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Aristotle on Emotions in Law and Politics pp 237–259Cite as

What Does Nemesis Have to Do with the Legal System? Discussing Aristotle’s Neglected Emotion and Its Relevance for Law and Politics

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Part of the book series: Law and Philosophy Library ((LAPS,volume 121))

Abstract

Aristotle defines nemesis (to nemesan = from the verb nemesao) as the emotional reaction of someone with a noble character at unmerited good fortune. That another’s good fortune is a central element of nemesis can also be inferred by the contraposition Aristotle proposed between nemesis and pity, which is pain at undeserved bad fortune. The modern concept of indignation, commonly used as a translation for the word nemesis, refers to outrage at a general form of injustice, and usually a serious one.

The authors intend to remain faithful to the original meaning of the term and to explore the impact it can have with respect to law. In contrast to the existing literature, which especially during the 1960s, discredited the narrow conception of indignation as defined in Aristotelian terms and interpreted indignation in terms of negative emotions such as envy or resentment, they argue that this emotion has a central position in legal reasoning and legal thought. Nemesis is that emotion which creates a strong conceptual bond between rectificatory justice (to diorthotikon dikaion), which today we may define as typical of legal reasoning, and distributive justice (to dianemetikon dikaion), typical of the moral and political realm. The concept of individual desert is presented as the juncture between the moral, the legal and the political fields.

D. Bonanno: Research financed by the A.v. Humboldt Foundation - Bonn.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Edition used: Aristotle (1926).

  2. 2.

    He uses the infinitive to nemesan of the verb nemesao, derivated from the noun nemesis.

  3. 3.

    Nussbaum (1996), pp. 318–319. On this particular attitude, see also Gastaldi (1995).

  4. 4.

    Sherman (1993), p. 2.

  5. 5.

    Hardie (1975); Sherman (1993); Hutchinson (1995), esp. pp. 213–232; Shields (2002).

  6. 6.

    Haidt (2003).

  7. 7.

    As told by Aristotle: “if a virtuous man does not obtain what is suitable for him, we feel indignant” (Rhet. 1387a 11, trans. J. H. Freese).

  8. 8.

    Konstan (2006) Ch. V, Envy and Indignation.

  9. 9.

    Nussbaum (2004), p. 75.

  10. 10.

    In this respect, it is meaningful that even the scholars of the ancient world often analyze nemesis within the semantic field of the wrath: see Cairns (2003), esp. pp. 35–39; Scheid-Tissinier (2007), p. 180; and Scheid-Tissinier (2012).

  11. 11.

    On the importance of the distance and proximity in the arousal of the emotions, see Ginzburg (1998).

  12. 12.

    On the relationship between envy, nemesis and zelos, see Gastaldi (1990), pp. 28–30 and more recently, Castelli (2015).

  13. 13.

    Aristotle (1907).

  14. 14.

    Williams (1981) and Nagel (1979).

  15. 15.

    Burger (1991), p. 127.

  16. 16.

    According to Maroney (in this volume) anger is the most appropriate emotion to support the judgement. In her opinion, anger is the “quintessentially judicial emotion”, Maroney (2018). More convincing is the position of Rapp (also in this volume), who more prudently suggests that nemesis could be a better candidate to explain the emotional experience of the judge. He proposes to revise the myth that according to Aristotle “an emotional judge” would be better than a “dispassionate” one. Rapp (2018).

  17. 17.

    Scheffler (2000), p. 965.

  18. 18.

    Slote (2002).

  19. 19.

    Sandel (2009), p. 295.

  20. 20.

    Cf. also Adkins (1960), pp. 195–219.

  21. 21.

    According to Burger (1991), nemesis is the psychological horizon acting as the background of the Aristotelian reflection on justice; it is the pathos motivating justice in the human soul. For this reason, Burger claims: “as a psychological dimension behind the institutional-mathematical analysis of justice […], it is not mere accidental but essential that nemesis remain hidden. It is a prerequisite for any sustainable political community that the desire for nature itself to punish the bad be converted into confidence in the law and satisfaction through it” (p. 131). This assumption seems to be based on two observations: first of all, the absence of “piety” in the EN, which appears instead in the Rhetoric as an emotion counterbalancing the nemesis; secondly, on the problematic status of the latter. Nemesis is in fact inserted by Aristotle among the ethical virtues, while not being a virtue at all and then it apparently disappears from the discussion. Even if quite stimulating, the argumentum e silentio does not seem sufficient to validate this thesis.

  22. 22.

    Viola (2014).

  23. 23.

    Dubreuil (2010b).

  24. 24.

    Strawson (1962), p. 1.

  25. 25.

    An example may be given by the law on purity contained in the Leviticus.

  26. 26.

    Dubreuil (2010a), p. 26.

  27. 27.

    Vromen (2012), pp. 174–175.

  28. 28.

    Mouchiroud and Zenasni (2013), p. 394.

  29. 29.

    Elster (2007), p. 159.

  30. 30.

    Sunstein (2009), p. 407; Kahneman and Sunstein (2007), p. 2.

  31. 31.

    Weiner (2006), p. 96.

  32. 32.

    Haidt (2003), p. 860.

  33. 33.

    Rozin et al. (1999).

  34. 34.

    Fitterer (2008).

  35. 35.

    Nussbaum (2013).

  36. 36.

    Spinoza (n.d.), ch. III, p. 9.

  37. 37.

    Kant (1963), p. 12.

  38. 38.

    Anderson (2014), p. 337.

  39. 39.

    Nietzsche (1994), I, p. 21.

  40. 40.

    Nietzsche (1998), II, p. 26:21.

  41. 41.

    Ranulf (1938).

  42. 42.

    Adorno et al. (1950).

  43. 43.

    Cf. Konstan (2006), p. 125.

  44. 44.

    Kahneman and Sunstein (2007), p. 2.

  45. 45.

    Such a reply is common to most legal realists; see Ratnapala (2009), pp. 108–109.

  46. 46.

    Maroney (2011a).

  47. 47.

    Among others: Maroney (2011b), Bandes (2009), and Henderson (1993).

  48. 48.

    Smith (2013), p. 27.

  49. 49.

    Nussbaum (2004), pp. 6–7.

  50. 50.

    Viola and Zaccaria (2003), p. 77.

  51. 51.

    About the contribution of the epieikeia to the Athenian justice, Harris (2013).

  52. 52.

    Shields (2002).

  53. 53.

    Abrams (2011), p. 588.

  54. 54.

    163 U.S. 537 (1896).

  55. 55.

    347 U.S. 483 (1954).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Culture and Society, University of Palermo, Palermo, Italy

    Daniela Bonanno

  2. Faculty of Economics and Law, Kore University of Enna, Enna, Italy

    Lucia Corso

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  1. University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    Liesbeth Huppes-Cluysenaer

  2. Faculdade de Direito de Ribeirão Preto, University of São Paulo, Ribeirão Preto, São Paulo, Brazil

    Nuno M.M.S. Coelho

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Bonanno, D., Corso, L. (2018). What Does Nemesis Have to Do with the Legal System? Discussing Aristotle’s Neglected Emotion and Its Relevance for Law and Politics. In: Huppes-Cluysenaer, L., Coelho, N. (eds) Aristotle on Emotions in Law and Politics. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 121. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66703-4_11

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