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Rethinking Secularism as a Political Principle in the Middle East: From Negative to Positive Understanding and Perception of Secularism

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The Sources of Secularism

Abstract

In the existing literature on secularism in the 2000s, it is commonly argued that secularism is in crisis. Although it was accused by scholars of generating conflict among identities, today there is a consensus to rethink secularism as an inclusionary and democratic principle. However, rethinking secularism cannot be separated from historical democratic gains, such as basic rights and/or gender equality. In that respect, rethinking secularism should be based on universal basic rights, equality, and freedom. In this paper, it is claimed that discourses of some intellectuals and political elites in the Middle East provide certain clues that point to the emergence of secularism with that new perception, which is egalitarian and liberal. Although they have some inconsistencies in their discourses, and they are not full-fledged secularists, it is significant to inquire whether their discourses about secularism comply with rethinking secularism.

In this paper, we argue that secularism is gaining acceptance among the intellectual circles of Middle Eastern countries, especially in Turkey, Iran, and Tunisia. Although these countries have experienced a kind of Islamization and/or fusion of religion and power at the state or social level, the recent developments point to the increasing acceptance of secularism as a way to avoid fundamentalism and radical conservatism. It should be added that this phenomenon is so new that it can only be seen in the discourses of intellectuals, and not yet at the popular level. That is why this paper will focus on the intellectual discourses and party declarations concerning secularism. While taking this phenomenon into consideration, it is also argued that secularism is put forward as an inclusionary, liberal, and egalitarian concept as a requirement for democracy in these countries. The negative image of secularism is nurtured by its near history in the Middle East where authoritarian leaders and administration implemented it to exclude groups of people from participation in the political process. In that respect, the early history of secularism in the Middle East shows that it was used to consolidate the powerful position of the elites. However, today it is seen as an emancipatory and egalitarian requirement for democracy against radical conservatism and nationalism . That is why this new understanding of secularism is more related to political liberalism.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See, e.g., C. Taylor, “Why We Need a Radical Redefinition of Secularism,” in E. Mendieta and J. VanAntwerpen (eds.), The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere, Columbia University Press, New York 2011, pp. 34–59, and R. Bhargava, “Rehabilitating Secularism” in C. Calhoun, M. Juergensmeyer and J. VanAntwerpen (eds.), Rethinking Secularism, Oxford University Press, New York 2011, pp. 92–113.

  2. 2.

    See, e.g., A. Stepan, “The Multiple Secularisms of Modern Democratic and Non-Democratic Regimes,” American Political Science Association 2010. Retrieved from https://ssrn.com/abstract=1643701, on Jun 12, 2017; V. Bader, Secularism or Democracy, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 2007; T. Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam and Modernity, Stanford University Press, Stanford 2003, and S. Mahmood, Religious Difference in a Secular Age, Princeton University Press, Princeton 2015.

  3. 3.

    V. Nasr, “Secularism: Lessons from the Muslim World,” Daedalus 132 (3), 2003, pp. 67–72, and idem, “European Colonialism and the Emergence of Modern Muslim States,” Oxford Islamic Studies Online. Retrieved from http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/book/islam-9780195107999/islam-9780195107999-chapter-13 on Jun 12, 2017.

  4. 4.

    C. Taylor, “Modes of Secularism,” in R. Bhargava (ed.), Secularism and Its Critics, Oxford University Press, New Delhi 1999, p. 33.

  5. 5.

    R. Bhargava (“Rehabilitating Secularism,” op. cit., p. 95) draws attention to the fact that religious diversity is of two kinds. First, the diversity of religions exists in a society where “the people adhere to faiths with very diverse ethoses, origins and civilizational backgrounds.” This kind of religious diversity exists, for example, in a society that has Muslims and Jews, or Muslims and Buddhists, or Christians and Muslims, and so on. Second, diversity within religion refers to internal differences within a religious group and is of two sorts: “horizontal” diversity and “vertical” diversity. Whereas horizontal diversity is about internal differentiations within a religion through sects, denominations, and confessions such as Catholicism , Orthodoxy, and Protestantism in Christianity, Sunni and Shi’a in Islam, vertical diversity refers to the cleavages through hierarchical relations among the people of the same religion.

  6. 6.

    John Rawls, Political Liberalism. Expanded Edition, Columbia University Press, New York 2005, pp. 3–4.

  7. 7.

    Ibid., pp. 9–11.

  8. 8.

