Abstract
This chapter focuses on the emotional ground of politics in Aristotle’s thought. The passages on “war lovers” and on the difference between Greek adult males (citizens by nature) and foreigners, slaves or women demonstrate that living in a polis as an equal and free partner requires a proper emotional temper. Aristotle’s criticism of Platonic communism and of economic inequality shows that according to him emotions are necessary for stability of polis, but are also a source of instability. The way Aristotle describes the crowd as the best judge in real world situations shows how emotions help to establish and maintain the best regime. All of this helps to understand how emotions were seen as important for instituting, preserving and developing the polis—and how at the same time they could be their main obstacles.
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Notes
- 1.
In this chapter, we don’t need to differentiate passions, emotions and feelings as phenomena in the semantic horizon of pathos. From Nicomachean Ethics we learn that pathos is a very important element of psychic and ethical life: “A state of the soul is either (1) an emotion, (2) a capacity, or (3) a disposition; (…). By the emotions, I mean desire, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, friendship, hatred, longing, jealousy, pity; and generally those states of consciousness which are accompanied by pleasure or pain. The capacities are the faculties in virtue of which we can be said to be liable to the emotions, for example, capable of feeling anger or pain or pity. The dispositions are the formed states of character in virtue of which we are well or ill-disposed in respect of the emotions; for instance, we have a bad disposition in regard to anger if we are disposed to get angry too violently or not violently enough, a good disposition if we habitually feel a moderate amount of anger; and similarly in respect of the other emotions.” (EN 1105b20…).
- 2.
Editions and translations of Aristotle’s works are listed in the references at the end of this text.
- 3.
“It seems odd that, while acceptance of the role of the emotions in public and political life was once commonplace, it is only now being rediscovered after decades of neglect. The Greeks debated the role of the emotions in public rhetoric, Machiavelli analyzed the contribution of love and fear to the exercise of power, and Hume examined the contribution of the moral sentiments to human reason. But during the last century political studies mostly eschewed consideration of the emotions. It was assumed that political subjects were essentially rational actors busily maximizing their strategic interests even while sometimes constrained by their limited information-processing abilities. This strange and lopsided account of the political subject split cognition from emotion, and reason from passion. To some extent, what happened in political studies simply echoed what was going on elsewhere in the social sciences, where, throughout much of the period after the Second World War, the grip of positivism and behaviorism was powerful. Only slowly was this tide to be turned: first, through what has sometimes been referred to as the ‘discursive turn’ in the social sciences – that is, through the interest in language, meaning and discourse which gathered force in the 1980s; second, and more recently, through what is sometimes referred to as the ‘affective turn’ in the social sciences.” (Hoggett and Thompson 2012, p. 1).
- 4.
- 5.
“Man alone of the animals possesses speech” (logon de monon anthropos echei ton zoon) (Pol. 1253 a). The verb “echo” means I have, I hold, I possess. Having the logos, here, does not simply mean it is something the human being holds: it is the way he is. Logos marks and confirms him in an essential sense.
- 6.
“Therefore it is preferable for the law to rule rather than any one of the citizens.” (…) “He therefore that recommends that the law shall govern seems to recommend that God and reason alone shall govern, but he that would have man govern adds a wild animal also; for appetite is like a wild animal, and also passion warps the rule even of the best men. Therefore the law is wisdom without desire.” (Pol. 1287 a).
- 7.
“Now, previous compilers of “Arts” of Rhetoric have provided us with only a small portion of this art, for proofs are the only things in it that come within the province of art; everything else is merely an accessory. And yet they say nothing about enthymemes which are the body of proof, but chiefly devote their attention to matters outside the subject; for the arousing of prejudice, compassion, anger, and similar emotions has no connection with the matter in hand, but is directed only to the dicast. The result would be that, if all trials were now carried on as they are in some States, especially those that are well administered, there would be nothing left for the rhetorician to say.” (Rhet. 1354 a).
- 8.
“At times, some of the more rationalist currents within political studies have tacitly assumed that if discourse is to be truly reasonable it should be free of passion. Indeed, we have argued that at times accounts of political deliberation have posited an ideal of communicative rationality shorn of the emotions (…). Of course such an ideal assumes that our reasoning capacities are enhanced when freed from emotion.” (Hoggett and Thompson 2012, p. 4).
- 9.
