345254, CNS-1409505, CNS-1518888, CNS-1409401, CNS-1314492, and CNS-1421373, the Center for Science of Information STC (CSoI), an NSF Science and Technology Center, under grant agreement CCF-0939370, the Maryland Procurement Office under contract H98230-14-C-0127, and FNR Luxembourg under the PETRVS Mobility grant.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Microsoft Research, Redmond, USA

    Josh Benaloh

  2. University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, USA

    Matthew Bernhard & J. Alex Halderman

  3. University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg City, Luxembourg

    Peter Y. A. Ryan

  4. University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, USA

    Philip B. Stark

  5. Rice University, Houston, USA

    Dan S. Wallach

  6. University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia

    Vanessa Teague

  7. The George Washington University, Washington, USA

    Poorvi L. Vora

  8. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, USA

    Ronald L. Rivest

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  1. Matthew Bernhard
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Correspondence to Matthew Bernhard .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Tallinn University of Technology, Tallinn, Estonia

    Robert Krimmer

  2. Technische Universität Darmstadt, Darmstadt, Germany

    Melanie Volkamer

  3. German Research Institute for Public Administration, Speyer, Germany

    Nadja Braun Binder

  4. University of Münster, Münster, Germany

    Norbert Kersting

  5. Université Catholique de Louvain, Louvain, Belgium

    Olivier Pereira

  6. IT University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark

    Carsten Schürmann

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Bernhard, M. et al. (2017). Public Evidence from Secret Ballots. In: Krimmer, R., Volkamer, M., Braun Binder, N., Kersting, N., Pereira, O., Schürmann, C. (eds) Electronic Voting. E-Vote-ID 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10615. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-68687-5_6

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