    See, e.g., C. Taylor, “Modes of Secularism,” op. cit., R. Bhargava, “Rehabilitating Secularism,” op. cit., and J. Baubérot, “The Evolution of Secularism in France: Between Two Civil Religions,” in L.E. Cady and E. Shakman (eds.), Comparative Secularisms in A Global Age, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2011, pp. 57–68.

  9. 9.

    C. Taylor, “Modes of Secularism,” op. cit.

  10. 10.

    See “Declaration Universelle Sur la Laïcité au XXIe Siecle” signed by 250 intellectuals, Le Monde, Dec 12, 2005.

  11. 11.

    We refer to Rawls’ notion of the political, which is one of the primary concepts that he uses in the Political Liberalism. In Rawlsian sense, “the political” can be best understood in contrast to “the comprehensive.” For Rawls, a conception is “comprehensive” if it is concerned with what is of value in human life and ideals of personal virtue and character (J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, op. cit., p. 175). A “political” conception, on the contrary, is about the basic structure, that is, the main political, social, and economic institutions, of the society and thus it applies to all citizens regardless of their identities and the comprehensive doctrines they affirm (ibid., p. 11). In that sense, “the political” is distinguished from “the comprehensive” with regard to its scope: whereas a political conception provides a guiding framework that helps reach a political agreement on issues concerning the basic structure including the constitutional essentials and basic questions of justice, comprehensive conceptions comprise non-political values and virtues that inevitably create gaps between individuals’ conscientious convictions (ibid., p. 156). Therefore, if a concept is political, then it does not presuppose a comprehensive doctrine and can thus be shared by all citizens regarded as free and equal (ibid., p. 176).

  12. 12.

    See R. Bhargava, “What is Secularism for?,” in R. Bhargava (ed.), Secularism and Its Critics, op. cit., pp. 512–514.

  13. 13.

    C. Taylor, “Modes of Secularism,” op. cit., pp. 36, 41.

  14. 14.

    Ibid., p. 36.

  15. 15.

    Ibid., pp. 38–39.

  16. 16.

    Commission de Réflexion sur l’Application du Principe de Laïcité dans la République, “Rapport Stasi au Président de la République,” La Documentation Française, Paris 2003.

  17. 17.

    One of the most striking critiques came from Jean Baubérot, a professor of sociology, who was also a member of the Stasi Commission. He argued that the law was against the Law of 1905 as well as the logic of laïcité due to its exclusionary consequences and particularly the fact that it can possibly lead Muslim girls to avoiding public education and to obliging their parents to finance private education for them, in spite of the fact that the provision of public education has a constitutive role in the established conception of laïcité. See J. Baubérot, “La laïcité, le chêne et le roseau,” Liberation, Dec 15, 2003. Retrieved from http://www.liberation.fr/tribune/2003/12/15/la-laicite-le-chene-et-le-roseau_455449, on Jun 23, 2017. For a more detailed discussion on the exclusionary aspects of the new law, see M. Akan, “Laïcité and Multiculturalism: The Stasi Report in Context,” British Journal of Sociology 60 (2), 2009, pp. 237–256.

  18. 18.

    J. Cohen, “Rethinking Political Secularism and the American Model of Constitutional Dualism,” in J. Cohen and C. Laborde (eds.), Religion, Secularism and Constitutional Democracy, Columbia University Press, New York, p. 121.

  19. 19.

    R. Bhargava, “What is Secularism for?,” op. cit., pp. 514–516.

  20. 20.

    T.N. Madan, “Secularism in its Place,” in R. Bhargava (ed.), Secularism and Its Critics, op. cit., p. 307.

  21. 21.

    For a detailed discussion, see R. Bhargava, “Is European Secularism Secular Enough?,” in Religion, Secularism and Constitutional Democracy, op. cit., pp. 157–181.

  22. 22.

    A.A. An-Na’im, Islam and the Secular State, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA and London 2008, and N. Hashemi, Islam, Secularism and Liberal Democracy, Oxford University Press, New York 2009.

  23. 23.

    N.R. Keddie, “Secularism and Its Discontents,” Daedalus 132 (3), 2003, p. 14.

  24. 24.

    Ibid.

  25. 25.

    A. Tamimi, “The Origins of Arab Secularism,” in J.L. Esposito and A. Tamimi (eds.), Islam and Secularism in the Middle East, New York University Press, New York 2000, p. 17.

  26. 26.