“Aristotle’s politics may be characterized as ‘naturalistic’, in that it assigns to the concept of nature (physis) a fundamental role in the explanation and evaluation of its subject matter. Indeed, naturalism, in this sense, is a dominant theme throughout his philosophy.” (Miller 2011, p. 195). Nature (physis) has many meanings in Aristotle: ““Nature” means: (a) in one sense, the genesis of growing things (…) (b) in another, that immanent thing from which a growing thing first begins to grow. (c) The source from which the primary motion in every natural object is induced in that object as such. (d) the primary stuff, shapeless and unchangeable from its own potency, of which any natural object consists or from which it is produced (…) (e) the substance of natural objects; as in the case of those who say that “nature” is the primary composition of a thing (…)” (Met. 1014 b). Politics mobilizes the concept of nature in different meanings. It is important to keep in mind “that the primary and proper sense of “nature” is the essence of those things which contain in themselves as such a source of motion; for the matter is called “nature” because it is capable of receiving the nature, and the processes of generation and growth are called “nature” because they are motions derived from it. And nature in this sense is the source of motion in natural objects, which is somehow inherent in them, either potentially or actually.” (Met. 1015 a). This is the central idea: nature is an inner principle of change of the natural things.
- 10.
There is a clear link between (1) the method of understanding a composite thing (sunthetos) from dividing (diaireo) it into uncompounded things (asunthetos)—this means, from finding the least parts of the whole (elachista moria tou pantos)—and (2) the method of understanding how things (pragmata) develop (phuo) from an inner principle (ex arches). The passages are juxtaposed (the fact that some editors put these passages at the end and at the beginning of different paragraphs tells us little about Aristotle’s argument), and they are both identified as a method used in other fields of study (en tois allois). Their link is especially clear from the strategy Aristotle follows next: he divides polis into its parts (families; tribes; men, women and children; slaves and free males) and wonders about the inner impulses that drive them to associate with each other. From this, Aristotle explains how political association develops (phuo) from forces which lie at the least parts (asunthetos) of community—at the origin (ex arches). Notice that also in Metaphysics Aristotle juxtaposes the passages about principle, cause, indivisible things and nature.
- 11.
“It is a common property, then, of all “beginnings” to be the first thing from which something either exists or comes into being or becomes known; and some beginnings are originally inherent in things, while others are not. Hence “nature” is a beginning (…)” (Met. 1013 a 15–21). In Physics we learn: “Of things that exist, some exist by nature, some from other causes. (…) All the things [‘by nature’] mentioned present a feature in which they differ from things which are not constituted by nature. Each of them has within itself a principle of motion and of stationariness (in respect of place, or of growth and decrease, or by way of alteration). (…) they do have such an impulse, and just to that extent which seems to indicate that nature is a source or cause of being moved and of being at rest in that to which it belongs primarily, in virtue of itself and not in virtue of a concomitant attribute. (…) ‘Nature’ then is what has been stated. Things ‘have a nature’ which have a principle of this kind.” (Phys. 192 b 8–35).
- 12.
See also DA 415 a 22.
- 13.
“(…) for he that can foresee with his mind is naturally ruler and naturally master, and he that can do these things with his body is subject and naturally a slave; so that master and slave have the same interest.” (Pol. I, 1252 a).
- 14.
The methodic decomposition of polis into its simple parts (human beings) is a necessary step in the naturalistic approach Aristotle assumes in Politics. Their souls hold the principles, which drive them to associate, in order to face the needs whose satisfaction is good. Necessity and end are based on them. Polis is according to nature (kata physin) as it answers to the natural impulses present in the parts which compound it. Yack is right in denying that political naturalism is a biological kind, as many scholars defend: “For Aristotle the “impulse” to form political communities exists in human nature. It is the human being that is substance and “has a nature”; the polis exists “according to nature,” a consequence of the natural behavior of human beings.” (Yack 1993, p. 94).
- 15.
As Mary Nichols notes: “Implicit in Aristotle’s presentation of the human good is our need for others, with whom we share our deliberations, choices, and actions. When Aristotle speaks of the human good as the end of our most authoritative association, he indicates that this good comes to us through association – not in isolation from others” (Pol. 1252 a 1–7). (Nichols 1991, p. 15).
- 16.
Mary Nichols (1991, p. 17) remarks “Unlike the growth of other natural beings, however, the development of cities is not inevitable.”
- 17.
“often somebody who would be a citizen in a democracy is not a citizen under an oligarchy” (Pol. 1275 a 5).
- 18.
See Ralli's “Empathic Political Animal”, in this volume.
- 19.
