Abstract
The ninth chapters argues that S-natural individuals constrain their possible developments by means of internal representation of future states of affairs and by means of phenomenologically validated decisions for certain future developments. Those constraints allow for identification of strains of developments of S-natural individuals. One is able to pick out series of those individuals by means of the relevant constraints. On the basis of those constraints S-natural individuals can be said to be present at different times. I show that this theory of PSP-as-Persistence is (formally) a version of the stage theory of persistence.
Keywords
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsNotes
- 1.
In Sect. 7.2.2, I allowed for the possibility of more than one adequate representation of the respective causal mesh. This is why I need to allow for more than one adequate futures at this point. Nevertheless, this further specification seems not of too much importance at this point.
- 2.
One could add at this point long and detailed discussions about the interrelation of phenomenology and agency. I will merely refer to Tim Henning’s exposition (2009).
References
Buchanan, Alan, and Dan Brock. 1989. Deciding for others. The ethics of surrogate decision making. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Carrol, Lewis, and Martin Gardner. 1960. The annotated alice. London: Penguin.
Charland, Louis. 1998. Is Mr. Spock mentally competent? Competence to consent and emotion. Philosophy, Psychology, Psychiatry 5(1): 67–81.
Drane, James. 1985. The many faces of competency. Hastings Center Report 15(2): 17–21.
Earman, John. 1986. A primer on determinism. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Goetz, Stewart. 2008. Freedom, teleology, and evil. Continuum studies in philosophy of religion. London: Continuum.
Henning, Tim. 2009. Person sein und Geschichten erzählen: Eine Studie über personale Autonomie und narrative Gründe. Quellen und Studien zur Philosophie, vol 90. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
Jacobs, Jonathan. 2007. Causal powers. A neo-aristotelian metaphysic. PhD dissertation, Indiana University.
Mele, Alfred. 2009. Effective intentions. The power of conscious will. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Strawson, Galen. 2009. The self. In The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind. Oxford handbooks, ed. Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann, and Sven Walter, 542–564. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
White, Betty. 1994. Competence to consent. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 2001. Philosophische Untersuchungen, kritisch-genetische Edition ed. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2017 Springer International Publishing AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Jaskolla, L. (2017). Mental Causation, Persistence, and Grounding. In: Real Fourdimensionalism. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 130. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65927-5_9
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65927-5_9
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-65926-8
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-65927-5
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)