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Ontological Indeterminism and the Evolutionist Matrix

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Kósmos Noetós

Part of the book series: Philosophical Studies Series ((PSSP,volume 131))

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Abstract

The aim of this chapter is to build the concept of Chance and its consequence for an epistemological and ontological indeterminism, which, besides being the cornerstone of Peirce’s Metaphysics, is also the starting point of his evolutionism. By recognizing Chance in the Universe, Peirce is trying to explain why some aspects of phenomena appear as irregular, asymmetrical. Refusing to conceive the world as strictly governed by law, such ontological indeterminism brings an epistemological consequence, namely, that all positive theories must be essentially probabilistic. Another important consequence of the indeterminism is the evolutionary conception of the universe, as claimed by Peirce: every law is still in formation, derived from aleatory facts under Chance action. A crucial question is then posited in the final part of the chapter: what could be the origin of the universe of laws? The response to it is one of the most important topics of Peirce’s Metaphysics, namely, that law came from a tendency of everything to take habits: individuals become reciprocally related by logical rules that guide their behavior. This is also not merely a guessing about the origin of natural laws, but also grounds one Peircean main doctrine, Objective Idealism, that will affirm that everything is of the nature of mind, which is developed in this chapter.

Arrancarle un jirón de clave, hundirle en el peor de los casos la flecha de la hipótesis, la antecipación del eclipse, reunir en un puño mental las riendas de esa multitud de caballos centelleantes y hostiles.

CORTÁZAR, Prosa del Observatorio

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Notes

  1. 1.

    In support of the concept of Chance, the development of the ideas of continuity and potentiality is also required. These concepts will be explained in Chap. 4.

  2. 2.

    CP, 6.74. The doctrine of Ontological Chance, Peirce called Tychism, from the Greek týchê (Chance).

  3. 3.

    In Chap. 4, the relations between possibility and generality will be highlighted.

  4. 4.

    Refer to note 60 in Chap. 2.

  5. 5.

    CP, 6.30; EP, 1.296; W, 8.109. 

  6. 6.

    CP, 5.342; EP, 1.75–76; W, 2.264–265; my italics.

  7. 7.

    CP, 1.406; EP, 1.276; W, 6.206–207.

  8. 8.

    CP, 7.189.

  9. 9.

    CP, 1.419; my italics.

  10. 10.

    CP, 1.422.

  11. 11.

    CP, 1.424.

  12. 12.

    As regards an in-depth analysis of the concepts of dyad and triad, see CP, 1.441–520.

  13. 13.

    In the essays titled “The Doctrine of Necessity Examined” (CP, 6.35–65; EP, 1.298–311; W, 8.111–125), “Causation and Force” (CP, 6.66–87), and “Variety and Uniformity” (CP, 6.88–101), dated 1892, 1898, and 1903, respectively, Peirce historically redeems the question of Ontological Chance by emphatically criticizing the doctrine of strict causality present in some philosophies.

  14. 14.

    I.e., in Physica, 195b, 31–198. 13.

  15. 15.

    Book II, 1.216–93 (both references are in the edition of the Collected Papers).

  16. 16.

    CP, 1.403; EP, 1.274; W, 6.204.

  17. 17.

    CP, 6.39; EP, 1.300; W, 8.113. 

  18. 18.

    CP, 6.48; EP, 1.305; W, 8.118.

  19. 19.

    CP, 1.144.

  20. 20.

    CP, 6.46; EP, 1.304; W, 8.118; my italics.

  21. 21.

    Chance as a “measure of our ignorance” is denied by Peirce in various passages. See, for example, CP 6.54–56, 6.74, and 6.612; EP, 1.306–307; W, 8.120.

  22. 22.

    CP, 6.57–58; EP, 1.307–308; W, 8.122. In the text, Peirce is rebutting the objection of a fictitious opponent.

  23. 23.

    Ibid.

  24. 24.

    CP, 6.37; EP, 1.299; W, 8.112. 

  25. 25.

    CP, 6.171.

  26. 26.

    CP, 1.162; my italics.

  27. 27.

    CP, 7.512.

  28. 28.

    CP, 7.514.

  29. 29.

    As for the ontogenesis of categories, please see Chap. 5.

  30. 30.

    CP, 7.515.

  31. 31.

    See Chap. 4 for further discussion on this topic.

  32. 32.

    CP, 6.101.

  33. 33.

    CP, 1.141.

  34. 34.

    CP, 1.9.

  35. 35.

    Ibid.

  36. 36.

    CP, 1.173.

  37. 37.

    CP, 1.174.

  38. 38.

    CP, 1.171.

  39. 39.

    See Chap. 4.

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Ibri, I.A. (2017). Ontological Indeterminism and the Evolutionist Matrix. In: Kósmos Noetós. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 131. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66314-2_3

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