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A Pluralistic Way Out of Epistemic Deflationism About Ontological Disputes

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Epistemic Pluralism

Part of the book series: Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy ((PIIP))

Abstract

Epistemicism about the debate on material composition (Bennett 2009) has it that there are too little grounds to believe any of the competing theories—Nihilism , Universalism and intermediate positions. Although an epistemic critique of this debate deserves serious consideration, I wish to resist epistemicism by countering it with a form of epistemic relativism. I will argue that each party to the debate is justified relative to the ranking of theoretical features and virtues that is “internal” to each position. I will urge that this view is to be preferred to epistemicism on account of its greater charity towards the participants involved in the relevant ontological debate.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Vienna, Vienna, 1010, Austria

    Delia Belleri

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  1. Delia Belleri
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Correspondence to Delia Belleri .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of California Irvine, Irvine, California, USA

    Annalisa Coliva

  2. Yonsey International Campus, Underwood International College, Incheon, Korea (Republic of)

    Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen

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Belleri, D. (2017). A Pluralistic Way Out of Epistemic Deflationism About Ontological Disputes. In: Coliva, A., Jang Lee Linding Pedersen, N. (eds) Epistemic Pluralism. Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65460-7_12

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