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A Crucial Distinction in William of Ockham’s Philosophy of Mind: Cognitio in se/cognitio in alio

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The Language of Thought in Late Medieval Philosophy

Part of the book series: Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action ((HSNA,volume 5))

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Abstract

William of Ockham frequently mentions a distinction between two modes of cognition: in se and in alio. The aim of this chapter is to show that this distinction raises some important problems for his philosophy of mind and more broadly for his nominalism. The main issue is the possibility of an externalist theory of mental contents. For, Ockham affirms that no material substance is cognized in se. But if only accidents are cognized in se does this mean that material substances are necessarily cognized in alio? How could this “something else” lead us to the cognition of something we have never experienced? The difficulty here is how we should understand his view concerning the acquisition of simple substance concepts like “man” or “horse.” On the one hand it seems that we have no direct acquaintance with substances. On the other hand, he says that these concepts, equivalent to simple natural kind terms in the mind, directly refer to singular substances thanks to external relations of causality and likeness, on which their signification is based. This chapter suggests that the evolution of Ockham’s theory of concepts during his career is probably the key for our understanding of this crucial distinction.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See, for instance, Ord. d. 2, q. 9, OTh II, 315. All translations are my own unless specified otherwise and all references are to Ockham unless otherwise stated.

  2. 2.

    According to Michon (1994, 34–52) this kind of question is relevant for the whole of Ockham’s semantic and cognitive theory.

  3. 3.

    The champion of this interpretation is Panaccio (2004) and Panaccio (2014).

  4. 4.

    The case of natural genera concepts would need another study. For a recent and very suggestive analysis, see Roques (2016). Moreover, I will not have enough space to deal with Ockham’s theory of confused and distinct cognition, as well as his theory of definitions, which are also very important elements for a complete understanding of his view on concepts.

  5. 5.

    Several other problems are raised by this externalist interpretation. See Susan Brower-Toland’s paper in this volume.

  6. 6.

    For this reason, Panaccio (2014) thinks that these concepts are not bare concepts, i.e. concepts that do not convey any kind of representational content. For the opposite view see Normore (2003) and for a critique of the notion of concepts as similitudes see King (2005).

  7. 7.

    The idea of maximal similarity was introduced by Panaccio (1991, 121).

  8. 8.

    In the following paragraphs, I summarize the well-known elements of Ockham’s philosophy. For a richer overview see Adams (1987) and Panaccio (1991).

  9. 9.

    It must be recalled here that for Ockham these relations objectively exist, independently of human minds, but are not additional things (res) distinct from the relata.

  10. 10.

    For the first theory of mental propositions see Karger (1996). For the second see Panaccio (1992). I will come back to this turn at the end of this chapter.

  11. 11.

    On this possibility see Ashworth (1980). Ockham distinguishes confused and distinct cognitions, so that he can say that a sign can signify something more distinctly than we understand it (only confusedly).

  12. 12.

    Ord. d. 3, q. 2, OTh II, 412: “[…] dico quod nulla substantia corporea exterior potest a nobis in se naturaliter cognosci, quidquid sit de anima intellectiva vel quacumque substantia quae est de essentia cognoscentis.”

  13. 13.

    The only simple concepts of God are connotative ones, derived from something else, such as negative or relative concepts. I will not discuss here the much-debated issue of the existence of simple connotative concepts in mental language. See Panaccio (2000).

  14. 14.

    Ord. d. 3, q. 2, OTh II, 416: “Ad sextum potest dici quod substantia non potest cognosci a nobis in aliquo conceptu composito proprio substantiis, ita quod quilibet illorum partialium conceptuum sit naturaliter abstrahibilis ab inferioribus suis”; 417: “[…] et ideo substantia cognoscitur in conceptibus connotativis et negativis, sicut in talibus: ens per se subsistens, ens non in alio, ens quod est subiectum omnium accidentium, et sic de aliis.”

  15. 15.

    It seems to be a general rule. Cf. Ord. d. 2, q. 9, OTh II, 315: “Omne cognoscibile a nobis aut cognoscitur in se, aut in conceptu simplici sibi proprio, aut in conceptu composito proprio, aut in conceptu communi sibi et aliis.”

  16. 16.

    Ord. Prol. q. 1, OTh I, 23: “Sed certum est quod intellectus potest habere notitiam incomplexam tam de Sorte quam de albedine, cuius virtute non potest evidenter cognoscere an sit albus vel non, sicut per experientiam patet; et praeter istam potest habere notitiam incomplexam virtute cuius potest evidenter cognoscere quod Sortes est albus, si sit albus.”

