Abstract
A prima facie case is presented for seeing various kinds of ethical significance in a family of views that share a ‘self-sceptical’ approach to personal identity. Variations on a simple self-sceptical argument for moral altruism can be found throughout the Buddhist philosophical tradition, as well as in contemporary Western philosophy, whereas key elements of this approach seem absent from long stretches of pre-modern Western philosophy. This chapter considers some exceptions to that pattern, in ancient and medieval Western philosophy, and other exceptions in early modern philosophy. The richness of various Buddhist approaches is highlighted, by contrast, including metaphysical and meta-ethical themes, as well as moral ones. The historical question of whether the exceptions in Western sources may have been influenced (directly or indirectly) by Buddhist sources is considered. The chapter closes with an overview of the various perspectives presented by the other contributors to this volume, and some common threads running through different segments of the volume; for example, some perspectives favour reductionist accounts of selfhood, while some favour non-reductionist accounts, and this difference can be ethically salient, which itself illustrates the basic idea that there are legitimate normative connections between self-sceptical metaphysics and ethics.
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Notes
- 1.
It would seem that ‘psychological egoism ’ would be even more of a non-starter, as it probably is in any case; but the qualification in my next sentence complicates the task of explaining how and why that would be so.
- 2.
The (different) question of whether egoism is morally justifiable might not even arise, if in this sense egoism is not theoretically valid – that is, lacking the metaphysical credentials that would be required for a place in any ontology .
- 3.
These so-called ‘agent-relative’ duties (conceived as justified by their alleged agent-relativity) would also be disqualified by moral consequentialists – who hasten to add, though, that such duties can be important (even crucial) in serving a larger purpose, such as overall well-being. Illusionists about selfhood , not to mention those who critique notions of identity in more nuanced ways, could make the same accommodation, if they share that purpose. There are other views, situated somewhere between egoism and agent-relative deontology, which often go by the name of ‘individualism ’, and which underlie certain liberal views in political philosophy ; many of those views would also seem to be threatened – in their foundations – by any unmasking of the self as an illusion.
- 4.
We are here concerned primarily with ethics and only secondarily with meta-ethics, so concerns with moral anti-realism will remain mostly in the background; I do include at the end of this chapter, however, a few comments on the intersection of meta-ethics and the metaphysics of personhood (see also notes 34, 37 and 38 below).
- 5.
The term ‘ethics’ will be used here in such a way as to cover more than ‘morality ’. Global rejections of moral truth warrant consideration, at least for theorists. Some other chapters in this volume also take seriously Pyrrhonist rejections – even those that go beyond their more usual suspensions – of moral belief; and yet, insofar as the Pyrrhonist goal is ataraxia, which is meant to be a desirable state of mind , this goal can itself be considered ethical in a broad axiological sense.
- 6.
Perhaps most ambitiously, Charles Goodman (2009) argues that a morally demanding form of impartial consequentialism follows from reductionism about personal identity (in conjunction with other elements of Buddhist axiology ); cf. earlier work in this vein by Siderits (2000) . For the most part, in this volume, we consider more modest ethical claims – sometimes prudential claims having to do with value(s) agents can find in their own lives, sometimes a moral altruism that leaves open the full shape of whatever moral theory should prevail. Claims like Goodman’s, however – focused on impartiality and/or cosmopolitan concern – surface in Chaps. 2, 5, 10, 11 and 13, respectively by Griffin, Davis & Renaud , Ramlakhan , Harris and Davis & Sahni .
- 7.
- 8.
This term is far from perfect, not only because it might seem to use ‘self’ indexically rather than as a general noun (so that any such view would sound unduly sceptical about itself), but also because many of the views with revisionist potential, and especially many Buddhist ones, are anti-realist rather than sceptical in the sense of suspending judgment while keeping an open mind about the reality of the self. For better or worse, the term at least resonates with its counterpart, ‘free will scepticism’ , which is generally intended to cover anti-realist views and not just classical scepticism . (Note also that reductionism , such as the kind explored by Parfit , can also be called ‘self-sceptical’ even though it differs in certain ways from both scepticism and anti-realism ; and the same applies to most forms of fictionalism and illusionism about personal identity .)