“And inasmuch as it is rare for a man to be divine (…) so a bestial character is rare among human beings; it is found most frequently among barbarians, and some cases also occur as a result of disease or arrested development.” (EN, 1141 a 30–35).
- 20.
Aquinas thinks it is incapability for philia, and suggests an emotional limit to exclude them from political life: “He [Aristotle] adds to this the saying of Homer, who condemned those who were solitary out of depravity. For he says that such individuals were unsocial because they were incapable of being bound by the bond of friendship, lawless because they were incapable of being bound under the rule of law, and criminal because they were incapable of being bound under the rule of reason. And those who are such by nature, being quarrelsome, as it were, and unrestrained, are at the same time necessarily disposed to be warlike. Just so, we see that solitary wild birds are predatory.” (Aquinas 2007, p. 16). Actually, the deprivation which affects, according to Aquinas, the polemou epithumetes is not just emotional, but also ethical (as he cannot be just) and intellectual (as he cannot be bound under the rule of reason). However, for the argument we develop in this text, it is useful to note the reference Aristotle possibly makes, in this passage, to emotions (pathos) as a condition of possibility for political life.
- 21.
For the many meanings of “nature” and “necessity”, see Metaphysics V, 1014 b and 1015.
- 22.
“Nature, then, is what has been said, and anything which has a source of this sort, has a nature. Such a thing is always a reality; for it is an underlying thing, and nature is always in an underlying thing. It is in accordance with nature, and so is anything which belongs to it of itself, as moving upwards belongs to fire – for that neither is a nature nor has a nature, but is due to nature and in accordance with nature.” (Phys. 192 b 30–35) “Again, nature in the sense in which the word is used for a process proceeds towards nature. It is not like doctoring, which has as its end not the art of medicine but health. Doctoring must proceed from the art of medicine, not towards it. But the process of growth does not stand in this relation to nature: that which is growing, as such, is proceeding from something to something. What, then, is it which is growing? Not the thing it is growing out of, but the thing it is growing into.” (Phys. 193 a 10–20) “Further, it belongs to the same study to know the end or what something is for, and to know whatever is for that end. Now nature is an end and what something is for. For whenever there is a definite end to a continuous change, that last thing is also what it is for; whence the comical sally in the play ‘He has reached the end for which he was born’—for the end should not be just any last thing, but the best.” (Phys. 194 b 25–35).
- 23.
Necessity is a key concept to understand the diverse meanings of nature Aristotle employs in Politics. “Necessary (anagkaion) means: (a) That without which, as a concomitant condition, life is impossible; e.g. respiration and food are necessary for an animal, because it cannot exist without them. (b) The conditions without which good cannot be or come to be”. Family and polis are certainly necessary in this last sense. However, fire burns necessarily in the sense that “what cannot be otherwise we say is necessarily so”) (Met. 1015).
- 24.
“That is a rough enumeration of the things which are called causes. (…) The seed, the doctor, the man who has deliberated, and in general the maker, are all things from which the change or staying put has its source. And there are the things, which stand to the rest as their end and good; for what the other things are for tends to be best and their end.” (Phys. 195 a).
- 25.
It is manifest therefore that the master ought to be the cause to the slave of the virtue proper to a slave, but not as possessing that of art of mastership which teaches a slave his tasks. Hence those persons are mistaken who deprive the slave of reasoning and tell us to use command only; for admonition is more properly employed with slaves than with children.
- 26.
Aristotle looks for the definition of citizen. The search of the citizen is quite congruent to the method of analysing the polis until its most simple parts. Polis is a community of citizens. “we now declare that one who has the right to participate in deliberative or judicial office is a citizen of the state in which he has that right, and a state is a collection of such persons sufficiently numerous, speaking broadly, to secure independence of life.” (Pol. 1275 b 20) “For inasmuch as a state is a kind of partnership, and is in fact a partnership of citizens in a government.” (Pol. 1276 b) To understand polis it is necessary to understand the citizens: “But a state is a composite thing, in the same sense as any other of the things that are wholes but consist of many parts; it is therefore clear that we must first inquire into the nature of a citizen; for a state is a collection of citizens, so that we have to consider who is entitled to the name of citizen, and what the essential nature of a citizen is.” (Pol. 1275 a) The definition of human being is obviously not the same as the definition of citizen. There is a significant discussion about the criteria of citizenship in the fifth and fourth Centuries legal and political oratory. Aristotle recalls it in his dialectical effort to find the citizen by nature. Women, children, slaves are all human beings, but they fail in some aspect of reason (logos) or emotion (pathos) which is necessary to live as a citizen. The failure is explained above.
