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Logoi enuloi. Aristotle’s Contribution to the Contemporary Debate on Emotions and Decision-Making

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Aristotle on Emotions in Law and Politics

Part of the book series: Law and Philosophy Library ((LAPS,volume 121))

Abstract

It seems natural to refer to Aristotle when reflecting on the role of emotion in decision-making in the legal field. Yet today study of the relationship between emotion and decision-making is carried out not only from a psychological, sociological, or rhetorical-argumentative perspective, but also via research on neural processes. Cognitive neuroscience has shown that emotions are components of the neural processes that underlie cognition and decision-making. This paper is an analysis of whether it is possible to trace a relationship between this new approach and Aristotle’s approach to the emotions. In this perspective Damasio’s theses are of main interest. By moving from Damasio’s antidualistic programme to Aristotle’s De anima—the work which lies closest to the domain of contemporary neuroscience—the paper also aims to show whether the latter can still provide useful tools for dealing with issues arising from the neuroscientific approach.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Lerner et al. (2015).

  2. 2.

    See e.g. Nussbaum (2001), Haidt (2001), Prinz (2006), and Hauser (2006).

  3. 3.

    See e.g. Bornstein and Wiener (2006). Therefore, it is not surprising that in the past decade “law and emotion” has been an “emerging field”—Maroney (2006)—and nowadays it has become the theme of an international congress of philosophy of law. For further details on law and emotions scholarship see in this volume Maroney (2018).

  4. 4.

    Rhetoric, edition used: The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, edited by Jonathan Barnes.

    I agree with the grounding idea of the approach to emotions in Aristotle’s Rhetoric provided in this volume by Cohen de Lara (2018).

  5. 5.

    Critical to this approach, Bennett and Hacker (2003), pp. 199–223.

  6. 6.

    See Greene’s classical discussion (Greene et al. 2001). For a critical evaluation of Greene’s approach see e.g. Berker (2009) and Pardo and Patterson (2013).

  7. 7.

    Salerno and Bottoms (2009).

  8. 8.

    LeDoux (1996), Panksepp (1998), Freeman (2000), and Gazzaniga (2005).

  9. 9.

    For a criticism of the neuroscientific approach to mind-body problem see Bennett and Hacker (2003).

  10. 10.

    Damasio (2010), p. 292. For possible outcomes of Damasio’s theory for decision-making in the legal field see f.i. Bennett and Broe (2007); Pettys (2007); Di Giovine (2009), pp. 130–138; Fuselli (2014), pp. 81–126.

  11. 11.

    For an overview of the criticism of Damasio’s theory, see Mezzalira (2011).

  12. 12.

    For possible relationships between Aristotle and other neuroscientists, see in this volume Bombelli (2018), sec. 5. However, in my opinion the notion of autopoiesis used by some modern (neuro)biologists lacks the specific trait of the Aristotelian idea of the living being, that is the notion of soul as its actuality (entelecheia).

  13. 13.

    As it has been pointed out, in the Corpus Aristotelicum there is no independent tractation of emotions, Rapp (2002), p. 545.

  14. 14.

    English translations of “logoi” in this context are not uniform; e.g., Barnes: “enmattered accounts” (Aristotle 1984); Lawson-Tancred: “formulae in matter” (Aristotle 1986); Smith: “enmattered formulable essence” (Aristotle 1931). For translations in other languages, see, e.g. Jannone-Barbotin: “des formes engagées dans la matière” (Aristote 1966); Theiler: “materiegebundene Begriffe” (Aristoteles 1994); Movia: “forme contenute nella materia” (Aristotele 2001); Rapp: “in der Materie befindliche Begriffe” (2002, p. 551). By using “forms”, I follow the French translation provided by Jannone-Barbotin and the Italian by Movia.

  15. 15.

    Damasio (1999), p. 30. On the relationship between our use of “mind” and Aristotle’s use of “soul” see Caston (2006), p. 317.

  16. 16.

    Damasio (2005), p. xx.

  17. 17.

    “(…) the mind exists in and for an integrated organism”, Ibid. On this topic see Johnson (2006).

  18. 18.

    Damasio (2003), p. 205.