  17. 17.

    Ord. Prol. q. 1, OTh I, 31: “Similiter, notitia intuitiva est talis quando aliquae res cognoscuntur quarum una inhaeret alteri vel una distat loco ab aliae vel alio modo se habet ad alteram, statim virtute illius notitiae incomplexae illarum rerum scitur si res inhaeret vel non inhaeret, si distat vel non distat, et sic de aliis veritatibus contingentibus.”

  18. 18.

    Another option would be the following: Socrates is the whole thing and the quality is considered a part of this whole. The term “Socrates” in a mental proposition would be imposed by the mind in order to signify the substance, even though it is not intuitively cognized as such.

  19. 19.

    Ord. Prol. q. 1, OTh I, 31: “Sicut si Sortes in rei veritate sit albus, illa notitia albedinis virtute cuius potest evidenter cognosci quod Sortes est albus, dicitur notitia intuitiva.”

  20. 20.

    Ord. d. 3, q. 8, OTh II, 540: “Sed ad notitiam intuitivam requiritur quod ipsa res cognita intuitive causet intellectionem, quia aliter non posset illa res naturaliter cognosci intuitive […].”

  21. 21.

    Ord. d. 3, q. 8, OTh II, 541: “Ad quartum dico quod pro statu isto, undecumque sit, nihil est motivum intellectus ad cognitionem sui ipsius nisi sensibilis qualitas extra, vel saltem per se sensibile, et aliqua infra animam, scilicet actus et passiones, et forte ipsamet anima intellectiva […].”

  22. 22.

    ExpPor. c. 2, OPh II, 52: “[…] et per ipsa accidentia innotescunt individua substantia, quia accidentia directe et in se cognoscuntur ab intellectu nostro, non sic autem substantiae.”

  23. 23.

    It is also problematic for simple concepts equivalent to proper names if they exist in mental language. But this topic would lead us too far from our main problem.

  24. 24.

    Buridan’s position is more complex than Scott suggests. There is now important literature on Buridan’s account of concept formation and in particular about concepts of substances, be they singular or general. See, for instance, Zupko (2003), Klima (2004), and Brumberg-Chaumont (2016)

  25. 25.

    We find this kind of theory in James of Viterbo’s Quodlibeta for instance. See Côté (2009).

  26. 26.

    Ord. Prol. q. 1, a. 1, OTh I, 36–37.

  27. 27.

    Ord. d. 30, q. 1, OTh IV, 287: “Omnis res realiter distincta ab alia re potest intelligi, illa alia non intellecta, et maxime si neutra illarum est pars alterius.”

  28. 28.

    Ord. Prol. q. 9, OTh I, 254–55: “Et ideo dictum est prius quod notitia unius rei extra non ducit sufficienter, cum intellectu, in notitiam primam incomplexam alterius rei in se. Et voco notitiam rei in se quando illa incomplexa cognitione nec aliqua parte ipsius aliquid aliud ab illa re intelligitur.”

  29. 29.

    Rep. III, q. 10, OTh VI, 340–341: “[…] omnes concedunt quod aliquam notitiam incomplexam habemus de Deo pro statu isto et etiam de substantia creata materiali et immateriali. Tunc quaero: quando intelligo Deum intellectione incomplexa, aut cognosco eum in se, aut in alio. Non in se, secundum omnes, quia nec intuitive nec abstractive. Non intuitive patet. Nec abstractive, quia illa cognitio semper praesupponit intuitivam, saltem in illa forma in qua est abstractiva respectu eiusdem rei, sicut alibi patet. Igitur etc. Unde Deus in se non plus cognoscitur a me abstractive pro statu isto quam Papa quem nunquam vidi, sed tantum eum cognosco in conceptu hominis. Deus igitur in se non intelligitur a me pro statu isto, nec aliqua substantia.”

  30. 30.

    Rep. III, q. 10, OTh VI, 341: “Si in alio, tunc aut in aliquo conceptu communi sibi et aliis, aut in aliquo reali. Si in aliquo reali, aut illud distinguitur a Deo secundum rationem tantum, aut realiter. Non primo modo, quia probatum est in primo quod res non potest distingui a ratione. Nec distinguitur realiter, quia tunc, cum intelligo Deum, aliqua res singularis creata terminat intellectionem meam. Et tunc non plus cognosco Deum quam quamcumque aliam rem de qua nihil cogito, quia tantum cognosco illam rem singularem quae terminat cognitionem meam. Igitur oporter necessario ponere quod intelligendo Deum pro statu isto cognoscam eum in conceptu communi sibi et aliis […].”

  31. 31.

    Rep. III, q. 10, OTh VI, 342: “Item, ex notitia incomplexa unius rei in se non potest causari notitia incomplexa alterius rei in se, sicut in prologo primi dictum est. Unde quantumcumque videas essentiam divinam clare, numquam per hoc videbis asinum in se, ita quod una notitia causetur ex alia. Igitur si notitia incomplexa creaturae ducit in notitiam incomplexam Dei, hoc erit in conceptu communi creaturae et Deo. Et hoc modo concedo quod notitia incomplexa unius rei in se ducit in notitiam incomplexam alterius rei in conceptu communi. Sicut per notitiam incomplexam albedinis quam vidi, ducor in notitiam alterius albedinis quam numquam vidi, per hoc quod a prima albedine abstraho conceptum albedinis qui indifferenter respicit unam albedinem et aliam. Eodem modo, ex aliquo accidente quod vidi, abstraho conceptum entis qui non plus respicit illud accidens quam substantiam, nec plus creaturam quam Deum. Et ideo, in illo conceptu non est aliqua prioritas qua res in se sit prior altera, sicut nec in conceptu hominis est Plato prior Sorte, licet forte in re sit prior.”

  32. 32.

    Ord. d. 2, q. 8, OTh II, 274, and ExpPeri. Prooemium, OPh II, 360.

  33. 33.

    Ord. d. 2, q. 9, OTh II, 315: “Omne cognoscibile a nobis aut cognoscitur in se, aut in conceptu simplici sibi proprio, aut in conceptu composito proprio, aut in conceptu communi sibi et aliis.”

  34. 34.

    Indeed, ficta are produced actively by the mind. Cf. Rep. II, q. 12–13, OTh V, 304–305: “Et quando dicit quod intellectus agens facit universalia in actu, verum est, quia facit quoddam esse fictum et producit quendam conceptum in esse obiectivo, qui terminat eius actum, qui tantum habet esse obiective et nullo modo subiective.”

  35. 35.

    Ord. d. 2, q. 8, OTh II, 272: “Et hoc per istum modum quod intellectus videns aliquam rem extra animam fingit consimilem rem in mente ita quod si haberet virtutem productivam sicut habet virtutem fictivam, talem rem in esse subjectivo – numero distinctam a priori – produceret extra. […] Et illud [fictum] potest vocari universale, quia est exemplar et indifferenter respiciens omnia singularia extra, et propter istam similitudinem in esse objectivo potest supponere pro rebus extra quae habent consimile esse extra intellectum.”

  36. 36.

    Aquinas, Summa theologiae I, q. 14, a. 5, IV, 172b: “[…] considerandum est quod dupliciter aliquid cognoscitur: uno modo in seipso, alio modo in altero. In seipso quidem cognoscitur aliquid quando cognoscitur per speciem propriam adaequatam ipsi cognoscibili; sicut cum oculus videt hominem per speciem hominis. In alio autem videtur id quod videtur per speciem continentis, sicut cum pars videtur in toto per speciem totius; vel cum homo videtur in speculo per speciem speculi, vel quocumque alio modo contingat aliquid in alio videri.”

  37. 37.

    Scotus, Reportatio Parisiensis Prol. q. 2, §15, XXII, 41: “Duplex est cognitio; quaedam est per speciem quae non est rei in se praesentis, et haec vocatur cognitio rei abstractiva; alia est cognitio rei ut habet esse in actuali existentia, et haec dicitur cognitio intuitiva.”

  38. 38.

    Scotus, Reportatio Parisiensis II, d. 3, q. 3, §10, XXII, 592: “Alia est cognitio intuitiva, seu visiva, quae est rei in se.”

  39. 39.

    For an overview of these debates, see Robert (forthcoming).

  40. 40.

    See Noone (2011).

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  1. Centre d’Etudes Supérieures de la Renaissance, CNRS – Université François Rabelais – Tours, Tours, France

    Aurélien Robert

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  1. University of Leuven – Research Foundation Flanders, Leuven, Belgium

    Jenny Pelletier

  2. Department of Philosophy, University of Hamburg – Laboratoire d’Etudes sur les Monothéismes (UMR 8485), Hamburg, Germany

    Magali Roques

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Robert, A. (2017). A Crucial Distinction in William of Ockham’s Philosophy of Mind: Cognitio in se/cognitio in alio . In: Pelletier, J., Roques, M. (eds) The Language of Thought in Late Medieval Philosophy. Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action, vol 5. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66634-1_3

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