- 9.
Or as we might put it, connecting metaphysics and ethics; however, many Buddhists are uneasy about entanglements with metaphysics, for various reasons. Comparative philosophers who construe the connection in terms of metaphysics may run the risk of imposing alien categories in Buddhist contexts; nonetheless, at least some Buddhist philosophers embrace a role for metaphysics (and meanwhile, problems and prospects of engaging in comparative metaphysics are at stake in many of the following chapters).
- 10.
Śāntideva’s most famous formulation of the argument is in verses 90–103 of Chapter 8 of his Bodhicaryāvatāra (quoted in full in Jay Garfield’s chapter here, i.e. Chap. 6 below); the fact that he does not focus on karuṇā in this passage calls for resorting to a more general concept, such as ‘altruism’ .
- 11.
These two approaches can be reconciled within Buddhist metaphysics by appealing to the distinction between conventional and ultimate truths . Regarding persons, there are no ultimate truths – so say almost all Buddhists – but Abhidharmists also allow conventional truths where (e.g.) ‘first-personal facts’ are reducible to impersonal facts that may correspond to ultimate truths (cf. the early chapters of Siderits 2015) .
- 12.
As Keown (2001) points out, some Buddhists have favoured a kindred notion of ‘transcendence’; Goodman (2009) has deepened the debate about this, highlighting insights on both sides, but Keown’s critique of this ‘transcendence’ – as an interpretation of Buddhism – remains persuasive, at least enough to shift the burden of argument, or so I would argue. Nietzschean ‘transvaluation’ is very different, but Douglas Berger’s critique of Nietzsche (in Chap. 8 in this volume) could be construed along similar lines.
- 13.
Bilimoria (1997) points out, however – echoing others who have expored the implications of Advaita Vedanta – that elements of the Hindu tradition converge with some readings of Buddhist anātman (see also n. 30 below). In his chapter here (Chap. 12), Ashwani Peetush considers this possibility as well.
- 14.
For a recent sympathetic account of his critique, see G. Strawson (2011); and for historical background, see Udo Thiel’s Early Modern Subject: Self-Consciousness and Personal Identity from Descartes to Hume (2011). A recent comparative study of Hume (on selfhood ) and Buddhism is Long (2012); cf. Garfield’s Chap. 6 in this volume.
- 15.
As Herbert Davidson shows (1992, 338–40), this view had a plausible basis in Averroes’s writings.
- 16.
For more detail on Spinoza , see Chap. 5 here (Davis & Renaud , in this volume).
- 17.
Even in its most radically sceptical phases, Sextan practice can resemble some Buddhist forms of spirituality , as Ethan Mills shows in his chapter here (Chap. 4 in this volume).
- 18.
Of those who were marked by Montaigne’s writings, Blaise Pascal was arguably not theoretical enough (particularly in ethics), while ‘les philosophes libertins’ were arguably not concerned enough with Montaigne’s altruism , to count as successors in this respect. (Those who would dismiss a ‘universalist’ reading in light of an alleged relativism in Montaigne might consider the anti-relativist interpretation in M. Conche’s Montaigne et la philosophie (1987).)
- 19.
Contemporary philosophers with a passing exposure to Buddhist texts sometimes complain that, while they seem rich in philosophical themes, these texts do not explicitly identify premises and conclusions in ways that would make attributions of philosophical reasoning possible; but insofar as such philosophers are often content to tease out argument structures in (ancient or early modern) Western texts – that is, to impose structures of reasoning that are not explicitly there – they should beware of the looming double standard.
- 20.
As Keown (2001) shows, Theravāda ethics is more straightforward, in some ways, than Mahāyāna ethics; but it is also worth mentioning that its Pali Canon contains a long-term moral vision very similar to the bodhisattva’s , especially in its famous ‘Metta Sutta’ .