  19. 19.

    Damasio (2005), p. 226.

  20. 20.

    Damasio (2003), p. 192.

  21. 21.

    Ibid., pp. 207–208.

  22. 22.

    “The mind had to be first about the body, or it could not have been”, Damasio (2005), p. xx.

  23. 23.

    Ibid., p. 118.

  24. 24.

    Damasio (1999), p. 24.

  25. 25.

    For a discussion see Panksepp (2003). For an overview of Damasio’s classifications see Barile (2013).

  26. 26.

    Damasio (2010), p. 109.

  27. 27.

    Damasio (1999), p. 37.

  28. 28.

    Damasio (2005), pp. 114–118.

  29. 29.

    Damasio (1999), pp. 53–54.

  30. 30.

    Damasio (2005), p. 139.

  31. 31.

    Damasio (1999), p. 55, Table 2.1. For a critical discussion see Lenzen (2004).

  32. 32.

    They are “happiness, sadness, fear, anger, surprise, or disgust”, Damasio (1999), p. 50.

  33. 33.

    Damasio (2005), p. 133.

  34. 34.

    Damasio (1999), p. 42.

  35. 35.

    Ibid., p. 52.

  36. 36.

    Damasio (2005), p. 134.

  37. 37.

    Damasio (1999), p. 55.

  38. 38.

    Ibid., p. 54.

  39. 39.

    Ibid., p. 282.

  40. 40.

    Ibid., p. 42.

  41. 41.

    Ibid., p. 286.

  42. 42.

    Damasio (2005), p. 151.

  43. 43.

    Damasio (2010), p. 185.

  44. 44.

    Damasio (2005), p. 159.

  45. 45.

    Damasio (1999), p. 284.

  46. 46.

    Damasio (2005), p. 159.

  47. 47.

    Ibid., p. 196.

  48. 48.

    Ibid., p. 197.

  49. 49.

    Ibid., p. 174. For an overview of the reactions to this hypothesis, see Dunn et al. (2006). For a more detailed discussion, see also Colombetti (2008).

  50. 50.

    Damasio (1999), p. 280.

  51. 51.

    Damasio (2003), p. 177.

  52. 52.

    Ibid., p. 178.

  53. 53.

    Damasio (2005), p. xi.

  54. 54.

    Ibid., p. xvii.

  55. 55.

    Ibid., p. 10.

  56. 56.

    Damasio (2010), p. 287.

  57. 57.

    Damasio (1999), p. 37.

  58. 58.

    Ibid.

  59. 59.

    Damasio (2010), p. 109.

  60. 60.

    Damasio (2003), p. 52.

  61. 61.

    Damasio (1999), p. 342.

  62. 62.

    Ibid., p. 57.

  63. 63.

    Damasio (2003), p. 146.

  64. 64.

    Damasio (1999), p. 56. My emphasis.

  65. 65.

    Ibid., p. 69.

  66. 66.

    Ibid., p. 143.

  67. 67.

    Damasio (2003), p. 147.

  68. 68.

    The term used is “pervasiveness”, Damasio (1999), p. 58.

  69. 69.

    Ibid., p. 67.

  70. 70.

    Ibid., p. 288.

  71. 71.

    Damasio (2005), p. 71.

  72. 72.

    Ibid., p. 128.

  73. 73.

    Damasio (2003), p. 54.

  74. 74.

    Ibid., p. 34.

  75. 75.

    Damasio (2010), p. 109.

  76. 76.

    Ibid., p. 110.

  77. 77.

    Damasio (1999), p. 58.

  78. 78.

    Damasio (2005), p. 139.

  79. 79.

    Ibid., p. 145. My emphasis.

  80. 80.

    Damasio (1999), p. 56.

  81. 81.

    Damasio (2005), p. 248.

  82. 82.

    Ibid.

  83. 83.

    Damasio (2010), p. 16.

  84. 84.

    On this topic, see Chiereghin (2004), pp. 189–196. For different critical perspectives about Damasio’s Cartesianism see, f.i., Kirkebøen (2001) and Teixeira (2002).

  85. 85.

    De Anima (On the soul), edition used: The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, edited by Jonathan Barnes.

