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The Exposition of PSP: Part I

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Real Fourdimensionalism

Part of the book series: Philosophical Studies Series ((PSSP,volume 130))

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Abstract

The seventh chapter revolves around steps towards a positive theory of Real Fourdimensionalism or phhysicalistic stage-panexperientialism. I start out from a discussion of different versions of panpsychism. I then delineate the central characteristics of Galen Strawson’s version of panpsychism and his SESMET theory. Finally, I extend Strawson’s thought and discuss different aspects of a general theory of the universe.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Translation by Hicks (1907).

  2. 2.

    As far as I can see, at least one problem arises when comparing Mental Reality with Strawson’s later work on monism: in Mental Reality, he opts for a position called Agnostic Monism, which argues that we should remain silent concerning the question concerning the extent of our knowledge of the non-mental. Thus, a certain asymmetry between Mental Reality and the later works arises, which makes this discussion a little more complicated.

  3. 3.

    Insertions in brackets (=…) mine.

  4. 4.

    Both the discussion of Russell monism as well as Idealism are extensions of Strawson’s original ideas. I nevertheless, think that they are validated in the sense that they apply Strawson’s presuppositions to other problems.

  5. 5.

    A word of caution is needed here: I will at several points during the next paragraphs use words like ‘constitution’, ‘dependence’ and other correlative words to describe the relation of self-experience and outer experience. These words are meant not to denote ontological one-sided dependence, but to denote a conceptual interrelation in the sense that those terms always occur together.

  6. 6.

    I am using ‘accompany’ in a Kantian context here – denoting that fact that self-experience is essential to any other form of experience: “Diejenige Vorstellung, die vor allem Denken gegeben sein kann, heißt Anschauung. Also hat alles Mannigfaltige der Anschauung eine notwendige Beziehung auf das: Ich denke, in demselben Subjekt, darin dieses Mannigfaltige angetroffen wird.” (Kant 1904, KrV, B 132).

  7. 7.

    I have transformed Strawson’s version from masjucules to normal letters to facilitate reading. Having introduced the E-S-C identity thesis earlier, I can suppress Strawson’s terminology which discerns phenomenological speaking (=in majuscules) from ontological speaking (=normal letters).

  8. 8.

    Insertions in brackets mine.

  9. 9.

    Additions in italics mine.

  10. 10.

    Please note that ESFD monism is not identical to equal status monism – it is rather the case that both S-monism and ESFD monism are versions of equal status monism (Strawson 1994, 77–78).

  11. 11.

    Once again: a detailed analysis of Strawson’s argument would go far beyond the scope of this essay. Nevertheless, I think that my argument depicts Strawsonian intuitions.

  12. 12.

    Strawson’s reading of Hume has been heavily contested – one of the best examples is certainly Ruth Millican’s 2009 Hume, Causal Realism, and Causal Science: “And it follows that the New Hume interpretation is not just wrong in detail – failing in the many ways documented above – but fundamentally misrepresents the basis, core, point and spirit of Hume’s philosophy of causation.” (Millican 2009, 708). Without claiming to be a Hume expert, I find Strawson’s exposition of Hume’s thought compelling. Nevertheless, if Strawson’s interpretation should be mistaken, this does not affect the argument presented here.

  13. 13.

    Additions in {…} be me.

  14. 14.

    Godehard Brüntrup has pointed me to one interesting problem: What about the ‘experience of Nirvana’ in Buddhist meditation? Concerning my definition, I would assume that although seemingly about nothing, these states exhibit some kind of intentional structure. I lack a good answer to this problem at the moment.

  15. 15.

    Insertion in {…} be me. Kriegel qualifies adverbialism as a non-relational version of intentionality, which is certainly correct if one understands relational intentionality as intentionality that is about something mind-external.

  16. 16.

    That this is possible, even desirable, shows for example Ehring (2011, 100–106).

  17. 17.

    Indeed, I think that my limitations (a) and (b) exceed the scope of Descartes’ project. And because of this fact, it seems futile to interpret Descartes as holding the one or the other view.

  18. 18.

    The preceding symbol denotes the usage of the were-would-operator of counterfactual conditionals as defined by David Lewis (1986b, 1–2).

  19. 19.

    Comment: This not a version of radical holism stating that every individual experience the whole world at every spatio-temporal location. Rather it is a version of the Whiteheadian idea that everything is related to everything else with reasonable gradations (Whitehead 1929/1978, 22 (iv)). Similar directions of thought can be sometimes found in Galen Strawson’s recurrence (2009c, 8.12) to Spinoza.

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  1. Munich School of Philosophy, Munich, Germany

    Ludwig Jaskolla

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Jaskolla, L. (2017). The Exposition of PSP: Part I. In: Real Fourdimensionalism. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 130. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65927-5_7

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