Abstract
In a famous inaugural speech delivered at the University of Zürich on 9 December 1922, What is a natural law?, Erwin Schrödinger pointed out the difficulty that the pioneers of quantum physics encountered in their attempt to introduce a nondeterministic conception of physical laws. Schrödinger defended a vision according to which natural regularities are the statistic result of particle interactions occurring by chance. Hence, the idea that nature is determined by necessity appeared to him as a sort of long-lived philosophical prejudice which was no longer supported by the most recent scientific advancements and which he thus intended to put into question. In his view, the strength behind the understanding of the physical world as absolutely necessitated stemmed from the authority of a millenary philosophical tradition:
From where does the general, widespread belief in the absolute causal determinacy of molecular events and the conviction of the unthinkability of the contrary originate? Indeed, from the inherited millenary habit to think causally, which makes an undetermined event, an absolute, primary accident, appear as perfect nonsense to us.
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Notes
- 1.
Schrödinger (1929).
- 2.
Ibid., 11: “Woher stammt nun der allgemein verbreitete Glaube an die absolute, kausale Determiniertheit des molekularen Geschehens und die Überzeugung von der Undenkbarkeit des Gegenteils? Einfach aus der von Jahrtausenden ererbten Gewohnheit, kausal zu denken, die uns ein undeterminiertes Geschehen, einen absoluten, primären Zufall als einen vollkommenen Nonsens, als logisch unsinnig erscheinen läßt.”
- 3.
Schrödinger (1932), 2: “Bis vor etwa 1 ½ Jahrzehnten hatte man daran nie gezweifelt. Der absolute Determinismus ist sozusagen das Grunddogma der klassischen Physik gewesen. Das durchsichtigste Beispiel, an dem man sich dabei orientiert hatte, war die klassische Mechanik: gegeben ein System von Massenpunkten, ihre Massen, Orte und Geschwindigkeiten in einem Anfangszeitpunkt, gegeben die Kraftgesetzte, wonach sie aufeinander einwirken. Dann läßt sich ihre Bewegung für alle künftige Zeiten vorausberechnen. In der Anwendung auf die Himmelskörper hatte diese Theorie ihre glänzende Bestätigung gefunden.”
- 4.
Dijksterhuis (1950).
- 5.
- 6.
On how the wondrous loomed large over early modern science, see Daston and Park (1998).
- 7.
- 8.
For an account of the development of the concept of natural laws in the early modern period, see Daston and Stolleis (2009).
- 9.
Schrödinger (1932), 14: “[man denkt sich], daß beim Zusammenstoß zweier Moleküle nicht durch die bekannten Stoßgesetze, sondern durch ein passendes Würfelspiel die weitere Bahn der Moleküle bestimmt wird.” “[One imagines], that the collision of two molecules determines the further course of the molecules not by the known laws of collision, but by a suitable dice game.”
- 10.
Aristotle (2014), 1621: “Since, among things which are, some are always in the same state and are of necessity (nor necessity in the sense of compulsion but that which means the impossibility of being otherwise), and some are not of necessity nor always, but for the most part, this is the principle and this the cause of the existence of the accidental; or that which is neither always nor for the most part, we call accidental […] Therefore, since not all things are or come to be of necessity and always, but the majority of things are for the most part, the accidental must exist” (Metaphysics E 1026b27-1027a28).
- 11.
See also ibid., 1622: “But while what is for the most part exists, can nothing be said to be always, or are there eternal things? This must be considered later, but that there is no science of the accidental is obvious; for all science is either of that which is always or of that which is for the most part. For how else is one to learn or to teach another? The thing must be determined as occurring either always or for the most part, e.g. that honey-water is useful for a patient in a fever is true for the most part. But one will not be able to state when that which is contrary to this happens, e.g. ‘on the day of new moon’; for then it will be so on the day of new moon either always or for the most part; but the accidental is contrary to this. We have stated, then, what the accidental is and from what cause it arises, and that there is no science which deals with it” (1027a15-1027a27).
- 12.
See Aristotle (1984), 334: “But chance and spontaneity are also reckoned among causes: many things are said both to be and to come to be as a result of chance and spontaneity. We must inquire therefore in what manner chance and spontaneity are present among the causes enumerated, and whether they are the same or different, and generally what chance and spontaneity are” (Physics, II, 195b31-195b36).
