Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in
Book cover

Regulation of Infrastructure and Utilities pp 35–56Cite as

Palgrave Macmillan

Regulatory Policies, Strategies, and Tools

  • Chapter
  • First Online:

  • 396 Accesses

Part of the book series: Studies in the Political Economy of Public Policy ((PEPP))

Abstract

Infrastructure and utilities can be regulated by following different approaches. This chapter discusses, in turn, regulation through public ownership, regulation through mixed public-private ownership firms, regulation through contracts, regulation through Independent Regulatory Agencies (IRAs), and regulation through (quasi-)market competition. The approaches of regulation can be located along a spectrum from the most pervasive role of the government in controlling infrastructure and utilities on the one hand, to the least invasive influence of public authorities on the conduct of infrastructure and utilities firms. The chapter concludes with the discussion of the regulation of telecommunications in Malaysia in the 1990s.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   89.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   119.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD   119.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

References

  • Backx, Mattijs, Michael Carney, and Eric Gedajlovic. 2002. Public, Private and Mixed Ownership and the Performance of International Airlines. Journal of Air Transport Management 8 (4): 213–220.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bakovic, Tonci, Bernard W. Tenenbaum, and Fiona Woolf. 2003. Regulation by Contract: A New Way to Privatize Electricity Distribution? Washington, DC: World Bank.

    Google Scholar 

  • Baumol, William J. 1977. On the Proper Cost Tests for Natural Monopoly in a Multiproduct Industry. The American Economic Review 1: 809–822.

    Google Scholar 

  • Berg S.V.‚ 2013. Best Practices in Regulating State-Owned and Municipal Water Utilities. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). Santiago‚ Chile: United Nations.

    Google Scholar 

  • Boardman, Anthony E., and Aidan R. Vining. 1989. Ownership and Performance in Competitive Environments: A Comparison of the Performance of Private, Mixed, and State-Owned Enterprises. Journal of Law and Economics 32 (1): 1–33.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bös, Dieter. 1986. A Theory of the Privatization of Public Enterprises. Journal of Economics 5: 17–40.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Buchanan, James M., Robert D. Tollison, and Gordon Tullock. 1980. Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society. College Station, TX: Texas A & M University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Coase, Ronald H. 1992. The Institutional Structure of Production. The American Economic Review 82 (4): 713–719.

    Google Scholar 

  • Coase, Ronald. 1998. The New Institutional Economics. The American Economic Review 88 (2): 72–74.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cuervo-Cazurra, Alvaro, Aandrew Inkpen, Aldo Musacchio, and Kannan Ramaswamy. 2014. Governments as Owners: State-Owned Multinational Companies. Journal of International Business Studies 45 (8): 919–942.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gilardi, Fabrizio. 2009. Delegation in the Regulatory State: Independent Regulatory Agencies in Western Europe. London: Edward Elgar.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gómez-Ibáñez, José A. 2003. Regulating Infrastructure: Monopoly, Contracts, and Discretion. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gupta, Nandini. 2005. Partial Privatization and Firm Performance. Journal of Finance 60 (2): 987–1015.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hausman, William J., and John L. Neufeld. 1991. Property Rights versus Public Spirit: Ownership and Efficiency of US Electric Utilities prior to Rate-of-Return Regulation. The Review of Economics and Statistics (August): 414–423.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lawson, Colin. 1994. The Theory of State-Owned Enterprises in Market Economies. Journal of Economic Surveys 8 (3): 283–309.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lee, Cassey. 2002. Telecommunications Reforms in Malaysia. Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics 73 (4): 521–540.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Littlechild, Stephen C. 1983. Regulation of British Telecommunications’ Profitability. Report to the Secretary of State. London: UK Department of Industry.

    Google Scholar 

  • Luherman, Timothy A. 1998a. Investment Opportunities as Real Options: Getting Started on the Numbers. Harvard Business Review 76: 51–66.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1998b. Strategy as a Portfolio of Real Options. Harvard Business Review 76: 89–101.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mallon, Richard D. 1994. State-Owned Enterprise Reform Through Performance Contracts: The Bolivian Experiment. World Development 22 (6): 925–934.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Matsumura, Tsohihiro. 1998. Partial Privatization in Mixed Duopoly. Journal of Public Economics 70 (3): 473–483.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mountain, Bruce, and Stephen Littlechild. 2010. Comparing Electricity Distribution Network Revenues and Costs in New South Wales, Great Britain and Victoria. Energy Policy 38 (10): 5770–5782.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Niskanen, William A. 1971. Bureaucracy and Representative Government. Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

    Google Scholar 

  • Oum, Tae H., Nicole Adler, and Yu. Chunyan. 2006. Privatization, Corporatization, Ownership Forms and Their Effects on the Performance of the World’s Major Airports. Journal of Air Transport Management 12 (3): 109–121.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sappington, David E.M., and Dennis L. Weisman. 2016. The Disparate Adoption of Price Cap Regulation in the US Telecommunications and Electricity Sectors. Journal of Regulatory Economics 49 (2): 250–264.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert W. Vishny. 2002. The Grabbing Hand: Government Pathologies and Their Cures. Boston, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Thacher, David, and Mein Rein. 2004. Managing Value Conflict in Public Policy. Governance 17 (4): 457–486.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tirole, Jean. 1988. The Theory of Industrial Organization. Boston, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wagle, Subodh, and Sachin Warghade. 2010. New Laws Establishing Independent Regulatory Agencies in the Indian Water Sector: Long Term Implications for Governance. South Asian Water Studies 2 (1): 49–77.

    Google Scholar 

  • Williamson O.E.‚ 1973. Markets and Hierarchies: Some Elementary Considerations. The American Economic Review 63 (2): 316–325.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1979. Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations. Journal of Law and Economics 22 (2): 233–261.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Finance and Management, SOAS, University of London, London, UK

    Alberto Asquer

Authors
  1. Alberto Asquer
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Alberto Asquer .

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2018 The Author(s)

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Asquer, A. (2018). Regulatory Policies, Strategies, and Tools. In: Regulation of Infrastructure and Utilities. Studies in the Political Economy of Public Policy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67735-4_3

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation