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Shapley Value in a Priori Measuring of Intellectual Capital Flows

  • Jacek Mercik
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10449)

Abstract

Analysis of transmission of intellectual capital as a specific types of information requires consequently different models. The graph presentation maybe in use but it needs more complicated structure including logical conditions and multi connections between the same nodes. In the process of evaluation of the role of each nodes of such graph the concepts of Shapley value and taxonomy dendrite were used. The obtained results let to evaluate the role of nodes not only as a separate element containing the intellectual capital but also as an element of much bigger structure.

Keywords

Group decisions Shapley value Taxonomy dendrite Intellectual capital 

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.WSB University in WroclawWrocławPoland

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