  86. 86.

    I am following here the Italian translation provided by Movia: “la forma e l’essenza”, Aristotele (2001), p. 61.

  87. 87.

    As it is well known, the word pathe is not specific for emotions only, but it can be used for all that can happen to a subject, all that someone can be affected by, Rapp (2008), p. 48. On the meaning of pathe in De Anima, see Oksenberg Rorty (1992), Leighton (1996), and Polansky (2007).

  88. 88.

    See above note 14. For a different reading, see Barnes (1979), p. 36. In this volume see also Brito (2018). The fact that the expression logoi enuloi is not used elsewhere by Aristotle seems to me to highlight the peculiarity of the pathe and the way they are a unity of form and matter. This is the reason why I do not agree on this point with de Sousa e Brito.

  89. 89.

    On this kind of relationship see Aubenque (1957).

  90. 90.

    According to Nussbaum and Putnam (1992), p. 44, in those passages (DA 403a5–19), “Aristotle is actually treating emotion as a type of perception, a selective cognitive awareness of an object or objects in the world”.

  91. 91.

    Oksenberg Rorty (1992), p. 8. About the reasons why that twofold character of emotions cannot be understood as the product or result of two different components, see Rapp (2008), p. 52.

  92. 92.

    Nicomachean Ethics, edition used: The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, edited by Jonathan Barnes.

  93. 93.

    With the well known exception of hate (Rhet., 1382a13). This could be seen as a clue that the field of emotion is wider than the field of the (bodily) pain-pleasure. On the different possibilities to understand the relationship between emotion and pleasure or pain sensation, see Rapp (2008), p. 49.

  94. 94.

    Movement of Animals, edition used: The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, edited by Jonathan Barnes.

  95. 95.

    Frede (1992), p. 282. The reason for it could perhaps be that imagination (phantasia) itself “is presentational or representational rather than discriminating or evaluative”, Polansky (2007), p. 433. Something like that could also be seen as the reason why humans can act according to imagination (phantasia) when their mind is eclipsed by passions. On the other hand, imagination (phantasia) is said to have a central role in the movement of animals (MA 700b17–18), inasmuch it can arouse the appetite (orexis) (MA 701a4–6). In discussing the issue, Nussbaum (1978), p. 261, suggests that imagination “is the animal’s awareness of some object or state of affairs, which may well prove to be an object of desire”. We can perhaps comprehensively say, that images move, insofar they are emotionally qualified or acting (see MA 701b16–702a5). As Schofield (2011), p. 131, points out “the psychological aspect of the psychophysical reaction prompted by phantasia and thinking – representing ‘the pleasant or fearful’ as they do in the cases Aristotle imagines – is emotion, something notable by its absence in the discussion so far, and particularly in the practical syllogism passage.”

  96. 96.

    Adamos (2001), p. 228, argues that emotions cannot be only mind states because they always imply a physiological state change.

  97. 97.

    The structure of this preparing itself for seems to be similar to that of the instantaneous present (nun) which is “an extremity of the past (no part of the future being on this side of it) and again of the future (no part of the past being on that side of it): it is, as we maintain, a limit of both.” (Phys. 233b35–234a3, trans. R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye) Edition of Physics used is The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, edited by Jonathan Barnes.

  98. 98.

    According to Fortenbaugh Rhetoric makes clear the relationship of emotion to reasoned argumentation (Fortenbaugh 1975, p. 17). On the cognitive structure and function of emotion in Rhetoric, see also Cooper (1996), Frede (1996), Nussbaum (1996), and Striker (1996). For an overview and a discussion of this topic, see Rapp (2002).

  99. 99.

    About the reasons why emotion is not like a judgement, see Rapp (2008), pp. 56–57.

  100. 100.

    Of course, the adjective ‘practical’ is not used here with the Aristotelian technical meaning.

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    Nuno M.M.S. Coelho

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Fuselli, S. (2018). Logoi enuloi. Aristotle’s Contribution to the Contemporary Debate on Emotions and Decision-Making. In: Huppes-Cluysenaer, L., Coelho, N. (eds) Aristotle on Emotions in Law and Politics. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 121. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66703-4_5

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