An Introduction to Security Based on Physical Disorder

  • Jonathan RobertsEmail author
Part of the Springer Theses book series (Springer Theses)


The ever-growing number of connected smart devices, programs and data brings with it a growing demand to ensure the security and reliability of these systems. This problem is now a significant challenge for all of society, as these devices have become completely pervasive in everyday life. Example uses include carrying out financial transactions, communicating with other people, monitoring people’s health and interacting with the environment. As these devices fulfil critical tasks, one of the core requirements that needs to be addressed lies in their secure authentication, identification and integrity checking. This chapter introduces a strategy that has emerged over recent years, which utilises inherent, hard-to-clone randomness of physically disordered systems to define the secure identity of a system.


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhysicsLancaster UniversityLancasterUK

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