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Dehumanization of Warfare pp 55–73Cite as

Dehumanization: The Ethical Perspective

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Abstract

To structure the debate on the ethical admissibility of “dehumanization” of warfare, e.g. by using drones, the distinction between evaluation rules and imputation rules seems to be helpful. Evaluation rules give information as to whether a certain behavior is obligatory, forbidden or permitted. From these rules, the rules that give information as to whether or not a person can actually be held responsible for a certain behavior must be distinguished; for this requires imputation. And without imputation of a behavior as an act (or omission) of a certain person, it is not even reasonable to apply the evaluation rules to this behavior. For it is by applying the imputation rules that the subject is determined to which the evaluation rules can then refer to. This also means that there are two categorically different avenues to shed light onto “dehumanized” behavior in war: It is possible that there are evaluation rules that forbid certain “dehumanized” behavior as a matter of principle; and it is possible that there are imputation rules, the violation of which could lead to persons successfully but unjustifiedly evading their own responsibility. The first avenue will be—after some introductory remarks in sections “Two Meanings of ‘Dehumanization’” to “The Distinction Between Evaluation Rules and Imputation Rules”—examined below in sections “Ban on Usage of Certain Weapons and Weapon-Systems” to “Drones and ‘Stealth’”, while the second is then investigated in sections “The Distinction Between Combatants and Civilians” and “Problems of Imputation”.

Jan C. Joerden holds the Chair of Criminal Law, especially International Criminal Law and Comparative Criminal Law, Legal Philosophy, European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), Germany. For the translation of this paper I have to thank my assistant Dr. Johannes Bochmann, Frankfurt (Oder)/Berlin.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For the legal and ethical problems with using drones cf. especially Frau (2014a).

  2. 2.

    For details of the technical realization cf. Mahn-Gauseweg (2014).

  3. 3.

    Cf. e. g. Leveringhaus and Giacca (2014), 22 et seq.; Borrmann (2014), 172 et seq.

  4. 4.

    Cf. Banaszewska (2014).

  5. 5.

    Cf. Hruschka (1987, 1991); Joerden (2015).

  6. 6.

    These chapters contain some revised parts of Joerden (2014).

  7. 7.

    This refers to the so-called ius in bello, cf. The Hague Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 1907, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948, the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court of 1998, to name just the most important attempts to limit waging war. These rules are supplemented by further Conventions to prepare or update these rules, as well as by Customary International Law, cf. in greater detail, Werle and Jeßberger (2014) marginal nos. 151 et seq., 1030 et seq.

  8. 8.

    In contrast, a spanning ban on nuclear weapons cannot be found either in International Treaty Law or in Customary International Law; for more details cf. Werle and Jeßberger (2014), marginal no. 1400.

  9. 9.

    More information on this e. g. in Leveringhaus and Giacca (2014).

  10. 10.

    It will most likely always remain a pacifistic ideal to ban all weapons suitable for warfare and lethal to humans in order to thus make wars impossible. It is another matter, however, whether this goal should be maintained at least as a moral imperative, with the consequence, inter alia, that waging war, provided that innocent civilians are affected—which is generally unavoidable, can be possibly excused but by no means be justified morally.

  11. 11.

    6th preliminary article towards perpetual peace, Kant (1795).

  12. 12.

    Ibid.

  13. 13.

    Ibid.

  14. 14.

    Ibid.

  15. 15.

    Ibid.

  16. 16.

    Ibid.

  17. 17.

    Ibid.

  18. 18.

    The Latin term “perfidus” can mean, among others, “faithless”, “dishonest”, or “treacherous”.

  19. 19.

    Cf. sec. 11 para. 1 no. 7 German Code on International Criminal Law (Völkerstrafgesetzbuch - dVStGB).

  20. 20.

    Cf. sec. 12 para. 1 no. 1 dVStGB.

  21. 21.

    “Breach of capitulation” arguably includes both cases in which someone takes action against a person who has already capitulated (sec. 8 para. 1 no. 1 in conjunction with para. 6 no. 3 dVStGB), as well as cases in which someone only feigns his capitulation in order to be able to attack the other party more effectively.

  22. 22.

    Kant (1797).

  23. 23.

    Kant (1795), Appendix II.

  24. 24.

    Ibid.

  25. 25.

    Cf. in greater detail Joerden (2011) with further references.

  26. 26.

    Cf. the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, cf. also sec. 7 para. 1 no. 5 dVStGB. – To what extent it could be permissive, exceptionally, to use torture in peace times to save human lives is highly controversial, at least in Germany; cf. the references on this debate, e.g. by Lackner and Kühl (2014), § 32 marginal no. 17a, and in more detail with further references Joerden (2005).

  27. 27.

