Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Risk Management from the Perspective of Catholic Social Ethics

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Sustainable Risk Management

Part of the book series: Strategies for Sustainability ((STSU))

Abstract

Each title implies certain expectations, of which I consider two to be in need of explanation in the present text in order to emphasize how I want to approach the topic.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Cf. Luhmann (2008).

  2. 2.

    (Stichweh 2016).

  3. 3.

    (Schirach 2014).

  4. 4.

    For concepts of resilience in social sciences, ethics and theology, cf. Endreß and Maurer (2015), Vogt and Schneider (2016).

  5. 5.

    Cf. Vogt (2013c, 229–326) (about the relationship of God’s law and human rights); (Vogt 2015, 50–53).

  6. 6.

    (Lübbe 1994, 297). He defines moralism as an attempt to solve urgent problems of civilization via pleas to the collective of uninvolved individuals; cf. ibid. 298.

  7. 7.

    Cf. Lübbe (1994, 293–297).

  8. 8.

    This is how Ulrich Beck analyzes “risk society” and its globalization as a “global risk society” with regard to basic deficits of political controllability and the illusion of promised but not redeemable responsibility. Cf. Beck (1986), Beck (2007).

  9. 9.

    (Schulze 2011).

  10. 10.

    (Wilhelms and Wulsdorf 2012, 3).

  11. 11.

    (Schulze 2011; Wilhelms and Wulsdorf 2012, 3–7; Renn 2014).

  12. 12.

    Cf. Lyotard (1989).

  13. 13.

    On the problem of multicriterial decisions from a rational theoretical viewpoint cf. Hausmanninger (2009).

  14. 14.

    Wolfgang Frühwald talks about “scientific fright”, and analyzes the various ambivalences of an accelerated society as basic scientific and ethical challenges; (Frühwald 2009, 9–10). (Böschen et al. 2004, 7–13), talk about the “end of the myth”, “safe knowledge” and a “shattered science”.

  15. 15.

    Cf. Schüßler (2006). What is new about Schüßler’s interpretation is, among others, that he links the problems of uncertainty reflected by Catholic moral casuistry with the resurrection of skepticism in the renaissance era. He assumes that the “negation of uncertainty in the ‘maximum security unit’ of philosophy of Descartes and Kant” is no longer fully satisfying in important aspects today and, therefore, in a new form, is especially current for ethics today, which egresses over the limits of enlightenment (ibid. 96–100). For the moral dealing with doubt about the validity of moral systems, also cf. Arntz (2009, 125–141).

  16. 16.

    Cf. Schüßler (2006, 96–100).

  17. 17.

    Ibid., 96–100.

  18. 18.

    (Wolbert 1992; Schüßler 2006, 284–295; Zichy and Grimm 2008, 87–116). 153–183; (Nida-Rümelin 2015).

  19. 19.

    Here esp. Spaemann (1999).

  20. 20.

    Cf. Kersten et al. (2012), esp. 41. It is widely unknown that the experts of MunichRe, a worldwide leading reinsurer with an expert committee for stochastic calculation of damage, decided in the 1970s, due to theoretical risk problems, not to insure nuclear power plants at all. Today, especially the comparison of risks of nuclear energy and fossil fuels and the question if and how those two can be compared, leads to basic risk ethical problems of method.

  21. 21.

    For juridical aspects of this debate, cf. Kersten (2014); for the controversial debate about ethical aspects, cf. Korff (1979), Spaemann (2011).

  22. 22.

    Cf. from a scientic theoretical viewpoint: Böschen et al. 2001; from a socio-ethical viewpoint: (Vogt 2013a, 347–372); from a sociological viewpoint: Beck (2007; Renn 2008).

  23. 23.

    There is a Bavarian research group with the title “Fit For Change” (which is a central scientific background of this paper); cf. http://www.forchange.de; about the relation between resilience, security and risk vgl. (Schneider 2015).

  24. 24.

    Cf. Lübbe (1994, 296f. and 293f). The use of moral categories in complex historical processes would therefore be assumed.

  25. 25.

    Cf. Dörner (1992); for following socio-ethical criteria about controlling complex adaptive systems, cf. Vogt (2013a, 347–372).

  26. 26.

