Abstract
Hardware Trojans pose a serious threat to the expected functionality, performance, and security of integrated circuits (ICs). Many of the existing techniques for detection of hardware Trojans require the use of a “golden IC.” The golden IC is a fabricated instance of the design which is required to be free of Trojans and is used as a reference to verify the responses obtained from an IC under authentication. However identification and even existence of a golden IC may not be possible. In light of these challenges, techniques are desired which can detect a hardware Trojan without the need for a golden IC. This chapter gives an overview of golden-free Trojan detection.
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Notes
- 1.
Prior work such as [8] have already proposed solutions for designing on-chip delay measurement circuitry.
- 2.
One way to measure arbitrary path delays is using an automatic test equipment (ATE), by generating test patterns which excite the desired path(s), assuming they are testable, and then sweeping the clock period in a similar way until failure occurs.
- 3.
In [5], these sensors were proposed in the context of custom test structures to isolate the paths that fail their delay constraints during post-silicon validation. But they can also be used in the described self-authentication process.
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Davoodi, A. (2018). Golden-Free Trojan Detection. In: Bhunia, S., Tehranipoor, M. (eds) The Hardware Trojan War. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-68511-3_9
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