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Impossible Colours: Wittgenstein and the Naturalist’s Challenge

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How Colours Matter to Philosophy

Part of the book series: Synthese Library ((SYLI,volume 388))

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Abstract

With the rise of naturalistic philosophy, conceptual analysis has faded into the background, and Ludwig Wittgenstein’s account of reddish green and transparent white as grammatically excluded has been written off or ignored. While his view of such impossible colours is, as he himself saw, open to question, so too is the naturalist’s alternative.

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Acknowledgement

As usual I am grateful to my friend Paul Forster for very useful comments and encouragement.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Canada

    Andrew Lugg

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  1. Andrew Lugg
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Correspondence to Andrew Lugg .

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  1. Federal University of Alagoas, Maceió, Alagoas, Brazil

    Marcos Silva

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Lugg, A. (2017). Impossible Colours: Wittgenstein and the Naturalist’s Challenge. In: Silva, M. (eds) How Colours Matter to Philosophy. Synthese Library, vol 388. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67398-1_6

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