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Common Good Oriented Banks

  • Christian Felber
Chapter

Abstract

This chapter is concerned with the function of commercial banks in a common good oriented economy. First, the emergence of profit-oriented banks and banks which are too big to fail is criticized, together with the fact that there is no international supervisory authority. Second, the ideal bank that is a common good oriented bank is described: It fulfills the “conservative” core tasks of a bank such as savings and loans, it does not distribute profits to owners, it applies a common good risk assessment to all loan requests, and it withdraws from the system of interest. Banks that shift to common good orientation could enjoy more preferential legal treatment than profit-oriented banks which could be handed over to the free market thereby losing these benefits. Finally, a solution to excessive private financial fortune is proposed: Money that is not used in the real economy could remain in electronic bank deposits. Capital income could melt down to zero, being replaced by different types of benefits that are in line with the economy’s goal.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • Christian Felber
    • 1
  1. 1.Economics and BusinessVienna UniversityViennaAustria

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