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Chinese Assertive Actions in the South China Sea

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Chinese Assertiveness in the South China Sea

Part of the book series: Global Power Shift ((GLOBAL))

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Abstract

The South China Sea (SCS) has become one of the most problematic spots of international politics, and it has been mentioned as a possible trigger to a large-scale world conflict, the critical tipping point in the geopolitics of the Asia-Pacific region, and the place where global economy meets geopolitics. This diagnosis is the direct result of the high importance of the area for the global economy combined with the complex situation of overlapping territorial claims between six directly involved actors.

The assertive China discourse developed as a reaction to the allegedly changed behaviour of China in the period of 2009–2010. However, it is argued here that the narrative was exaggerated at the time. While the SCS is most often mentioned as the area where Chinese foreign policy indeed was supposed to become more assertive, the individual events in the SCS show only policy adjustments at most. Moreover, the Chinese actions and reactions were not entirely disproportionate when compared to the moves of the other countries. Still, China started to defend its claims more actively. Even though these claims have not been adjusted for decades, the level of activity with which China decided to impose them and also react to other countries’ moves was growing.

In the period of 2011–2016, however, China did become assertive in its behaviour. Altogether five cases of Chinese assertiveness in this period were identified: the cable-cutting incidents in 2011; the Scarborough Shoal stand-off in 2012; the Second Thomas Shoal stand-off, which has been running since 2013; the oil rig incident in 2014; and the land reclamation, construction, and militarization of the outposts taking place since 2014. These five events will be further analysed in subsequent chapters to establish their driving forces.

The upcoming chapter draws on previously published works of the author; see Turcsányi (2013a, b, c, 2016)

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For the map of the area, see BBC (2015b).

  2. 2.

    The term “Taiwan” is used throughout the book to label the territory controlled by the government of the Republic of China on Taiwan. The term “China” will be used to label the administered territory and government of the People’s Republic of China, also called Mainland China. This does not suggest any position on the status of Taiwan and its relation with the PRC.

  3. 3.

    For the map see Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (2016a).

  4. 4.

    The claims of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan are largely identical. This, however, does not necessarily mean that the two actors interpret their respective claims and act in the same way. Taiwan has repeatedly rejected cooperation with China in upholding its claims in the SCS but also in the East China Sea with regard to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.

  5. 5.

    For the map of claims, see, for instance, The Economist (2012).

  6. 6.

    Fravel (2011); for more on Chinese historical rights see Wu (2013, pp. 15–39). For the historical counterargument, see, for example, Hayton (2014).

  7. 7.

    For the map of occupation outposts of the claimant countries in the Spratly Islands (the Paracel Islands are all occupied by China since 1988), see Austin (2016).

  8. 8.

    Storey (2013b, pp. 20–47). According to another count, Vietnam controls 21 features, the Philippines 9, China 7, Malaysia 5 and Taiwan 1; see Vuving (2016).

  9. 9.

    This conclusion differs with the one of Jerdén (see pages 71–72), who believes the submission constitutes a policy adjustment. It is argued here that since this event was unique (driven by the upcoming deadline and the submissions of other countries), China’s behaviour in this case cannot be compared to any of the previous situations. But since the Chinese reaction was entirely in line with its longstanding policy, there is no policy change.

  10. 10.

    See Table 2.1 for summary of the relevant events, their labelling, and argumentation.

  11. 11.

    It might be suggested that the scope and nature of the Chinese claims are already inappropriate. The tentative position about the legal strength of the Chinese argumentation was presented in the previous section. It is not the goal of this book to present an exhaustive legal analysis of the claims.

  12. 12.

    Interestingly, the Philippines did not officially decommission the vessel, which might be an important issue considering its alliance with the USA.

  13. 13.

    For the Chinese media’s perception of Vietnam and the Philippines see Abb (2016).

  14. 14.

    Carl Thayer suggests a legal difference between the two terms; see Thayer (2015).

  15. 15.

    See Table 2.2 for summary of assertive events, their labelling, and argumentation.

  16. 16.

    China consistently opposes what it calls the ‘internationalization’ of the dispute and the third party mediation, and it sticks to its principle of resolving the issue bilaterally. See, for example, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China (2015c, e).

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Turcsányi, R.Q. (2018). Chinese Assertive Actions in the South China Sea. In: Chinese Assertiveness in the South China Sea. Global Power Shift. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67648-7_2

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