- 27.
In Nicomachean Ethics there is another important case of emotional incapacity to deliberating and acting well: “(c) that the unrestrained man does things that he knows to be evil, under the influence of passion, whereas the self-restrained man, knowing that his desires are evil, refuses to follow them on principle.” (EN, 1145 b 10–15).
- 28.
Anger (thumos) is a central emotional phenomenon both in ethics and in politics, as well as friendship (philia). See also On the Soul “If we consider the majority of them, there seems to be no case in which the soul can act or be acted upon without involving the body; e.g. anger, courage, appetite, and sensation generally” (DA, 403 a 16): “But we must return from this digression, and repeat that the affections of soul are inseparable from the material substratum of animal life, to which we have seen that such affections, e.g. passion and fear, attach, and have not the same mode of being as a line or a plane.” (DA 403 b 16).
- 29.
See also Politics: “for because the barbarians are more servile in their nature than the Greeks, and the Asiatics than the Europeans, they endure despotic rule without any resentment.” (Pol. 1285 a).
- 30.
Garver stresses the rational-deliberative incapacity that follows from emotional deficiency, and its political meaning: “Thymos, then, is not simply will, the will to put one’s judgments into action. The European and Asiatic character flaws show that without the thymos, and, on my reading, without eunoia, certain cognitive capacities would be incomplete, and phronesis impossible. Phronesis is incomplete without citizenship, and citizenship impossible without thymos.” (Garver 1994, p. 114).
- 31.
We cannot address here the question of the possibility of overcoming the psychic deficiency that prevents the natural slave from living as a citizen. That requires investigating whether this (both emotional and rational) capacity to deliberate is due to socialization processes. This possibility was certainly on the table: there were strong speeches against slavery. Aristotle demonstrates the controversy surrounding this topic, but there are probably no safe reasons to support that thesis in Politics (although this would make his position on slavery less confronting). In any case, it is important to notice that Aristotle’s concept of nature involves comprehending things that usually (and not necessarily) happen. From this, it is not surprising that some Greek citizens think and feel as slaves, and that some Barbarians can deliberate well (Pol. 1254 b).
- 32.
- 33.
As he had done in Book 1, Aristotle starts Book 2 by analysing a Platonic thesis. The Platonic thesis presented in Politics II (women should be common as this would increase the emotional bonds among citizens) is congruous with the (also Platonic) thesis proposed in Book 1 (according to which there is no essential difference between domestic and political communities). To Plato, as both polis and family have the same nature, it is possible to achieve political unity by increasing familial love. Aristotle does not accept this notion. He believes that polis and family are essentially different, and then the bonds that unify each community must be different too. This way he distinguishes familial and political friendship.
- 34.
Striving (Stasis) is a major theme in Greek political philosophy. Internal striving and external conflicts made Athenians anxious about the risk of destruction. There are some important reflections regarding how emotions play a role both in the destruction of and the preservation of polis: “friendship is the greatest of blessings for the state, since it is the best safeguard against revolution, and the unity of the state” (Pol. 1262 b 7–9). This perspective clearly shows emotions (pathos) as both a basis for, and a threat to polis’ survival. “Instead of a view of politics that stresses the importance of regime legislation, Aristotle favors a view of politics which stresses preservation (…) This is a task that requires far more skill and wisdom (…) he [Aristotle] stresses the importance of preservation over founding in his political science.” Bates (2016, p. 25); Bates (2015) offers an interesting table of emotions as causes of political stasis.
- 35.
This is an important topos in Aristotle’s Politics, recurrently used in the problematization of city-states (politeai) and laws: the exam of conformity between their intended goals, and the results they actually achieve.
- 36.
Plato’s proposal aims at increasing consideration (diaphrontizein). Nevertheless, it would lessen esteem (oligoresousin).
- 37.
Another methodical remark now to notice the use of emotions (pathos) by political philosophy as a criterion for choosing among disputant positions. In Politics Aristotle states that the Socratic thesis for the community of women is disgusting (echei de duschereias) (Pol. 1261 a 10). The expression is usually translated into “involves difficulties”, consistent with the dialectical structure of Aristotle’s political inquiry. However, the context suggests more than an intellectual obstacle, it indicates an emotional difficulty to the acceptance of the thesis. This is another basis for refusing Plato’s thesis: it is repulsive. This shows the use of emotions (pathos) as a topos in (political) philosophical investigation and teaching. The emotional argument is quite familiar to the reader of Rhetoric. Its use in political research shows some rhetorical aspect, It is not surprising that political philosophy, as practical thought, uses rhetoric. Its aim is not only knowing about the good in common life, but making it real, we could state in analogy to Nicomachean Ethics.
- 38.
Polis is also defined as a system of exchanges. We choose associating in polis because self-sufficiency can be obtained this way. Exchange makes an achievement of goods possible, which could never be obtained in the family or the tribe. If there were no love for things, would there be any exchange? Without love for things, would polis be possible as community wherein people interact to achieve autarchy and self-sufficiency? (Pol. 1321 b 10–20).
- 39.
Of course a life with no pleasure is not a good life: that’s (also) why love for money can destroy eudaimonia both whether it is too big or too little.
- 40.
“Hence the business of drawing provision from the fruits of the soil and from animals is natural to all. But, as we said, this art is twofold, one branch being of the nature of trade while the other belongs to the household art; and the latter branch is necessary and in good esteem, but the branch connected with exchange is justly discredited (for it is not in accordance with nature, but involves men’s taking things from one another).” (Pol. 1258 a–b).
- 41.
This is central to understanding the whole Politics. Political philosophy has three different levels of inquiry and counsel. The analogy with a physical educator is elucidative. He masters an art able to give counsels to perfect bodies, to average and even to very bad ones. It is same for political philosophy: “so that the good lawgiver and the true statesman must be acquainted with both the form of constitution that is the highest absolutely and that which is best under assumed conditions, and also thirdly the form of constitution based on a certain supposition (for he must be also capable of considering both how some given constitution could be brought into existence originally and also in what way having been brought into existence it could be preserved for the longest time: I mean for example if it has befallen some state not only not to possess the best constitution and to be unprovided even with the things necessary for it, but also not to have the constitution that is practicable under the circumstances but an inferior one)” (Pol. 1288 b 24–30).
- 42.
Notice that Aristotle’s perspective remains normative and not simply descriptive, but it is quite different giving counsels to normal people from counselling perfect ones.
- 43.
“and they have acquired this quality even in their boyhood from their homelife, which was so luxurious that they have not got used to submitting to authority even in school” (Pol. 1295b).
- 44.
The best cities have a strong and dominant middle class. This realizes the equilibrium between equality and heterogeneity: “But surely the ideal of the state is to consist as much as possible of persons that are equal and alike, and this similarity is most found in the middle classes; therefore the middle-class state will necessarily be best constituted in respect of those elements of which we say that the state is by nature composed.” (Pol. 1295b) The exaggerated heterogeneity threatens polis also because it impedes friendship. Friends must have something in common. Philia is the bond, which links people who aim at a same goal, and who are somehow similar. If diversity is total—as it can be between the very rich and the very poor—there is no friendship but slightness and envy—both “very far removed from friendliness, and from political partnership — for friendliness is an element of partnership, since men are not willing to be partners with their enemies even on a journey” (Pol. 1295b).
- 45.
“And even those who fix their aim on the good life seek the good life as measured by bodily enjoyments, so that inasmuch as this also seems to be found in the possession of property, all their energies are occupied in the business of getting wealth; and owing to this the second kind of the art of wealth-getting has arisen. For as their enjoyment is in excess, they try to discover the art that is productive of enjoyable excess; and if they cannot procure it by the art of wealth-getting, they try to do so by some other means, employing each of the faculties in an unnatural way.” (Pol. 1258 a).
- 46.
As Aristotle states in Politics, “to feel that a thing is one’s private property makes an inexpressibly great difference for pleasure; for the universal feeling of love for oneself is surely not purposeless, but a natural instinct. Selfishness on the other hand is justly blamed; but this is not to love oneself but to love oneself more than one ought, just as covetousness means loving money to excess—since some love of self, money and so on is practically universal.” (Pol. 1263 a 35–1263 b).
- 47.
He concludes that “A citizen pure and simple is defined by nothing else so much as by the right to participate in judicial functions and in office.” (Pol. 1275 b). It is not by chance that this definition of citizen (thought to stand for any regime, and not just relative to any specific model) fits the democratic regime better. It has to do with Aristotle’s conception of democracy as the regime that better realizes, in the real world, the nature of the citizen and of the political community.
- 48.
The theme of epieikeia is familiar to jurists. It raises the task of being equitable.