- 21.
Cf. Dayal (1999) and Goodman (2009); Williams (1998) takes issue with these interpretations, but I incorporate his qualification in speaking of others ‘reaching enlightenment as well’, the issue being whether a bodhisattva is meant to ‘postpone’ enlightenment itself. (On this issue, see Davis (2013).)
- 22.
In praising the bodhisattva ideal , I am assuming – as many ‘Engaged Buddhists’ do – that “cyclic existence” can be reinterpreted so as to cohere with ideals that do not depend on belief in rebirth. Meanwhile, those who would propose an Aristotelian answer to this should consult Keown’s (2001) The Nature of Buddhist Ethics, which appeals to a hybrid of Buddhist and Aristotelian philosophy, actually finding many of the key aretaic elements of the latter in early Buddhism itself. The question remains whether recourse to the notion of personal identity (such as Sorabji (2006) finds in Aristotle ) would end up jeopardizing the prospects for an Aristotelian justification for altruism .
- 23.
As Nalini Ramlakhan shows in her chapter here (Chap. 10).
- 24.
Schopenhauer bears re-examination in this respect, although his reliance on Indian sources mitigates his claim to originality; another avenue for exploration, outlined briefly below, would be via the works of Friedrich Schelling (1775–1854) , who picks up on ideas about selflessness expressed by Schleiermacher (noted at the end of Chap. 5 (Davis & Renaud , in this volume)). It is – intriguingly – unclear, however, what Asian sources Schelling had access to prior to 1804, when he expressed similar ideas (in Schelling 2010).
- 25.
I would argue that these parallels can be illuminating even if reductionism is ultimately not the right framework for interpreting Madhyamaka emptiness (setting aside, as we must here, the question of whether Madhyamaka could ‘ultimately ’ allow a definitive interpretation, by its own lights). One could explore parallels with at least two kinds of reductionism: metaphysical reductionism (in relation to ethics, see Dancy (1997)) and meta-ethical reductionism (see Nuccetelli and Seay (2012)).
- 26.
Lorenzo Valla (1407–57) or perhaps cousin Giorgio (1447–1500); and if not Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463–94) then quite possibly his nephew G. Francesco (1470–1533).
- 27.
- 28.
App (2006) argues that the Gita was an earlier influence on Schopenhauer than the Upanisads , and also points out that he had been exposed to Buddhist ideas well before 1818 (the year of the first edition of World as Will and Representation). On his exposure to Buddhism, see App (2006: 58, 62n.) and his own op. cit.
- 29.
- 30.
Bilimoria (1997) proposes this rapprochement between the traditions: “insofar as the ātman remains a designation for the concept of the immutable, undifferentiated, unconditioned and autonomous principle of existence… the Buddhists were justified in calling into question the particular conception [i.e. a different conception of ātman] in their assertion of the anātman or no-self doctrine” (1997: 253, my italics). Bilimoria offers an account of a similarly self-sceptical perspective in Shankara’s (Advaita Vedanta ) approach.
- 31.
In his Introduction to a new translation of Olympiodorus, Griffin (2014) addresses related themes in Neoplatonism . There is an older secondary literature comparing Indian philosophy and Neoplatonism, e.g. Radhakrishnan (1939) , who, in relation to Buddhism, focuses even more on Gnostic parallels (1939, 207 ff.) – yielding interesting comparisons, whatever one may think of the zealous perennialism underlying them.
- 32.
It may be worth acknowledging here that Descartes, traditionally considered the pivotal figure between the Renaissance and a new phase of modern philosophy, advanced a highly cosmopolitan conception of universal moral concern (see Marquardt 2015) . In light of his robustly realist affirmation of the self as a persisting and irreducible entity, this reminds us that theories of altruism cannot be monopolized by those who deny this; and anyway, the Buddhist claim is not that believing in ātman entails being a normative egoist (so the Buddhist can acknowledge Descartes’s consistency, metaphysical soundness aside), it is rather that an-ātman entails not being a normative egoist (salva veritate). Descartes might be germane to comparisons with Buddhist ethics; but the metaphysical gulf between them remains wide.