    (Vogt 2013a, 473–475); with regard to strategies of sustainability ibid. 134–179. 347–372; with regard to the question of systemic risks and respective adaption cf. OECD 2004.

  27. 27.

    Cf. Vogt (2013b, 307–332).

  28. 28.

    Cf. Drobinski 2014, 4.

  29. 29.

    (Kersting 2005, 317).

  30. 30.

    For methods of moral assessment cf. Korff (1979, 68–90).

  31. 31.

    (Jonas 1984), 63 f. also cf. 385 (for anthropological error of utopia) and 390–392 (for the relation of fear, hope and responsibilty), (Hasted 1991, 172) in a critical approach. A final opinion on this very complex question is hardly possible. Jonas’ critiques on utopia keep their validity, even if he hardly thinks about the consequences of not taking action.

  32. 32.

    About the problem of systemic risks cf. OECD (2003), Renn (2008), Vogt and Ostheimer (2008, 186–191).

  33. 33.

    (Renn and Klinke 2003, 29). Behind the discussed paradigm change of modeling risks or uncertainties there are also mathematical problems. Today’s chess computers, for example, do not only calculate the consequences of single moves regarding the question which man can beat which, but also optimize an assessment of the positions with regard to their attack possibilities and weaknesses on a meta-level. Accordingly, in ethics, one should switch in complex situations from individual good assessment to assessment of action laws on a meta level.

  34. 34.

    (Kersting 2005, 318).

  35. 35.

    (Nida-Rümelin 1996, 827).

  36. 36.

    Cf. Halík (2012), esp. 9–33 and 290–319. He links in a special way to Paulus, Augustinus, mysticism of the Middle Ages with its negative theology, to Kierkegaard and some postmodern authors.

  37. 37.

    (Nikolaus von Kues 1977), esp. I, 7–11 und 109–113. Nikolaus von Kues here takes a special position as he puts the “informed unknowing” as a basis to his theology exploring and fertilizes it for example epistemologically, for dealing with paradoxes, or for methods of negative theology.

  38. 38.

    Acting for many N. Luhmann is here directed to, a significant theorist of contingency, who refers to Nikolaus von Kues again and again.

  39. 39.

    To this from a primarily socio-psychological, techno-ethical and economical point of view: (Maring 2010).

  40. 40.

    Cf. Hafner (2009).

  41. 41.

    Cf. Richard Schäffler’s reflections about the term freedom Schäffler (2004, III, 329–388).

  42. 42.

    Cf. Hafner (2009).

  43. 43.

    To this cf. the analysis about delegating political responsibility in the financial crisis to experts and constraints in Wilhelms and Wulsdorf (2012), esp. 3–5.

  44. 44.

    Frühwald vehemently defends the access of poetry as a necessary perspective for the understanding of man. It runs danger of dying because of the dominance of perspectives that are fixated on facts. To see the humane in the human, whose complexity cannot be measured on a level of facts, requires poetry; Frühwandel 2009, 255–284. About the meaning of paradoxes for the understanding of man cf. Halík (2012, 44–58).

  45. 45.

    Cf. Arntz (2009).

  46. 46.

    Cf. the example of Green Genetic Engineering, (Köstner et al. 2007).

  47. 47.

    Cf. Vogt (2014).

References

  • Arntz, K. (2009). Moral unter Geltungsrisiko. Entscheidungshilfe durch Moralsysteme? In Scheule (loc. cit.) (pp. 129–141).

    Google Scholar 

  • Beck, U (1986). Risikogesellschaft. Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne. Frankfurt.

    Google Scholar 

  • Beck, U (2007). Weltrisikogesellschaft. Auf der Suche nach der verlorenen Sicherheit. Frankfurt.

    Google Scholar 

  • Böschen, S., Schneider, M., & Lerf, A. (Eds.) (2004). Handeln trotz Nichtwissen. Vom Umgang mit Chaos, und Risiko in Politik, Industrie und Wissenschaft. Frankfurt.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dörner, D. (1992). Die Logik des MisslingensStrategisches Denken in komplexen Situationen. Reinbek.

    Google Scholar 

  • Endreß, M., & Maurer, A. (2015). Resilienz im SozialenTheoretische und empirische Analysen. Wiesbaden.