    E.E. Shahin, “Secularism Manipulating Islam: Politics and Religion in Tunisia,” unpublished ms. Retrieved from http://emadshahin.com/eshahin2/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Secularism-Tunisia-Final.pdf, on Jun 12, 2017, p. 4.

  27. 27.

    For a detailed review of this debate, see A. Tamimi, “The Origins of Arab Secularism,” op. cit., pp. 18–28.

  28. 28.

    J.L. Esposito, “Introduction: Islam and Secularism in the Twenty-First Century,” in J.L. Esposito and A. Tamini (eds.), Islam and Secularism in the Middle East, op. cit., p. 2.

  29. 29.

    R. Jahanbegloo, “Two Concepts of Secularism,” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 31 (1), 2011, p. 14.

  30. 30.

    E.E. Shahin, “Secularism Manipulating Islam: Politics and Religion in Tunisia,” op. cit., p. 6.

  31. 31.

    R. Al-Ghannouchi, “Secularism in the Arab Maghreb,” in J.L. Esposito and A. Tamini (eds.), Islam and Secularism in the Middle East, op. cit., p. 105.

  32. 32.

    E.E. Shahin, “Secularism Manipulating Islam: Politics and Religion in Tunisia,” op. cit., p. 7, and R. Al-Ghannouchi, “Secularism in the Arab Maghreb,” op. cit., pp. 98–99.

  33. 33.

    E.E. Shahin, “Secularism Manipulating Islam…,” op. cit., p. 5.

  34. 34.

    Ibid.

  35. 35.

    J.L. Esposito, “Introduction: Islam and Secularism in the Twenty-First Century,” op. cit., p. 9.

  36. 36.

    See R. Al-Ghannouchi, “Secularism in the Arab Maghreb,” op. cit., p. 98, and G. Haarscher, “Religious Revival and Pseudo-Secularism,” Cardozo Law Review 30, 2009, pp. 2799–2819.

  37. 37.

    It is important to underline that what motivates us to define the form of secularism previously dominant in the Middle East as “pseudo-secularism” is not any theoretical distinction from the Western forms of secularism but its political practices that contradict the humanist ideals of political secularism (although this is often the case in the West, too).

  38. 38.

    R. Jahanbegloo, “Two Concepts of Secularism,” op. cit., and D. Hopwood, Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 1992, p. 84.

  39. 39.

    T. Atabaki, “Türkiye ve İran’da Hilafet, Ulema ve Cumhuriyetçilik: Karşılaştırmalı Bazı Tespitler,” in T. Atabaki and E.J. Zürcher (eds.), Türkiye ve İran’da Otoriter Modernleşme Atatürk ve Rıza Şah Dönemleri, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, Istanbul 2012, p. 43.

  40. 40.

    H. Katouzian, “Rıza Şah Döneminde Devlet ve Toplum,” in T. Atabaki and E.J. Zürcher (eds.), Türkiye ve İran’da Otoriter Modernleşme…, op. cit., p. 32.

  41. 41.

    E. Abrahamian, Modern İran Tarihi, Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, Istanbul 2014, p. 113.

  42. 42.

    In the Turkish language, the word laiklik means secularism. It has its roots in the French word “laïque” and is thus commonly considered synonymous with laïcité. However, the similarity between the two concepts is not merely syntactical. For example, scholars have compared the semantic connotations of the French laïcité and Turkish laiklik in the literature, generally emphasizing their “assertive” character and the limitations they set to the public visibility of religion (see, e.g., A.T. Kuru, Secularism and State Policies Towards Religion: United States, France and Turkey, Cambridge University Press, New York 2007). Nevertheless, despite the semantic similarities with the French laïcité, there is one significant difference: in Turkey, laiklik has always been understood as an attribute of the state, not so much of individuals, which enables the state to intervene in religious affairs. This kind of the understanding of laiklik is far older than the concept itself, and has been inherited from the territorial ancestors of Turkey, from Ottoman and Byzantine Empires. See I. Gozaydın, “Bizans, Osmanlı ve Cumhuriyet… Üçünde de din devletin kontrolünde,” Jan 28, 2015. Retrieved from http://sosyal.hurriyet.com.tr/yazar/ahmet-hakan_131/bizans-osmanli-ve-cumhuriyet-ucunde-de-din-devletin-kontrolunde_28065223, on Jun 12, 2017.

  43. 43.

    R. McCarthy, “Re-thinking Secularism in Post-Independence Tunisia,” The Journal of North African Studies 19 (5), 2014, pp. 734–735.