- 33.
There are fault-lines, on this point, that divide Theravādins from some Mahāyānists (and perhaps Yogācārins from other Mahāyānists) who understand ‘nirvāna’ very differently; cf. Huntington 1989 , Makransky 1997 : ch. 13, Suzuki 1999 (a sutra that aims to subvert certain earlier notions of nirvana ), Clayton 2006 : 115, & Cowherds 2016 .
- 34.
Debates about conventional and ultimate truth in Buddhism provide one sort of occasion for posing the meta-ethical questions that arose in my second paragraph (in the introduction). Important discussions include Keown’s (2001) on the ‘transcendency thesis’ (the idea that ethical concerns disappear from the ultimate point of view, an idea Keown rightly challenges), and the Cowherds (2016) . As some chapters in the latter seem to confirm, global emptiness claims (e.g. of Madhyamaka origin) may risk subverting the notion of moral truth , potentially disqualifying every form of morality that is not merely a ‘conventional’ morality . Be that as it may, this possibility arises from reflections on global emptiness, not from anātman or other self-sceptical approaches to ethics.
- 35.
Sikka thereby maintains some critical distance from – inter alia – a famous but unsubstantiated story related by William Barrett about Heidegger’s reaction to reading work by the Japanese Buddhist philosopher Daisetz Suzuki (mentioned in Barrett 1956); allegedly, Heidegger remarked on a close convergence between his ideas and the Zen perspective of Suzuki. In her fn. 1, Sikka cites studies that trace other ways in which East Asian philosophical works may have influenced Heidegger.
- 36.
In the case of Ramlakhan’s remit , this means the post-idealist generation of James and Russell , to which Henri Bergson could be added (with his Two Sources of Morality and Religion expressing a deep affinity with Buddhist axiology ); meanwhile the claim of intercultural convergence could be strengthened by looking, as we have not done here, at similar ideas in their idealist predecessors (as the ethical themes here cut across the idealist-realist divide), such as F.H. Bradley (1846–1924) and J.M.E. McTaggart (1866–1925) .
- 37.
This meta-ethical question is raised in some of the chapters here, e.g. in the latter half of Chap. 5; in Emer O’Hagan’s discussion of Charles Goodman’s ethics of emptiness (Chap. 7); in Nalini Ramlakhan’s discussion of William James’s pragmatism (Chap. 10); in Stephen Harris’s account of Susan Wolf’s objections to Parfit’s reductionism (Chap. 11); and elsewhere, in Cowherds (2016), cited especially by Jay Garfield (Chap. 6).
- 38.
Williams (1998) worries about this in connection with a sort of nihilism that certain Buddhist views seem to imply about values – something that he thinks is indeed implied, nolens volens. (One can dispute his diagnosis of the problem; but the texts and contexts he cites may show at least that the question is not just a peculiarly modern preoccupation.) Some of the Cowherds (2016) argue that there is no such problem; I have argued that there is a problem, but one incurred elsewhere, i.e. not as a result of the anatman claim that worries Williams (Davis forthcoming).
- 39.
These three philosophers are hardly alone in exploring innovative forms of Buddhist ethical theory , and an earlier version of this footnote had included a list of names of others who have advanced the state of the art in this area – however, the list grew too long to fit into a single note. (See Gowans 2015 , for both a survey of some of these writers and a detailed assessment of the problems and prospects for their interpretations and positions).
- 40.
Siderits (2015, 1–5) .
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Davis, G.F. (2018). Self-Sceptical Ethics and Selfless Morality: A Historical and Cross-Cultural Overview. In: Davis, G. (eds) Ethics without Self, Dharma without Atman. Sophia Studies in Cross-cultural Philosophy of Traditions and Cultures, vol 24. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67407-0_1
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