- 49.
“Yet certainly physicians themselves call in other physicians to treat them when they are ill, and gymnastic trainers put themselves under other trainers when they are doing exercises, believing that they are unable to judge truly because they are judging about their own cases and when they are under the influence of feeling.” (Pol. 1287 a 25–30).
- 50.
Christof Rapp's defense, in this book, of judges' rationality (“Dispassionate Judges Encountering Hotheaded Aristotelians”) brings clever warnings about the risks of partiality and probably portrays very well Aristotle’s concerns on the topic.
- 51.
“(…) equity, though just, is not legal justice, but a rectification of legal justice. The reason for this is that law is always a general statement, yet there are cases which it is not possible to cover in a general statement. In matters therefore where, while it is necessary to speak in general terms, it is not possible to do so correctly, the law takes into consideration the majority of cases, although it is not unaware of the error this involves. And this does not make it a wrong law; for the error is not in the law nor in the lawgiver, but in the nature of the case: the material of conduct is essentially irregular. When therefore the law lays down a general rule, and thereafter a case arises which is an exception to the rule, it is then right, where the Iawgiver’s pronouncement because of its absoluteness is defective and erroneous, to rectify the defect by deciding as the lawgiver would himself decide if he were present on the occasion, and would have enacted if he had been cognizant of the case in question.” (EN 1137 a 15–25).
- 52.
“This is the essential nature of the equitable: it is a rectification of law where law is defective because of its generality. In fact this is the reason why things are not all determined by law: it is because there are some cases for which it is impossible to lay down a law, so that a special ordinance becomes necessary.” (EN, 1137 b).
- 53.
“for where there are many, each individual, it may be argued, has some portion of virtue and wisdom, when they have come together, just as the multitude becomes a single man with many feet and many hands and many senses, so also it becomes one personality as regards the moral and intellectual faculties.” (Pol. 1281 b 4–7). Once again, he seems to fight Plato.
- 54.
The crowd discerns better because it is rationally superior than one or a few man. Although separately the individual is immature in judgement (ekastos ateles peri to krinein estin) (Pol. 1281 b 38), “all when assembled together have sufficient discernment” (Pol. 1281 b 34–35). He challenges the topos about the superiority of the specialist: “for although each individual separately will be a worse judge than the experts, the whole of them assembled together will be better or at least as good judges” (Pol. 1282 a, 15–17).
- 55.
The crowd discerns better because it is ethically superior to one or a few man. The sum of virtues of the majority exceeds the virtue of any singular person. If there were someone who exceeded the sum of crowd’s virtue, he should govern, Aristotle admits. But this is just for the sake of the argument—in reality, there is not such a man or a group. Actually, this would require virtue above the level of human nature (Pol. 1286 b 27) and it is not applicable to his own time: “But now that the states have come to be even greater than they were, perhaps it is not easy for yet another form of constitution beside democracy to come into existence.” (Pol. 1286 b 20–22).
- 56.
Actually, this is true also for deliberation: “For to lay down a law about things that are subjects for deliberation is an impossibility. Therefore men do not deny that it must be for a human being to judge about such matters, but they say that it ought not to be a single human being only but a number: (…) it would doubtless seem curious if a person saw better when judging with two eyes and two organs of hearing and acting with two feet and hands than many persons with many” (Pol. 1287 b 20–30).
- 57.
“A ‘definition’ is a phrase signifying a thing’s essence.” (Topics 101 b a 39–40).
- 58.
“The discovery of the differences of things helps us both in reasonings about sameness and difference, and also in recognizing what any particular thing is. That it helps us in reasoning about sameness and difference is clear: for when we have discovered a difference of any kind whatever between the objects before us, we shall already have shown that they are not the same: while it helps us in recognizing what a thing is, because we usually distinguish the expression that is proper to the essence of each particular thing by means of the differentiae that are proper to it.” (Top. 108 a 38–b 6).
- 59.
“If, then, we render as the genus what is common to all the cases, we shall get the credit of defining not inappropriately.” (Top. 108 27–28).
- 60.
The genus proposition also indicates the essence of things. “A ‘genus’ is what is predicated in the category of essence of a number of things exhibiting differences in kind.” (Top. 102 a 31–32).
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Coelho, N.M.M.S. (2018). Emotions: Impediment or Basis of Political Life?. In: Huppes-Cluysenaer, L., Coelho, N. (eds) Aristotle on Emotions in Law and Politics. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 121. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66703-4_17
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