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Pluralism About Knowledge

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Epistemic Pluralism

Part of the book series: Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy ((PIIP))

Abstract

In this chapter, I consider the prospects for pluralism about knowledge , that is, the view that there is a plurality of knowledge relations. After a brief overview of some views that entail a sort of pluralism about knowledge , I focus on a particular kind of knowledge pluralism I call standards pluralism. Put roughly, standards pluralism is the view that one never knows anything simpliciter. Rather, one knows by this-or-that epistemic standard. Because there is a plurality of epistemic standards, there is a plurality of knowledge relations. In §2, I argue that one can construct an impressive case for standards pluralism. In §3, I clarify the relationship between standards pluralism, epistemic contextualism and epistemic relativism. In §4, I argue that standards pluralism faces a serious objection. The gist of the objection is that standards pluralism is incompatible with plausible claims about the normative role of knowledge . In §5, I finish by sketching the form that a standards pluralist response to this objection might take.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Vienna, 1010, Vienna, Austria

    Robin McKenna

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  1. Robin McKenna
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Correspondence to Robin McKenna .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of California Irvine, Irvine, California, USA

    Annalisa Coliva

  2. Yonsey International Campus, Underwood International College, Incheon, Korea (Republic of)

    Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen

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McKenna, R. (2017). Pluralism About Knowledge. In: Coliva, A., Jang Lee Linding Pedersen, N. (eds) Epistemic Pluralism. Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65460-7_7

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