    Nonetheless, some prohibitions directed at these means can be found in the German Code of International Criminal Law (dVStGB); cf., e.g. sec. 11 para. 1 no. 7 dVStGB on the “assassin”, sec. 12 para 1 nos. 1 and 2 on the “poisoner”, sec. 8 para 1 no. 1 in conjunction with para. 6 no. 3 dVStGB on “breach of capitulation”, sec. 8 para. 3 no. 4 dVStGB on “incitement to treason”. This, however, shall not imply that there is complete congruence between the respective “vile practices” [“hellish arts”] Kant names on the one hand and the actions covered by the quoted provisions of the dVStGB on the other hand.

  28. 28.

    One might ask whether the regulations of the Rome Statute or the mostly corresponding German Code of International Criminal Law (dVStGB) are better suited to guide such a distinction. However, these rules approach the problems rather casuistically and thus hardly contain general criteria for the distinction at hand here. Rather, particularly the rules in the dVStGB for their part, are based on the distinction between intentional homicide (sec. 212 dStGB) and murder (sec. 211 dStGB), including the rule on genocide [literally “peoples' murder” in German] in sec. 220a dStGB that was abolished at the same time the dVStGB was implemented.

  29. 29.

    It is perfectly clear that the wordings of secs. 211, 212 dStGB refer to peace times and rather have the single perpetrator in mind. Anyway, this article is not so much concerned with criminal proceedings against an offender, but rather with the underlying ethical differentiation between “simple killings” and “particularly damnable killings”, i.e. murder. – One also might ask whether the problematic wording of sec. 211 dStGB, of all things, can be helpful for the differentiation discussed here. For firstly, it is common knowledge that the legislative history of sec. 211 dStGB is very problematic because this regulation was implemented in 1935 (cf., e.g. Wolf [1996]) and signalized a departure from Criminal Law that focused on the offense (“Tatstrafrecht”) and an orientation towards the idea of Criminal Law being focused on the offender (“Täterstrafrecht”). Additionally, the borderline between murder and intentional homicide by law is indeed debated; cf. in recent times on respective reform efforts Kubik and Zimmermann (2013) with further references. Even given this critique of secs. 211 and 212 dStGB and their systematic relation to each other, it still seems that the current wording of sec. 211 dStGB includes many (whether all, I will leave unanswered at this point) forms of action that would be characterized as particularly damnable in the context of war, too; cf. hereinafter.

  30. 30.

    As far as there is no ius ad bellum, at least according to more recent perceptions on non-justifiable war of aggression, waging war that is not defensive is a violation of (Public International) Law, in fact even if this war complies with the rules of ius in bello.

  31. 31.

    A pacifist, on the other hand, would be able to hold the view that the killing of an enemy can never be justified, but rather excused, at most.

  32. 32.

    Whereat the killing of civilians is excluded here; and even combatants may only be killed if they have not surrendered etc.

  33. 33.

    This is not meant to imply a thesis that there are no other acts besides those (indirectly) included in sec. 211 dStGB which should be banned or are already prohibited by the Rome Statute, other rules of International Law or the dVStGB. It rather seems to be that at least those kinds of killing covered by sec. 211 dStGB are particularly damnable and thus cannot be justified in war, too.

  34. 34.

    Cf. Löffelmann (2013), p. 500; Eser and Sternberg-Lieben (2014) § 211 marginal no. 41.

  35. 35.

    The term “demanded” (“geboten”) derives from the wording of sec. 32 dStGB and makes clear, according to the prevailing opinion, that so-called social-ethical limitations of the right to self-defense must be considered, e.g. in cases of provocation of self-defense, flagrant disproportionality between the attacked interest and the attackers interest that is affected by the defense, and in cases of self-defense against persons belonging to certain groups (in particular not criminally responsible persons).

  36. 36.

    The question whether the BGH (Bundesgerichtshof – Federal Court of Justice) would actually draw this consequence in every relevant case shall remain unanswered at this point.

  37. 37.

    1st and 3rd group of murder criteria in sec. 211 para. 2 dStGB: pleasure, sexual gratification, greed, otherwise base motives, intent to facilitate or cover up another offense.

  38. 38.

    2nd group of murder criteria: stealth, cruelty, committal by means that pose a danger to the public.

  39. 39.

    Cf. in greater detail in Joerden (2014).

  40. 40.

    This is a condition that judicature establishes; the probably prevailing opinion in legal scholarship differs and requires a particularly damnable breach of trust by the offender in addition.

  41. 41.

    Cf. Lackner and Kühl (2014), § 211 marginal no. 6.

  42. 42.

