Abstract
Efficient as the (new) StE is, it can only be used with a restricted class of signatures in order to allow effective verification. The Commit_then_Encrypt_and_Sign (CtEaS) paradigm has the merit of accepting any signature among its building blocks without compromising the verification protocols. In this chapter, we investigate this method by determining the exact security property needed for the encryption to achieve secure constructions. Our study, conducted for confirmer signatures, applies also to signcryption.
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El Aimani, L. (2017). Analysis of CtEaS. In: Verifiable Composition of Signature and Encryption. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-68112-2_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-68112-2_5
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Online ISBN: 978-3-319-68112-2
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