Abstract
This article argues that two of the three types of rhetorical speech conceived by Aristotle, namely, judicial speech and rhetorical speech, could be used by those wishing to assure that a well-ordered political community of a kind envisaged by Aristotle, was actually governed in accordance with what Aristotle took to be good governance, i.e. “the rule of law”. In judicial settings, rhetorical speech can arouse emotions about the rule of law that may lead citizens to refrain from disrespecting it. In deliberative settings, it can create a kind of emotional involvement with our fellow citizen that seems to be required in order for a deliberative assembly to function well. If what is said here is correct, rhetoric as conceived by Aristotle would be a powerful tool in both the hands of the unjust and the just.
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Notes
- 1.
Edition used: Aristotle (1977).
- 2.
Bates (2013), p. 59.
- 3.
- 4.
Although the conjunction of these two passages suggests a correspondence between epideictic speeches and the magistracies, I shall also refrain from commenting on this possible analogy since constraints of space make it impossible for me to treat epideictic speeches in this article.
- 5.
Engberg-Pedersen (1996), p. 122.
- 6.
Edition used: Aristotle (1997).
- 7.
Engberg-Pedersen (1996), p. 124.
- 8.
Ibid., p. 133.
- 9.
Grimaldi (1972), p. 2.
- 10.
Ibid., p. 3.
- 11.
For a recent defense of the opposing view see in this volume Rapp (2018).
- 12.
On this topic, see Gagarin (1978).
- 13.
Demosthenes (1935).
- 14.
Antiphon (1954).
- 15.
Whether or not Euaeon was actually convicted because of this, of course, is an entirely different matter. Nevertheless, the fact that Demosthenes interprets the case in this way in order to support his argument shows that he believed that the judges he was addressing would recognize and accept this reading.
- 16.
Leighton (1996), p. 210.
- 17.
Nussbaum (1996), p. 309.
- 18.
Reeve (1996), p. 199.
- 19.
Engberg-Pedersen (1996), p. 122.
- 20.
Kennedy (1991), p. 18.
- 21.
Bates (2013), p. 62.
- 22.
Yack (2006), p. 422.
- 23.
Ibid.
- 24.
Ibid., p. 423.
- 25.
Ibid., p. 424.
- 26.
Cooper (1990).
- 27.
Ibid., p. 236.
- 28.
Ibid., p. 220.
- 29.
The interpretation defended here does not need to claim that any cases where this conflict presents itself is a case of what van Straalen in this volume calls ‘the dilemma of dirty hands’. In order to support such a claim, we would have to show that Aristotle thought that even the best way out of at least some episodes of this conflict would involve the commission of an act that is both right and shameful, and that would involve an independent argument against Nielsen (2007) which would take us too far from our subject. However, insofar as the interpretation proposed here shows that Aristotle not only conceived of possible cases of that dilemma that are not considered either by van Straalen or by Nielsen but also provided us with recommendations on how to act on these cases that neither author mentions, this interpretation does give us reasons to at least reassess the claim first made by Nielsen (p. 273) and reaffirmed in this volume by van Straalen, according to which Aristotle did not recognize any cases that would qualify as cases of ‘the dilemma of dirty hands’.
- 30.
As De Lara remarks in this volume, many authors seem to believe that according to Aristotle living in a polis and engaging in political participation can cause a subjective change in men that transforms individuals who are guided by self-interest into individuals who are guided by the pursuit of the common good. The interpretation offered here is in accordance with and complements the critique of this position offered by De Lara.
References
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Nascimento, D.S. (2018). Rhetoric, Emotions and the Rule of Law in Aristotle. In: Huppes-Cluysenaer, L., Coelho, N. (eds) Aristotle on Emotions in Law and Politics. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 121. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66703-4_19
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