    The attacker’s artlessness and defenselessness will also no longer exist regarding (possible) reactions of a third party acting to defend the attacked person [Notwehrhelfer; note that self-defense in German Criminal Law includes the defense of others], so that the third party, too, does not commit a murder by stealth which is justified as an act of self-defense but merely a justified intentional homicide. For whosoever attacks another person is no longer artless not only regarding this person’s possible defense but also regarding possible defensive acts by any third party, exactly because he knows that he is acting illegally and thus must and will always take into account possible counter-reactions by persons that want to defend the attacked person or the legal order.

  43. 43.

    Even in cases that appear somewhat constructed, in which B, who only pretends to be sleeping, seems to be asleep and is attacked by A, one can hardly say that A is artless and defenseless, if the seemingly sleeping B “awakens” and stabs the attacker to death.

  44. 44.

    According to the probably prevailing scholarly opinion the house tyrant took his “artlessness” into his sleep; cf. on the killing of sleeping persons as murder by stealth, e.g. Lackner and Kühl (2014), § 211 marginal no. 7 with further references, including judicature.

  45. 45.

    Of course, there is legitimate subject for debate as to whether this is in fact a case of a murder by stealth. If, in accordance with the probably prevailing scholarly opinion, a “particularly damnable breach of trust” is seen as an additional requirement of “stealth”, this may well not be the case.

  46. 46.

    A justification under the (general) rules on a defensive state of emergency (analogous application of sec. 228 dBGB) will also mostly fail due to the criterion of “necessity” to ward off the danger, because the rule “Justice does not have to yield to injustice” [Recht braucht dem Unrecht nicht zu weichen; cf. the castle doctrine in US law, according to which there is no duty to retreat] does not apply in the context of a defensive state of emergency. – Apart from that, only a ground of excuse could come into question, cf. the references on the respective debate, given, e.g. by Lackner and Kühl (2014), § 34 marginal no. 9.

  47. 47.

    Indirectly, this finds expression when soldiers who are blamed that all soldiers are murderers defend themselves against this allegation, particularly because they do not intend to fulfill murder criteria and would also deny that every killing in war also constitutes murder.

  48. 48.

    Cf. sec. 12 dVStGB.

  49. 49.

    Apart from this, the aspect of endangering third parties, e.g. by splinter bombs etc. is regularly added.

  50. 50.

    As a side-note it may be of interest that secs. 6 (genocide) and 7 (crimes against humanity) dVStGB can also apply outside of acts of war.

  51. 51.

    Cf. in greater detail Merkel (2012).

  52. 52.

    Dissenting, Merkel (2012), who considers an “impure” justification in the “normatively impure sphere of war” (p. 1137) referring to the concept of a “nonideal theory” debated by John Rawls.

  53. 53.

    At least, the solution via the so-called duplex-effectus-doctrine, according to which collateral damages are seen as a quasi non-intended byproduct of the killing of combattants and are thus acceptable, that is often suggested is not convincing. In greater detail on possible conditions of applying the duplex-effectus-doctrine, particularly in Criminal Law, cf. Joerden (2007), p. 242 et seq.

  54. 54.

    Cf. the references to Case Law, e.g., those given in Lackner and Kühl (2014), § 211 marginal no. 5a.

  55. 55.

    Apart from the means of espionage, this valuation Kant gives should still receive wide acceptance even today.

  56. 56.

    This might be seen differently if one follows Kant’s opinion that the mere act of espionage must be prohibited in itself (regardless of acts of killing that may be connected); cf. Chapter “Kant’s Suggestion” above.

  57. 57.

    Apart from espionage, regarding which a ban by International Law is not even being discussed at all, the “vile practices” Kant has named are mostly prohibited (e.g. by the dVStGB); cf. once again the references given in fn. 27.

  58. 58.

    Cf. e. g. Arendt (2014), pp. 27–30.

  59. 59.

    Cf. Banaszewska (2014), Leveringhaus and Giacca (2014).

  60. 60.

    Cf. Leveringhaus and Giacca (2014), p. 15.

  61. 61.

    In more detail Joerden (2015) with further references.

  62. 62.

    For additional questions of imputation in the context of the use of drones cf. Frau (2014b), pp. 238–243.

  63. 63.

    In the end, this is also the reason why judges can principally not be replaced by computers.

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  1. Lehrstuhl für Strafrecht und Rechtsphilosophie, Europa-Universität Viadrina, Große Scharrnstraße 59, 15230, Frankfurt (Oder), Germany

    Jan C. Joerden

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  1. Faculty of Law, European University Viadrina, Frankfurt (Oder), Germany

    Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg

  2. Faculty of Law, European University Viadrina, Frankfurt (Oder), Germany

    Robert Frau

  3. University of Passau , Passau, Germany

    Tassilo Singer

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Joerden, J.C. (2018). Dehumanization: The Ethical Perspective. In: Heintschel von Heinegg, W., Frau, R., Singer, T. (eds) Dehumanization of Warfare. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67266-3_4

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