- 13.
Ibid., 334–335, (196b10-196b17).
- 14.
Ibid., 337.
- 15.
Ibid.
- 16.
Ibid., 338: “The difference between spontaneity and what results by chance is greatest in things that come to be by nature; for when anything comes to be contrary to nature, we do not say that it came to be by chance, but by spontaneity. Yet strictly this too is different from the spontaneous proper; for the cause of the latter is external, that of the former internal” (197b18-197b36).
- 17.
Ibid., 340: “[…] those things are natural which, by a continuous movement originated from an internal principle, arrive at some end: the same end is not reached from every principle; nor any chance end, but always the tendency in each is towards the same end, if there is no impediment” (199b14-199b18).
- 18.
Ibid.
- 19.
Alexander of Aphrodisia (1658): “Unde et illud sequitur, quod eorum quae natura sunt, secundum legem aliquam praeviam, quae de iis determinate ferri videtur, unumquodque semper et constanter fiat. Cum vero inter ea quae natura fiunt, alia etiam praeter naturam fiant, et non omnia secundum naturam (eodem modo quo in Artis operibus fieri videmus) sequitur ut et inter ea quae Fato fiunt locum etiam habeant ea quae praeter Fatum fiunt. Adeo ut, si locum habeat id quod praeter naturam est., nec sit illud inane prorsus nomen, inter ea. etiam quae fato fiunt, illi, quod est. prater Fatum, locus concedendus sit. Nec igitur a ratione alienum est. si dicamus propriam cuiusque rei naturam, eius principium esse, causamque dispositionis omnium, quae ab ea. secundum naturam fiunt.” [Emphasis added]
- 20.
For a discussion of the issue of contingency and necessity in medieval philosophy and its theological implication, see Roques, Chap. 3 of this volume.
- 21.
Maier (1949), 222–223: “Jede anorganische Ursache, jedes ‘agens a natura’ wirkt nach Aristoteles mit Notwendigkeit, d.h. immer und immer in derselben Weisen, ein agens libere (ein agens ab intellectu) dagegen mit Kontingenz derart, dass es unter gleichen Bedingungen einen Effekt hervorbringen oder nicht hervorbringen kann. Es ist das ein fundamentaler Unterschied swichen den beiden Gruppen von wirkenden Kräften, die die Scholastik unterscheidet: die einen sind causae determinatae, die mit mechanischer Notwendigkeit auf ein bestimmes Ziel hinwirken und immer wirken (oer wenigstens immer zu wirken bestebt sind), während die andern causae intederminatae sind, die ceteris paribus mit einer ‘contingentia ad utrumlibet’ wirken oder nicht wirken können.”
- 22.
Ibid., 223: “[…] neben dieser Kontingenz der Freiheit gibt es für die Scholastik noch eine zweite, nämlich eine Kontingenz der natürliche Ereignisse. Bei dieser handelt es sich nicht um die Modalität des agere auf Seiten des Ursache, sondern um die Modalität des fieri auf Seiten des Effekts. Denn obwohl jedes agens naturale mit Notwendigkeit wirkt, tritt der Effekt nicht immer mit Notwendigkeit ein, sondern kann per accidens durch andere Ursachen oder durch die mangelnde Disposition im patiens oder sonst irgendwie vereitelt werden. In diesem Fall spricht man von ‘kontingenten’ Ereignissen, wobei das Wort Kontingenz nicht mehr die Undeterminiertheit des Wirkens, sondern die Unsicherheit im Zustandekommen der Wirkung bezeichnet. Der Gegensatz zu dieser Kontingenz ist die Modalität derjenigen Effekte, due schlechtin immer und unvermeidlich eintreten, wenn die sie anstrebenden Ursachen gegeben ist.”
- 23.
