Bacon and the Virtuosi: Experimental Contingency and Mechanical Laws in the Early Royal Society

Abstract

This paper examines the role of matter in the explanation of natural phenomena in Cartesian natural philosophy, as well as the extent to which Descartes conceived these phenomena to be necessary or contingent. While it recognizes that Cartesian natural philosophy has strong necessitarian implications, it challenges this idea in relation to the behavior of the most complex entities of the physical universe: God’s organic machines. The argument is not that observed animal behavior is incompatible with a strictly deterministic view of physical processes in the universe, rather it is that Descartes’ frequent allusions to hydraulic or clockwork-type devices presented his readers with models that made it difficult to imagine how animals could react meaningfully to the contingencies – that is to say: to previously unrehearsed situations – in their environment, and that therefore we have to be cautious when interpreting Descartes’ usage of those metaphors. I will argue that the key concept to which Descartes’ readers should pay attention when thinking about these matters is “spontaneity,” and that a careful analysis of the term in Descartes’ writings reveals that there is a sense in which Cartesian natural automata may give meaningful and spontaneous responses to external and internal stimuli. Spontaneity in the Cartesian world, as I will show, is a novel way of thinking about the workings of auto-generating and self-sustaining material systems that have to operate within ever-changing sets of mechanical constraints. The conclusion is that life phenomena – including such high-order functions as perceptual cognition – may be reduced to utterly “blind” mechanisms more successfully within the framework proposed by Cartesians, than it is generally recognized.