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Introduction

  • Theodore Pelagidis
  • Michael Mitsopoulos
Chapter

Abstract

The strategic failure in the approach to deal with the problems of the Greek economy, namely the disproportionate internal devaluation of the private sector and the tax base with respect to the milder internal devaluation of the government expenditure, has certainly taken place in the context of a country that was asked to undertake one of the most difficult adjustments made by any country and through a deal that appeared to be ignoring important warning signs (Mitsopoulos and Pelagidis 2011; Pelagidis and Mitsopoulos 2014). Essentially, the 2010 and onward sequential deals amounted to agreeing with the political leadership and the administration of an economy that has been turned by the former into a quasi-Soviet economy at the fringes of free markets, that they will tear down the bureaucracy they have established for over 30 years, while being offered the cash and support to keep operating largely in a “business as usual” environment.

References

  1. Mitsopoulos, Μ., and T. Pelagidis. 2011. Understanding the Crisis in Greece. From Boom to Bust. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Second edition, 2012.Google Scholar
  2. Pelagidis, T., and M. Mitsopoulos. 2014. Greece. From Exit to Recovery? Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • Theodore Pelagidis
    • 1
  • Michael Mitsopoulos
    • 2
  1. 1.NR Senior FellowBrookings InstitutionWashington, DCUSA
  2. 2.Hellenic Federation of EnterprisesAthensGreece

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