Abstract
In the third and final part of his A Theory of Determinism, Ted Honderich addresses the fundamental question concerning “the consequences of determinism.” That is, what follows if determinism is true? This question is, of course, intimately bound up with the problem of free will and, in particular, with the question of whether or not the truth of determinism is compatible or incompatible with the sort of freedom that is supposed to be required for moral responsibility. It is Honderich’s aim to provide a solution to “the problem of the consequences of determinism” and a key element of this is his attempt to collapse the familiar compatibilist/incompatibilist dichotomy. More specifically, Honderich offers us a third way—the response of “Affirmation.” Although his account of Affirmation has application and relevance to issues and features beyond freedom and responsibility, my primary concern in this chapter will be to examine Honderich’s theory of “Affirmation” as it concerns the free will problem as it is generally understood.
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Notes
- 1.
My discussion in this chapter focuses largely on Honderich (2002), which, although it “follows the same path” as the earlier work, is intended to be more than a mere précis of it. As Honderich points out, How Free Are You? is not only shorter and more recent, it advances some new lines of argument and interest (2002, 6–7). For all these reasons, it seems the best work to focus my attention on for the purpose of this chapter—but readers should also consult Honderich’s first and larger work for more detailed arguments and discussions relating to his views.
- 2.
There are several overlapping features of Honderich’s approach here that run parallel to P.F. Strawson’s famous contribution in “Freedom and Resentment” (1962). This includes the importance of not “over-intellectualizing” this issue and, related to this, an understanding of this debate in terms of broadly optimistic and pessimistic metaphysical attitudes.
- 3.
Whether we attach the label “fate ” to this concern is merely a verbal matter—the substantial concern or issue remains with us.
- 4.
It may be argued that Honderich’s commitment to a dualist picture of our conceptual commitment and metaphysical attitudes requires a richer genealogical approach—one that is more sensitive to how we (modern, Westerners) have acquired the aims and assumptions of “the morality system” and its specific views about moral freedom and ethical life. This is certainly one feature that divides Honderich’s (ahistorical) approach from William’s more self-conscious genealogical account. See, in particular , Williams (1993).
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Russell, P. (2018). Free Will and Affirmation: Assessing Honderich’s Third Way. In: Caruso, G. (eds) Ted Honderich on Consciousness, Determinism, and Humanity. Philosophers in Depth. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66754-6_9
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