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International Conference on Game Theory for Networks

GameNets 2017: Game Theory for Networks pp 165–172Cite as

Paradoxes in a Multi-criteria Routing Game

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Abstract

In this paper, we consider a routing game in a network that contains lossy links. We consider a multi-objective problem where the players have each a weighted sum of a delay cost and a cost for losses. We compute the equilibrium and optimal solution (which are unique). We discover here in addition to the classical Kameda type paradox another paradoxical behavior in which higher loss rates have a positive impact on delay and therefore higher quality links may cause a worse performance even in the case of a single player.

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References

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Blida 1, Route de Soumaa, B.P. 270, Blida, Algeria

    Amina Boukoftane & Nadia Oukid

  2. Universit Cote d’Azur (UCA), INRIA, 06902, Sophia-Antipolis, France

    Eitan Altman

  3. LINCS, 23 avenue d’Italie, 75013, Paris, France

    Eitan Altman

  4. LIA/CERI, University of Avignon, Agroparc, BP 1228, 84911, Avignon, France

    Majed Haddad

Authors
  1. Amina Boukoftane
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  2. Eitan Altman
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  3. Majed Haddad
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  4. Nadia Oukid
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Eitan Altman .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Engineering Systems and Design Pillar, Singapore University of Technology and Design, Dover, Singapore

    Lingjie Duan

  2. Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, Virginia, USA

    Anibal Sanjab

  3. Electrical Engineering/Computer Sciences, The University of Tennessee, Knoxville, Tennessee, USA

    Husheng Li

  4. School of Data and Computer Science, Higher Education Mega Center, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou, China

    Xu Chen

  5. University of Tennessee, Knoxville, Tennessee, USA

    Donatello Materassi

  6. Laboratoire Informatique d’Avignon (LIA), University of Avignon, Avignon, France

    Rachid Elazouzi

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© 2017 ICST Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering

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Boukoftane, A., Altman, E., Haddad, M., Oukid, N. (2017). Paradoxes in a Multi-criteria Routing Game. In: Duan, L., Sanjab, A., Li, H., Chen, X., Materassi, D., Elazouzi, R. (eds) Game Theory for Networks. GameNets 2017. Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, vol 212. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67540-4_15

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67540-4_15

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-67539-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-67540-4

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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