Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Between Nomos and Pathos: Emotions in Aristotelian Theory of Adjudication and the Dual Process Theory

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Aristotle on Emotions in Law and Politics

Part of the book series: Law and Philosophy Library ((LAPS,volume 121))

Abstract

Emotions play an important role in the Aristotelian theory of action since emotions can trigger action, including the actions of the judge. Aristotle concentrates on training habits of action to reach a state of mind conducive to coping with passions in a virtuous way. At the same time Aristotle observes that it is important that the law should rule rather than people. This requires that the judicial process be based on rational evaluation of the merits of a given case and optimal understanding of laws. The focus of this paper is on the antinomy, which arises from this double role of decisions—the choice between action (emotion) and deliberation (practical reason). The authors first discuss the virtue-centered approach. They concentrate on potential threats to impartiality and rational justification posed by individually fair decisions in complex cases. This problem cannot be resolved and is unavoidable in a virtue-centered approach. The second point of criticism of this approach is that it pays no attention to the interaction of reason and emotion in the judicial process. The authors then proceed to give an overview of the dual process theory, which does pay attention to this interconnectedness.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Edition used: Aristotle (2000).

  2. 2.

    In this volume Bombelli (2018), pp. 41–48.

  3. 3.

    Cf. Solum (2013), pp. 12–30.

  4. 4.

    Ibid., p. 26.

  5. 5.

    Ibid., p. 26.

  6. 6.

    Kraut (2002), p. 106.

  7. 7.

    Cf. Jolls et al. (2000) and Vermeule (2006).

  8. 8.

    Kahneman (2003) and Guthrie et al. (2001).

  9. 9.

    Jolls et al. (2000).

  10. 10.

    Kahneman (2003) and Vermeule (2006, 2009).

  11. 11.

    Cf. Kahneman (2011).

  12. 12.

    Damasio (1994).

  13. 13.

    Kahneman (2003).

  14. 14.

    Sloman (2002).

  15. 15.

    Cf. Glöckner (2008) and Glöckner and Ebert (2011).

  16. 16.

    This aspect has also been stressed by A. Damasio and is rediscovered in context of Aristotelian philosophy. Cf. Fuselli in this volume (2018), pp. 8–10.

  17. 17.

    This suggestion clearly coincides with Aristotelian model of pathos as incentive for action in Nicomachean Ethics. Cf. In this volume Bombelli (2018), pp. 57–58.

  18. 18.

    Jolls et al. (2000).

  19. 19.

    Kahneman (2003).

  20. 20.

    Allen and Brooks (1991).

  21. 21.

    Sunstein (2005).

  22. 22.

    Guthrie et al. (2007).

  23. 23.

    Frederick (2005).

  24. 24.

    Bennett and Broe (2010), p. 16.

  25. 25.

    Guthrie et al. (2007), pp. 7–8.

  26. 26.

    For a strong argument in favor of indispensable character of emotions cf. Damasio (1994).

  27. 27.

    Guthrie et al. (2015).

  28. 28.

    The concept of affect heuristic has been introduced in Slovic (2002), p. 397.

  29. 29.

    Kahneman (2011), p. 139.

  30. 30.

    Kunda (1990), pp. 493–494.

  31. 31.

    Guthrie et al. (2015), p. 869.

  32. 32.

    Maroney (2018), p. 206.

  33. 33.

    Cf. Ibid., pp. 212–213.

References

  • Allen, Scott W., and Lee R. Brooks. 1991. Specializing the Operation of an Explicit Rule. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 120 (1): 3–19.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Aristotle. 2000. In Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics, ed. Roger Crisp. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Bennett, Hayley, and G.A. Broe. 2010. Judicial Decision-Making and Neurobiology: The Role of Emotion and the Ventromedial Cortex in Deliberation and Reasoning. Australian Journal of Forensic Sciences 42 (1): 11–18.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bombelli, Giovanni. 2018. Emotion and Rationality in Aristotle’s Model: From Anthropology to Politics. In Aristotle on Emotions in Law and Politics, ed. Liesbeth Huppes-Cluysenaer and Nuno M.M.S. Coelho. Dordrecht: Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Damasio, Antonio R. 1994. Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain. New York: Putnam.