  44. 44.

    Ibid., p. 741.

  45. 45.

    See O. Göksel, “Perceptions of the Turkish Model in Post-Revolutionary Tunisia,” Turkish Studies 15 (3), 2014, pp. 476–495.

  46. 46.

    Declassified documents from CIA show that both USA and British governments had a role in this coup d’état. See, e.g., the Guardian article, “CIA Admits a Role in 1953 Iranian Coup” from Aug 19, 2013. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/19/cia-admits-role-1953-iranian-coup, on Jun 12, 2017.

  47. 47.

    E. Abrahamian, Modern İran Tarihi, op. cit., p. 167.

  48. 48.

    Ibid.

  49. 49.

    F. Volpi, “Explaining and (Re-Explaining) Political Change in the Middle East During the Arab Spring: Trajectories of Democratization and of Authoritarianism in the Maghreb,” Democratization 20 (6), 2013, pp. 69–99.

  50. 50.

    In fact, religious intellectuals formulated secular demands in the 1990s on the basis of the Islamic worldview because of their fear of the Islamic regime. They can be called “cautious” secularists.

  51. 51.

    H. Dabashi, İran: Ketlenmiş Halk, Metis Yayıncılık, Istanbul 2008, p. 143.

  52. 52.

    Ibid.

  53. 53.

    E. Abrahamian, Modern İran Tarihi, op. cit., p. 161.

  54. 54.

    Ibid.

  55. 55.

    H. Dabashi, İran: Ketlenmiş Halk, op. cit., p. 146.

  56. 56.

    E. Abrahamian, Modern İran Tarihi, op. cit., p. 196.

  57. 57.

    Ibid., p. 199.

  58. 58.

    Ibid.

  59. 59.

    Ibid., p. 187.

  60. 60.

    A. Mirsepassi, Intellectual Discourse and the Politics of Modernization, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2000, p. 96.

  61. 61.

    Ibid., p. 99.

  62. 62.

    Ibid., p. 101.

  63. 63.

    Ibid., p. 114.

  64. 64.

    Ibid., p. 116.

  65. 65.

    D. Kandiyoti, “The Travails of the Secular: Puzzle and Paradox in Turkey,” Economy and Society 41 (4), 2000, p. 520.

  66. 66.

    Ibid., p. 521.

  67. 67.

    See E. Rouleau, “Turkey: Beyond Atatürk,” Foreign Policy 103 (2), 1996, pp. 70–87.

  68. 68.

    D. Kandiyoti, “The Travails of the Secular: Puzzle and Paradox in Turkey,” op. cit., p. 524.

  69. 69.

    R. McCarthy, “Re-thinking Secularism in Post-Independence Tunisia,” op. cit., p. 741.

  70. 70.

    Ibid., p. 742.

  71. 71.

    Ibid., p. 743.

  72. 72.

    Ibid., p. 745.

  73. 73.

    E. Murphy, Economic and Political Change in Tunisia: From Bourguiba to Ben Ali, Palgrave Macmillan, London 1999, p. 213.

  74. 74.

    N. Ghobadzadeh and L.Z. Rahimi, “Islamic Reformation Discourses: Popular Sovereignty and Religious Secularization in Iran,” Democratization 19 (2), 2012, p. 336.

  75. 75.

    A. Bayat, Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn, Stanford University Press, Stanford 2007, p. 14.

  76. 76.

    Ibid., p. 52.

  77. 77.

    Ibid., pp. 52–53.

  78. 78.

    M. Kamrava, Iran’s Intellectual Revolution, Cambridge University Press, New York 2008, p. 18.

  79. 79.

    A. Bayat, Making Islam Democratic, op. cit., p. 54.

  80. 80.

    S.A. Arjomand, After Khomeini: Iran under His Successors, Oxford University Press, New York 2009, p. 81.

  81. 81.

    Ibid., p. 50.

  82. 82.

    Ibid., p. 90.

  83. 83.

    A. Bayat, Making Islam Democratic, op. cit., p. 131.

  84. 84.

    Turkish Constitutional Court, Decision no 1998/1, 16 Jan 1998.

  85. 85.

    Y. Akdoğan, Muhafazakar Demokrasi, AK Parti Yayınları, Ankara 2003, pp. 95–100.

  86. 86.

    See e.g. G. Groc, “AKP, Türkiye’deki Laikliğin Derdi mi Dostu mu?,” in S. Akgönül (ed.), Tartışılan Laiklik: Fransa ve Türkiye’de İlkeler ve Algılamalar, Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, Istanbul 2011, p. 45.

  87. 87.

    “Notre voie vers la democratie,” Collectif du 18 Octobre pour les droits et des libertes en Tunisie, a declaration given on Jun 15, 2005. Retrieved from https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BhTPhszPJngNTdqdXd3TFBVRlZQWUtDazY2ZlFNdFFDUU5F/view?pref=2&pli=1,

    on Jun 12, 2017.

  88. 88.

    Ibid., p. 62.

  89. 89.

    M. Somer, “Conquering versus Democratizing the State: Political Islamists and Fourth Wave Democratization in Turkey and Tunisia,” Democratization, online content, 2016, pp. 6–7. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2016.1259216, on Jun 12, 2017.

  90. 90.

    M. Zeghal, “Competing Ways of Life: Islamism, Secularism and Public Order in the Tunisian Transition,” Constellations 20 (2), 2013, p. 8.

  91. 91.

    Ibid.

  92. 92.

    M. Özkan, “Religion, Secularism and Politics in Post-Revolutionary Tunisia,” Raphir: Revista de Antropologia y Filosofia de las Religiones 1 (2), 2014, p. 54.

  93. 93.

    A. Ehtestami and M. Zweiri, Iran and the Rise of its Neoconservatives. The Politics of Tehran’s Silent Revolution, I.B. Tauris, London 2007, p. 65.

  94. 94.

    Ibid., p. 73.

  95. 95.

    Ibid., p. 92.

  96. 96.

    Ibid., p. 90.

  97. 97.

    A. Soroush and R. Khojasteh-Rahimi, “I am not the Reformists’ Godfather: Interview with Abdolkarim Soroush,” Aug 20, 2006. Retrieved from http://www.drsoroush.com/English/Interviews/E-INTIAmNotTheReformistsGodfather.html, on Jun 12, 2017.

  98. 98.

    Ibid.

  99. 99.

    A. Soroush and F. Biazpour, “We Must Have a Referandum in Iran. An interview with Abdolkarim Soroush,” Feb 1, 2010. Retrieved from http://drsoroush.com/en/we-must-have-a-referendum-in-iran/, on Jun 12, 2017.

  100. 100.

    A. Soroush and R. Khojasteh-Rahimi, “I am not the Reformists’ Godfather,” op. cit.

  101. 101.

    Ibid.

  102. 102.

    A. Soroush and F. Biazpour, “We Must Have a Referandum in Iran,” op. cit.

  103. 103.

    A. Soroush and N. Amiri, “The Current Iranian System Rests on Obedience, not Human Rights, Interview with Abdolkarim Soroush,” Mar 1, 2010. Retrieved from

    http://drsoroush.com/en/the-current-iranian-system-rests-on-obedience-nothuman-rights/, on Jun 12, 2017.

  104. 104.

    A. Ganji and C. Taylor, “Akbar Ganji in Conversation with Charles Taylor,” Social Science Research Council, Chicago, Apr 11–12, 2007. Retrieved from http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/wp-content/uploads/2008/12/ganji-taylor-interview3.pdf, p. 7 on Jun 12, 2017.

  105. 105.

    A. Ganji, “The Latter Day Sultan Power and Politics in Iran,” Foreign Affairs, Nov-Dec 2008. Retrieved from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2008-11-01/latter-day-sultan, on Jun 12, 2017.

  106. 106.

    A. Ganji, “Observations on the Repression of Women,” Rooz, May 25, 2007. Retrieved from http://www.roozonline.com/english/opinion/opinion-article/article/observations-on-the-repression-of-women.html, on Jun 12, 2017.

  107. 107.

    A. Ganji, “What Killed Egyptian Democracy,” Boston Review, Jan 21, 2014. Retrieved from http://www.bostonreview.net/forum/what-killed-egyptian-democracy/akbar-ganji-response-egyptian-democracy, on Jun 12, 2017.

  108. 108.

    A. Ganji, “Co-opting the Struggle for Democracy,” Al Jazeera, Nov 23, 2013. Retrieved from

    http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/11/co-opting-struggle-democracy-20131121113428919732.html, on Jun 12, 2017.

  109. 109.

    See R. Bhargava, “Rehabilitating Secularism,” op. cit., p. 97.

  110. 110.

