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Main Arguments Against the Use of PPM Measures

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Environmental Process and Production Methods (PPMs) in WTO Law

Part of the book series: European Yearbook of International Economic Law ((EYIELMONO,volume 3))

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Abstract

The legality of PPM measures has been one of the most controversial issues in WTO law. If these instruments have given rise to intense debates, it is because strong arguments against their use and against their prohibition coexist.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See e.g., on the one hand, Hudec (2000), p. 188 (stating that the US – Tuna reports, which basically outlawed PPM measures under the GATT 1947, were ‘greeted by a storm of protest from environmental organizations and other allied groups’) and, on the other hand, Bhagwati (2004), p. 157 (stating about the US – Shrimp report, which eventually upheld a non-product-related PPM measure, that it ‘left many observers in the developing countries outraged’ and that it was a ‘dangerous’ decision because it opened up a ‘Pandora’s box’). See also Charnovitz (2002), p. 59 (stating that PPMs are the subject of one of the ‘most knotty controversies’ in the trade and environment debate. He also asserts on p. 61 that the US – Shrimp case demonstrated ‘the cloud of suspicion surrounding the application of PPMs’).

  2. 2.

    Bagwell et al. (2002), p. 76; Horn and Mavroidis (2008), p. 1125 et passim; Jansen and Lugard (1999), p. 533 and n. 6 p. 535; Schoenbaum (1997), pp. 279 f. See also Jackson (1992), p. 1244 who argues that ‘[p]ossibly these exceptions should be limited to the situation where governments are protecting matters that occur within their territorial jurisdiction’; US – Tuna II, para. 5.17. See also infra, Chap. 5.

  3. 3.

    This view has not remained uncontested. See infra, Chap. 5.

  4. 4.

    See e.g. Brownlie (2012), pp. 456 ff.

  5. 5.

    This view has not remained uncontested. See infra, Chap. 5.

  6. 6.

    Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Amongst States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, UNGA Res. 2131, UN, GAOR, 20th Sess., UN Doc A/6220 (1965), Chap. 1 (b) (‘[n]o state may use or encourage the use of economic, political, or any other type of measures to coerce another state in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights or to secure from it advantages of any kind’).

  7. 7.

    Gathii (2000), pp. 2029 f. See also the arguments of the complainants in the US – Shrimp case, Panel Report, para. 3.6, 3.41, 3.104 and particularly 3.157.

  8. 8.

    See infra, Chap. 5.

  9. 9.

    UNGA Res. 2635, UN GAOR, 25th Sess., UN Doc. A/8028 (1970); Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration. See also infra, Chap. 4.

  10. 10.

    See infra, Chap. 4.

  11. 11.

    See e.g. US – Tuna I (United States v. Mexico) and US – Shrimp (United States v. India, Malaysia, Thailand and Pakistan). See also Charnovitz (2002), pp. 62 f.

  12. 12.

    Declaration of the South Summit from the Group of 77, 12–14 April 2000, para. 21, p. 7 (‘[w]hile recognizing the value of environmental protection, labour standards […] and protection of all universally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms, […] we reject all attempts to use these issues as conditionalities for restricting market access or aid and technology flows to developing countries’).

  13. 13.

    Bierman (2001), p. 433.

  14. 14.

    Esty (1994), p. 185.

  15. 15.

    Ibid., p. 184.

  16. 16.

    Bierman (2001), p. 433.

  17. 17.

    Esty (1994), pp. 185 ff.; Jackson (1992), p. 1230.

  18. 18.

    OECD (1997b), p. 33.

  19. 19.

    Bhagwati (1993), p. 174; Bhagwati (2004), p. 155.

  20. 20.

    See infra, Chap. 4.

  21. 21.

    Esty (1994), p. 182.

  22. 22.

    See e.g. Bhagwati (1993), pp. 186 f.

  23. 23.

    US – Tuna II, Panel Report, para. 5.26; US –Tuna I, Panel Report, para. 5.28.

  24. 24.

    US –Tuna I, Panel Report, para. 5.28.

  25. 25.

    See e.g. GATT Secretariat (1992) (‘[i]n principle, it is not possible under GATT’s rules to make access to one’s own market dependent on the domestic environmental policies or practices of the exporting country’). See also Hudec (2000), p. 189, with further references; Charnovitz (2002), pp. 76 f., with further references; Schoenbaum (1997), pp. 288 and 290; Okubo (1999), pp. 618 ff.; Marceau (2002), p. 807; Joshi (2004), p. 79; Pauwelyn (2004), p. 585.

  26. 26.

    Bhagwati (2004), pp. 154 f. (stating that the fear of allowing PPMs measures ‘was that an open-ended grant of exception on values-related PPMs could lead to a slippery slope and a flood of exclusions that could not be challenged’); GATT Secretariat (1992) (‘[i]f the door were opened to use trade policies unilaterally to offset the competitiveness effects of different environmental standards, or to attempt to force other countries to adopt domestically-favoured practices and policies, the trading system would start down a very slippery slope’); Jackson (1992), pp. 1241 f.

  27. 27.

    Cosbey (2002), pp. 13 f.; Petersmann (1996), p. 50 et passim.

  28. 28.

    Jackson (1992), p. 1235 (‘[e]nvironmental policies can be so easily used as an excuse for protectionism’).

  29. 29.

    Bhagwati (1993), p. 171. See also GATT Secretariat (1992), explaining that the rationale for the exclusion of PPMs is ‘that to do otherwise would invite a flood of import restrictions’.

  30. 30.

    GATT Secretariat (1992).

  31. 31.

    Jackson (1992), p. 1231.

  32. 32.

    See Bhagwati (1993), p. 167; Jackson (1992), p. 1231; Jackson (1997), pp. 236 f.

  33. 33.

    Jackson (1997), p. 237.

  34. 34.

    See e.g. Trebilcock and Giri (2004), p. 57. It has also been argued that certain differences in internal regulations represent merely cost advantages, which are not relevant for the achievement of efficiency, for instance when two countries produce the same externality but only one of them internalises these costs (see Howse and Regan 2000, p. 281).

  35. 35.

    See Howse and Regan (2000), p. 281. They argue that this cost advantage would be derived to mere legal facts, while foreign producers would produce the same externality on a shared resource as domestic producers. See also Chang (1995), pp. 2131 ff.

  36. 36.

    For further details, see infra, 7.1.2.2.

  37. 37.

    See GATT Secretariat (1992) (explaining that the rationale for the exclusion of PPMs is ‘that to do otherwise would invite a flood of import restrictions’); Jackson (1992), pp. 1241 f.

  38. 38.

    See US – Tuna I, Panel Report, para. 5.28; US – Tuna II, Panel Report, para. 5.26.

  39. 39.

    Esty (1994), pp. 35 ff.

  40. 40.

    Strauss (1998), p. 771.

  41. 41.

    See infra, Chap. 3.

  42. 42.

    See infra, Chap. 4.

  43. 43.

    See in particular infra, 7.1.2.1.

  44. 44.

    See US – Shrimp 21.5, Appellate Body Report.

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  1. University of Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland

    David Sifonios

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Sifonios, D. (2018). Main Arguments Against the Use of PPM Measures. In: Environmental Process and Production Methods (PPMs) in WTO Law. European Yearbook of International Economic Law(), vol 3. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65726-4_2

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