Aquinas: “Sciendum etiam quod quidam definierunt esse necessarium, quod non habet impedimentum; contingens vero sicut frequenter, quod potest impediri in paucioribus. Sed hoc irrationabile est. Necessarium enim dicitur, quod in sui natura habet quod non possit non esse: contingens autem ut frequenter, quod possit non esse. Hoc autem quod est. habere impedimentum vel non habere, est. contingens. Natura enim non parat impedimentum ei quod non potest non esse; quia esset superfluum.” “[…] someone defines to be necessary what does not have any obstruction; and also contingent for what concerns things that happen for most part as what can be impeded on few occasions. But this is not correct. Indeed, they say necessary is defined as what by nature cannot not be; contingent or for the most part, what can not be. Rather, what can have or not have impediment is contingent. Nature indeed does not dispose an impediment for what cannot not be, for this would be superfluous” Commentaria in libros physicorum,” in Corpus thomisticum, electronic edition (http://www.corpusthomisticum.org), lib. 2 l. 8 n. 4. […]−2.
- 24.
Goclenius (1613), 464: “Modi, quo Continges aliquid dicitur, tres sunt: Unus, quo dicitur quid evenire plerunque [sic] seu ut plurimum: Alter, quo pro re nata: Tertius, quo raro, ut fortuna. Primi Modi contingentia per se causas habent, & sunt epistemata, cum sint eorum rationes universales, ut necessariorum, quibus sunt vicina. Secundi et Tertii modi contingentia non habent causas necessarias, sed accidentalis. Itaq; non sunt epistemata. Horum (secundi & tertii modi) causae dicuntur indefinitae, quia effecta possunt efficere, vel non efficere, ita ut incerta sint. Ac Aliae sunt liberae, aliae fortuitae, & casuales.” “There are three ways in which something is said to be contingent. First, of what is said to happen for the most part; second, according to circumstances; third, and more rarely, by chance. The contingent things of the first kind have per se causes, and are sciences, because their properties are universal as those of things said to happen by necessity, to which are similar. […]”
- 25.
Micraelius (1653), 277: “Contingens ut plurimum, est. quod fit natura, cui quandoque ponitur impedimentum,” that is, “Contingent for the most part is what happens in nature, whenever an impediment is given.”
- 26.
See Manzo, Chap. 4 in this volume.
- 27.
We consider Cusanus from this viewpoint in Garau and Omodeo (2019).
- 28.
This is the subject of Omodeo, Chap. 5.
- 29.
“Adunque per le cose dette, ricorderò a quelli che si vorranno porre a così fatte imprese nel giudicare, overo comandare la essecutione, di qualsivoglia machina, essersi necessario non solo havere cognitione delle matematiche, ma ancora essere avveduto, e pratico mecanico.”
- 30.
See Regier, Chap. 6.
- 31.
Vanden Broecke, Chap. 7.
- 32.
Spinoza (1984), 433.
- 33.
Ibid., 436.
- 34.
- 35.
Rusu, Chap. 9.
- 36.
See Dyde Chap. 13.
- 37.
Boyle (1996), 101: “[…] it seems more allowable to argue a providence from the exquisite structure and symmetry of the mundane bodies, and the apt subordination and train of causes, than to infer from some physical anomalies that things are not framed and administered by a wise author and rector. For the characters and impressions of wisdom that are conspicuous in the curious fabric and orderly train of things can with no probability be referred to blind chance, but must be [ascribed] to a most intelligent and designing agent. Whereas on the other hand, besides that the anomalies we speak of are incomparably fewer than those things which are regular and are produced in an orderly way; besides this, I say, the divine maker of the universe being a most free agent and having an intellect infinitely superior to ours, may in the production of seemingly irregular phenomena have ends unknown to us, which even the anomalies may be very fit to compass.”
- 38.
Ibid.
- 39.
Voltaire (1772), 9.
- 40.
- 41.
Bacon (1670), Preface (page number not listed).
- 42.
On Bacon’s understanding of natural history, see Anstey (2012): 11–31.
- 43.
See Garau, Chap. 10.
- 44.
See Kekedi, Chap. 12.
- 45.
See Tho, Chap. 14.
- 46.
See Sacco, Chap. 11.
- 47.
See Pasini, Chap. 15.
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Garau, R., Omodeo, P.D. (2019). Introduction. In: Omodeo, P.D., Garau, R. (eds) Contingency and Natural Order in Early Modern Science. Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, vol 332. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67378-3_2
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