    Google Scholar 

  • Frederick, Shane. 2005. Cognitive Reflection and Decision-Making. Journal of Economic Perspectives 19 (4): 25–42. https://doi.org/10.1257/089533005775196732.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fuselli, Stefano. 2018. Logoi Enuloi. Aristotle’s Contribution to the Contemporary Debate on Emotions and Decision-Making. In Aristotle on Emotions in Law and Politics, ed. Liesbeth Huppes-Cluysenaer and Nuno M.M.S. Coelho. Dordrecht: Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Glöckner, Andreas. 2008. How Evolution Outwits Bounded Rationality: The Efficient Interaction of Automatic and Deliberate Processes in Decision-Making and Implications for Institutions. In Better than Conscious? Decision-Making, the Human Mind, and Implications for Institutions, ed. Christoph Engel and Wolf Singer. Cambridge: MIT Press. http://public.eblib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=3338898.

    Google Scholar 

  • Glöckner, Andreas, and Irena D. Ebert. 2011. Legal Intuition and Expertise. In Handbook of Intuition Research, ed. Marta Sinclair. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.

    Google Scholar 

  • Guthrie, C., J.J. Rachlinski, and A.J. Wistrich. 2001. Inside the Judicial Mind. Cornell Law Review 86: 777–830.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2007. Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases. Cornell Law Review 93 (1): 1–44.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2015. Heart Versus Head: Do Judges Follow the Law or Follow Their Feelings? Texas Law Review 93 (4): 855–923.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jolls, Christine, Cass R. Sunstein, and Richard Thaler. 2000. A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics. In Behavioral Law and Economics. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kahneman, Daniel. 2003. A Perspective on Judgment and Choice: Mapping Bounded Rationality. American Psychologist 58 (9): 697–720.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2011. Thinking, Fast and Slow. London: Penguin Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kraut, Richard. 2002. Aristotle: Political Philosophy. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kunda, Ziva. 1990. The Case for Motivated Reasoning. Psychological Bulletin Psychological Bulletin 108 (3): 480–498.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Maroney, Terry A. 2018. Judicial Emotion as Vice or Virtue: Perspectives Both Ancient and New. In Aristotle on Emotions in Law and Politics, ed. Liesbeth Huppes-Cluysenaer and Nuno M.M.S. Coelho. Dordrecht: Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sloman, Steven. 2002. Two Systems of Reasoning. In Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgement, ed. Thomas Gilovich, Dale W. Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Slovic, Paul. 2002. Affect Heuristic. In Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgement, ed. Thomas Gilovich, Dale W. Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Solum, Lawrence. 2013. Virtue Jurisprudence: Towards an Aretaic Theory of Law. In Aristotle and the Philosophy of Law Theory, Practice and Justice, ed. Liesbeth Huppes-Cluysenaer and Nuno M.M.S. Coelho. Dordrecht: Springer. http://public.eblib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=1083709.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sunstein, C.R. 2005. Moral Heuristics. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (4): 531–542.

    Google Scholar 

  • Vermeule, Adrian. 2006. Judging Under Uncertainty: An Institutional Theory of Legal Interpretation. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2009. Law and the Limits of Reason. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Law, University of Lodz, Łódź, Poland

    Mariusz Jerzy Golecki & Mateusz Franciszek Bukaty

Authors
  1. Mariusz Jerzy Golecki
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Mateusz Franciszek Bukaty
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Mariusz Jerzy Golecki .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    Liesbeth Huppes-Cluysenaer

  2. Faculdade de Direito de Ribeirão Preto, University of São Paulo, Ribeirão Preto, São Paulo, Brazil

    Nuno M.M.S. Coelho

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2018 Springer International Publishing AG

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Golecki, M.J., Bukaty, M.F. (2018). Between Nomos and Pathos: Emotions in Aristotelian Theory of Adjudication and the Dual Process Theory. In: Huppes-Cluysenaer, L., Coelho, N. (eds) Aristotle on Emotions in Law and Politics. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 121. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66703-4_21

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66703-4_21

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-66702-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-66703-4

  • eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation