Reflections on Corruption in the Context of Political and Economic Liberalization

  • Pranab Bardhan
Part of the International Economic Association Series book series (IEA)


The chapter is in the nature of a partial overview, with a focus on some issues as yet rather inadequately discussed in the literature on Corruption and Development. After discussing different types of corruption and their differential implications for policy, it goes into the specific issue of the complexities in the relationships between economic and political liberalization and the incidence of corruption.


Economic liberalization Corruption Democracy 


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of California at BerkeleyBerkeleyUSA

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