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Discussion: Why Signals Can Help to Overcome the Liability of Complexity

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Financing High-Tech Startups

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Abstract

In this chapter, the theoretical and practical implications of the findings and the framework are discussed. This concluding discussion mirrors the theoretical body of the thesis and the subchapters following this introduction. This chapter also describes the limitations of the studies and the thesis as a whole. I then synthesize potential follow-up research and give an outlook.

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  1. Alexander von Humboldt Institute for Internet and Society, Berlin, Germany

    Robin P. G. Tech

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Tech, R.P.G. (2018). Discussion: Why Signals Can Help to Overcome the Liability of Complexity. In: Financing High-Tech Startups. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66155-1_7

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