    Google Scholar 

  • Frühwald, W. (2009). Blaupause des Menschen. Streitgespräche über die beschleunigte Evolution. Berlin.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hafner, J. (2009). Entschiedenheit. Gebet als Beitrag der Religion zur Frustrationsabsorption. In Scheule (loc. cit.) (pp. 171–187).

    Google Scholar 

  • Halík, T. (2012). Nachtgedanken eines Beichtvaters. Glaube in Zeiten der Ungewissheit. Freiburg.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hasted, H. (1991). Aufklärung und TechnikGrundprobleme einer Ethik der Technik. Frankfurt.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hausmanninger, T. (2009). Vernunft, Differenzierung, Werterwartungstheorie. In Scheule (loc. cit.) (pp. 25–46).

    Google Scholar 

  • Jonas, H. (1984). Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation (2nd ed). Frankfurt.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kersten, J. (2014). Der Abschied vom Restrisiko? Zur juristischen Neubewertung atomarer Risiken nach Fukushima. In J. Ostheimer, M. Vogt (Eds.), Die Moral der Energiewende. Risikowahrnehmung am Beispiel der Atomenergie (pp. 164–181). Stuttgart.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kersten, J., Uekötter, F., & Vogt, M. (2012). Europe after Fukushima. German perspectives on the future of nuclear power (Vol. 1). München: Rachel Carson Center Perspectives.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kersting, W. (2005). Kritik der GleichheitÜber die Grenzen der Gerechtigkeit und der Moral. Weilerswist.

    Google Scholar 

  • Korff, W. (1979). Kernenergie und Moraltheologie. Der Beitrag der theologischen Ethik zur Frage allgemeiner Kriterien ethischer Entscheidungsprozesse. Frankfurt.

    Google Scholar 

  • Köstner, B., van Saan-Klein, B., & Vogt, M. (Eds.). (2007). Agro-Gentechnik im ländlichen Raum—Potenziale, Konflikte und Perspektiven (Vol. 22). Dettelbach: Forum für Interdisziplinäre Forschung.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lübbe, H. (1994). Moralismus oder fingierte Handlungssubjektivität in komplexen historischen Prozessen. In ders. (Eds.), Kausalität und Zurechnung. Über Verantwortung in komplexen kulturellen Prozessen (pp. 289–301). Berlin/ New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Luhmann, N. (2008). Die Moral der Gesellschaft. Herausgegeben von Detlef Horster. Berlin.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lyotard, J.-F. (1989). Der Widerstreit (2nd ed.). München.

    Google Scholar 

  • Maring, M. (2010). Vertrauen – zwischen sozialem Kitt und Senkung von Transaktionskosten. Karlsruhe.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nida-Rümelin (2015). Die Optimierungsfalle. Philosophie einer humanen Ökonomie (2nd ed.). München.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nida-Rümelin, J. (1996). Ethik des Risikos. In ders. (Ed.), Angewandte Ethik. Die Bereichsethiken und ihre theoretische Fundierung. Ein Handbuch (pp. 806–830). Stuttgart.

    Google Scholar 

  • OECD (2003) Emerging Systemic Risks. Final Report to the OECD Futures Project. Paris.

    Google Scholar 

  • Renn, O. (2008). Risk Governance. Coping with Uncertainty in a Complex World. London.

    Google Scholar 

  • Renn, O. (2014). Das Risikoparadox. Warum wir uns vor dem Falschen fürchten. Frankfurt.

    Google Scholar 

  • Renn, O., & Klinke, A. (2003). Risikoabschätzung und -bewertung. Ein neues Konzept zum Umgang mit Komplexität, Unsicherheit und Ambiguität. In J. Beaufort, E. Gumpert, & M. Vogt (Eds.), (loc. cit.) (pp. 21–51).

    Google Scholar 

  • Schäffler, R. (2004). Philosophische Einübung in die Theologie (Vol. 3). Freiburg/München.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schirach, A. (2014). Du sollst nicht funktionierenFür eine neue Lebenskunst. Tropen.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schneider, M. (2015). Mehr als Sicherheit: Der befreiende Charakter von Resilienz. http://www.forchange.de/assets/archiv/dokumente/Tagung-Tutzing/Schneider-Tutzing-2.pdf.

