Abstract
The eighth chapter explicates a theory of mental causation based on general considerations concerning the nature of causal being. Against the background of a broadly Aristotelian framework, I discuss productive and structuring causation. I then apply these terms to the theory of Real Fourdimensionalism as discussed in Chap. 7
Keywords
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- 1.
Tim Crane – among others – has pointed out that my approach has reasonable similarities to the account proposed by Fred Dretske in his Explaining Behaviour. There are structural similarities. Yet, because of the fact that I do not share Dretske’s ontology of the mind, I refrain from referring to him as ‘roots’ of my approach; see Dretske (1991, chapter 3) and Dretske (1993, 128).
- 2.
A similar idea can be found in Michael Tooley’s concept of ‘control’. In contrast to Tooley (1997, 111), I argue that the constraints set by structuring causation are not necessarily instances of abstract causal laws. As well as in Gregg Rosenberg’s concept of causal significance (2004, 158); see also McKritrick (2006, 2).
- 3.
Of course, the argument has not been proposed in this specific way. Nevertheless, I think that a close look at typical argumentative strategies in recent philosophy of mind take this general approach to criticize the causal relevance of the mental. See for example Ehring (1996, 461) and Ehring (2011, ch. 5).
- 4.
I have already motivated this figure of thought in Sect. 1.2 of the introductory part.
- 5.
The idea of decisions as causally relevant factors entails that not every instance of structuring causation falls under strict causal laws – see concerning this point the refutation of strict causal laws for physics – and accordingly renders the respective position as a version of singularism as defined by Michael Tooley (1997, 100).
- 6.
- 7.
Additions in italics and […] by the author.
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Jaskolla, L. (2017). The Exposition of PSP: Part II. In: Real Fourdimensionalism. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 130. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65927-5_8
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