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Reflections on Corruption in the Context of Political and Economic Liberalization

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Institutions, Governance and the Control of Corruption

Part of the book series: International Economic Association Series ((IEA))

Abstract

The chapter is in the nature of a partial overview, with a focus on some issues as yet rather inadequately discussed in the literature on Corruption and Development. After discussing different types of corruption and their differential implications for policy, it goes into the specific issue of the complexities in the relationships between economic and political liberalization and the incidence of corruption.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, USA

    Pranab Bardhan

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  1. Pranab Bardhan
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Correspondence to Pranab Bardhan .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. The World Bank, Washington, DC, USA

    Kaushik Basu

  2. The World Bank, Washington, DC, USA

    Tito Cordella

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Bardhan, P. (2018). Reflections on Corruption in the Context of Political and Economic Liberalization. In: Basu, K., Cordella, T. (eds) Institutions, Governance and the Control of Corruption. International Economic Association Series. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65684-7_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65684-7_5

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  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-73822-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-65684-7

  • eBook Packages: Economics and FinanceEconomics and Finance (R0)

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