  • Schulze, G. (2011). Krisen. Das Alarmdilemma. Frankfurt.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schüßler, R. (2006). Moral im Zweifel. Bd. 2, Die Herausforderung des Probabilismus. Paderborn.

    Google Scholar 

  • Spaemann, R. (1999). Die schlechte Lehre vom guten Zweck, FAZ from 23.10.1999.

    Google Scholar 

  • Spaemann, R. (2011). Nach uns die KernschmelzeHybris im atomaren Zeitalter. Stuttgart.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stichweh, R. (2016). Große Gesellschaftliche Herausforderungen. Zum Papier des Wissenschaftsrates und zur Theorie des Wissenschaftssystems (Ethik Forum der Universität Köln). http://www.academia.edu/21733050/_Gro%C3%9Fe_gesellschaftliche_Herausforderungen_._Zum_Papier_des_Wissenschaftsrats_und_zur_Theorie_des_Wissenschaftssystems_2016.

  • Vogt, M. (2013). Prinzip Nachhaltigkeit. Ein Entwurf aus theologisch-ethischer Perspektive (3rd ed.). München.

    Google Scholar 

  • Vogt, M. (2013b). Der unterschätzte Risikofaktor Mensch. Ethische Debatten zur Atomenergie nach Fukushima. In J. D. Gauger u.a. (Hg.), Das christliche Menschenbild. Zur Geschichte, Theorie und Programmatik der CDU (pp. 307–332). Freiburg.

    Google Scholar 

  • Vogt, M. (Hg.)(2013c). Theologie der Sozialethik. Freiburg.

    Google Scholar 

  • Vogt, M. (2014). Handeln unter der unsicheren Bedingung. In P. Neuner (Ed.) Zufall als Quelle von Unsicherheit (227–260). Freiburg: Herder Verlag.

    Google Scholar 

  • Vogt, M. (2015). Christliche Sozialethik in der Spannung zwischen Rationalität und Glaube. In cogito 7/2015 (pp. 50–53).

    Google Scholar 

  • Vogt, M., & Ostheimer, J. (2008). Risikomündigkeit—rationale Strategien im Umgang mit Komplexität. In Zichy/Grimm (loc. cit.).

    Google Scholar 

  • Vogt, M., & Schneider, M. (Eds.). (2016). Theologische und ethische Dimensionen von Resilienz (Münchner Theologische Zeitschrift 3/2016). München.

    Google Scholar 

  • von Kues, N. (1977). Die belehrte Unwissenheit. De docta ignorantia (2nd ed.). Hamburg.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wilhelms, G., & Wulsdorf, H. (2012). Von Unsicherheit, Sachzwängen und gesellschaftlichen Debatten Krisenszenarien in Politik, und Wirtschaft auf der Spur. In Amosinternational 3/2012 (pp. 3–7).

    Google Scholar 

  • Wolbert, W. (1992). Vom Nutzen der Gerechtigkeit. Zur Diskussion um Utilitarismus und teleologische Theorie (Studien zur theologischen Ethik 44). Freiburg/CH.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zichy, M., & Grimm, H. (2008). Praxis in der EthikZur Methodenreflexion der anwendungsorientierten Moralphilosophie. Berlin.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Chair of Christian Social Ethics, Ludwig Maximilians University, Munich, Germany

    Markus Vogt

Authors
  1. Markus Vogt
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Markus Vogt .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Institute for Earth System Preservation, Technical University of Munich, Garching, Germany

    Peter A. Wilderer

  2. Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies, Potsdam, Germany

    Ortwin Renn

  3. Bavarian State Ministry of the Environment and Consumer Protection, Munich, Germany

    Martin Grambow

  4. Klinik für Strahlentherapie, Technical University of Munich, Munich, Germany

    Michael Molls

  5. Chair of Philosophy and Philosophy of Science, Technical University of Munich, Munich, Germany

    Klaus Mainzer

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2018 Springer International Publishing AG

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Vogt, M. (2018). Risk Management from the Perspective of Catholic Social Ethics. In: Wilderer, P., Renn, O., Grambow, M., Molls, M., Mainzer, K. (eds) Sustainable Risk Management. Strategies for Sustainability. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66233-6_1

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation