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Analysis of Potential Code Vulnerabilities Involving Overlapping Instructions

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Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security (SAFECOMP 2017)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNPSE,volume 10489))

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Abstract

This article proposes approaches supporting the analysis of code vulnerabilities based on overlapping machine instructions of variable length. For the purpose of focusing the search for potential malicious code it is suggested to apply first disassembling techniques allowing for a restriction of potentially exploitable memory space. Successively, testing based on heuristic optimization may be applied in order to evaluate dynamically the practicality of vulnerability exploitation.

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Acknowledgment

The authors gratefully acknowledge that a major part of the work presented was supported by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi), project SMARTEST. The project is carried out in cooperation with the partner institutions University of Magdeburg, University of Applied Sciences of Magdeburg-Stendal and AREVA GmbH.

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Correspondence to Francesca Saglietti .

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Al Sardy, L., Tang, T., Spisländer, M., Saglietti, F. (2017). Analysis of Potential Code Vulnerabilities Involving Overlapping Instructions. In: Tonetta, S., Schoitsch, E., Bitsch, F. (eds) Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security . SAFECOMP 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10489. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66284-8_10

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66284-8_10

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-66283-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-66284-8

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