Abstract
After a short explanation of case selection and introduction, this chapter discusses three within-cases associated with the grand strategy design input of diplomacy. The analyzed cases are China’s involvement in the Ukraine Crisis, its engagement of the Arctic Council, as well as the ‘One Belt, One Road’ major initiative. Each within-case study contains an introduction, course of events, analysis of relationship with honor and legitimacy, alternative explanations, and a summary.
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Notes
- 1.
See Luttwak (2012) for an in-depth account of this.
- 2.
- 3.
See Zhang (2015).
- 4.
- 5.
Tibet is the only clear case of Han-Chinese population which China claims as its inherent territory. An exception to this is the ‘detour’ claim of arguing that ‘South Tibet’ should be part of the Tibetan Autonomous Region of China, or possibly that ‘Outer Mongolia ’ should be part of the Chinese ‘Inner Mongolia’ province.
- 6.
In the event that China goes against the United States or its allies in East Asia, Southeast Asia, or South Asia, conforming to anti-hegemonism may also carry an accusation of China’s own implicit regional hegemonic ambitions.
- 7.
See Luttwak (2012).
- 8.
See Luttwak (2012).
- 9.
Russia —connected to its long-standing obsession with gaining access to ice-free ports—Port Arthur (today’s Lüshunkou district of Dalian city) was annexed during that time in history, and a railway from the Russian homeland all the way to Port Arthur was built to gain access to this ice-free sea haven. Incidentally, the recent annexation of Crimea is equally connected to the Russian search for ice-free sea ports much like this late nineteenth-/early twentieth-century case.
- 10.
For a comprehensive analysis of China’s strategy toward the Arctic, see Abel (2012).
- 11.
See Chap. 5 for more information on these FTAs.
- 12.
The EU had also applied for permanent observer status during the 2013 Kiruna meeting of the AC . In a sense, the EU would have been a good counterweight to China, but likely due to the restrictive stance on fishing rights in Brussels, this was not a viable option for the AC . Instead, India alone, along with Japan and South Korea , was the better alternative in this case.
- 13.
Unless otherwise stated, this chapter will refer to OBOR as a diplomatic initiative, since the term strategy in the context of diplomacy might be confused with the security concepts of grand strategy , tactics, and so forth.
- 14.
An earlier version of this subchapter was published in parts in Danner (2016).
- 15.
Here, too, one cannot help but think of the Chinese equivalent of the Russian obsession with ice-free seaports; that is, the possibility of facing a hypothetical traumatic experience in the form of a U.S.-initiated naval blockade on the Malacca Strait , which is central to the maritime Silk Road and China’s access to trading with much of the world via ships. It seems that a hedging behavior underlies many such diplomatic initiatives and infrastructural projects, which seem altruistic at first but paranoid at second glance. Also, consider China’s interest in the Arctic and possible future sea routes via an ice-free global North. See prior subchapter for more information.
- 16.
- 17.
- 18.
Laos , Myanmar , or Cambodia are not APEC members, as they do not border the Pacific Ocean.
- 19.
For more information about the 2014 Central Economic Work Conference, see Tiezzi (2014c) and Xinhua (2014a).
- 20.
See also Xinhua (2015c).
- 21.
The ‘first face of power’: ‘Payment or economic inducement to do what you initially did not want to may seem more attractive to the subject, but any payment can easily be turned into a negative sanction by the implicit or explicit threat of its removal. (…) Moreover, in unequal bargaining relationships, (…) a paltry ‘take it or leave it’ payment may give the [LDC] little sense of choice’ (Nye 2011, p. 12). The ‘second face of power’: ‘If ideas and institutions can be used to frame the agenda for action in a way that make others’ preferences seem irrelevant or out of bounds, then it may be possible to shape others’ preferences by affecting their expectations of what is legitimate or feasible. Agenda-framing focuses on the ability to keep issues off the table, or as Sherlock Holmes might put it, dogs that fail to bark’ (Nye 2011, p. 12). The ‘third face of power’: ‘[I]deas and beliefs also help shape others’ initial preferences. (…) [One] can also exercise power over [another] by determining [their] very wants. [One] can shape [others’] basic or initial preferences, not merely change the situation in a way that makes [them] change [their] strategy for achieving [one’s] preferences. (…) If [one] can get others to want the same outcomes that [one] wants, it will not be necessary to override their initial desires’ (Nye 2011, p. 13).
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Danner, L.K. (2018). Diplomatic Case Studies. In: China’s Grand Strategy . Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65777-6_4
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