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A Security Evaluation of FIDO’s UAF Protocol in Mobile and Embedded Devices

  • Christoforos Panos
  • Stefanos Malliaros
  • Christoforos Ntantogian
  • Angeliki Panou
  • Christos XenakisEmail author
Conference paper
Part of the Communications in Computer and Information Science book series (CCIS, volume 766)

Abstract

The FIDO (Fast Identity Online) Universal Authentication Framework is a new authentication mechanism that replaces passwords, simplifying the process of user authentication. To this end, FIDO transfers user verification tasks from the authentication server to the user’s personal device. Therefore, the overall assurance level of user authentication is highly dependent on the security and integrity of the user’s device involved. This paper analyses the functionality of FIDO’s UAF protocol and identifies a list of critical vulnerabilities that may compromise the authenticity, privacy, availability, and integrity of the UAF protocol, allowing an attacker to launch a number of attacks, such as, capturing the data exchanged between a user and an online service, impersonating a user at any UAF compatible online service, impersonating online services to the user, and presenting fake information to the user’s screen during a transaction.

Keywords

Authentication FIDO Security analysis Trusted computing TPM Remote attestation TrustZone Mobile and embedded devices 

Notes

Acknowledgments

This research has been funded by the European Commission in part of the ReCRED project (Horizon H2020 Framework Programme of the European Union under GA number 653417).

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • Christoforos Panos
    • 1
  • Stefanos Malliaros
    • 2
  • Christoforos Ntantogian
    • 2
  • Angeliki Panou
    • 2
  • Christos Xenakis
    • 2
    Email author
  1. 1.Department of Informatics and TelecommunicationsUniversity of AthensAthensGreece
  2. 2.Department of Digital SystemsUniversity of PiraeusPireasGreece

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