    See AKP Parti, “2002 Genel Seçimleri Seçim Beyannamesi,” Ankara 2002. Retrieved from http://www.akparti.org.tr/upload/documents/2002-beyanname.pdf, on Jun 12, 2017. Cf. Y. Akdoğan, Muhafazakar Demokrasi, op. cit.

  111. 111.

    See Anon., “İşte Erdoğan’ın Vizyon Belgesi,” CNNTurk, Jul 15, 2014. Retrieved from

    http://www.cnnturk.com/fotogaleri/turkiye/iste-erdoganin-vizyon-belgesi?page=1, on Jun 12, 2017.

  112. 112.

    N. Miş and A. Aslan, “Erdoğan Siyaseti ve Kurucu Cumhurbaşkanı Vizyonu,” TMFA Konulu Konferans, Mar 15, 2013. Retrieved from http://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakani-ahmet-davutoglu_nun-diyarbakir-dicle-universitesinde-verdigi-_buyuk-restorasyon_-kadim_den-kuresellesmeye-yeni.tr.mfa, on Jun 12, 2017.

  113. 113.

    AKP Parti, “2002 Genel Seçimleri Seçim Beyannamesi,” op. cit.

  114. 114.

    Anon., “İşte Erdoğan’ın Vizyon Belgesi,” op. cit.

  115. 115.

    Anon., “Erdoğan eğitimi yeniden inşa etmekten, radikal adımlar atmaktan bahsetti,” Diken, Mar 26, 2016. Retrieved from http://www.diken.com.tr/erdogan-sozunden-vazgecmedi-hedefimiz-dindar-nesil-yetistirmek/, on Jun 12, 2017.

  116. 116.

    See Anon., “Dindar Gençlik Yetiştireceğiz,” Hurriyet, Feb 2, 2012. Retrieved from http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/dindar-genclik-yetistirecegiz-19825231, on Jun 12, 2017, and Anon., “Erdoğan hedefine bağlılık bildirdi: Dindar nesil yetiştireceğiz,” Diken, Feb 27, 2016. Retrieved from http://www.diken.com.tr/erdogan-sozunden-vazgecmedi-hedefimiz-dindar-nesil-yetistirmek/, on Jun 12, 2017.

  117. 117.

    See Anon., “Erdoğan Eğitim Şurası’nda konuştu: Anaokulundan başlayarak yeni bir yaşam tarzı…,” Hurriyet, Dec 2, 2014. Retrieved from http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/erdogan-egitim-s-rasinda-konustu-anaokulundan-baslayarak-yeni-bir-hayat-tarzi-27691352 on Jun 12, 2017, and Anon., “Evlatlarımız değerlerimiz çerçevesinde hazırlanan çizgi filmleri izlemeli,” Posta, Jun 19, 2015. Retrieved from http://www.posta.com.tr/siyaset/HaberDetay/-Evlatlarimiz-degerlerimiz-cercevesinde-hazirlanan-cizgi-filmleri-izlemeli-.htm?ArticleID=287637, on Jun 12, 2017.

  118. 118.

    I. Gözaydın, “Management of Religion in Turkey: The Diyanet and Beyond,” in Ö.H. Çınar and M. Yıldırım (eds.), Freedom of Religion and Belief in Turkey, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle upon Tyne 2014, p. 13.

  119. 119.

    N. Mutluer, “Yapısal, Sosyal ve Ekonomi Politik Yönleriyle Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı,” in idem, Sosyo-Ekonomik Politikalar Bağlamında Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı: Kamuoyunun Diyanet’e Bakışı, Tartışmalar ve Öneriler, Helsinki Yurttaşlar Derneği, Istanbul 2014, pp. 22–26.

  120. 120.

    ERG,“Eğitim İzleme Raporu 2014–2015,” 2015, p. 83. Retrieved from

    http://www.egitimreformugirisimi.org/files/EIR2014_04.09.15.WEB.pdf, on Jun 12, 2017.

  121. 121.

    ERG, “Eğitim İzleme Raporu 2012,” 2012, p. 104. Retrieved from http://www.egitimreformugirisimi.org/files/ERG-EIR2012-egitim-izleme-raporu-2012-(12.09.2013).pdf, on Jun 12, 2017.

  122. 122.

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    Ibid.

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    Ibid., p. 453.

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    Ibid.

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    Ibid., p. 9.

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    Ibid., p. 10–12.

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    M. Zeghal, “Competing Ways of Life,” op. cit., p. 23.

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    S.J. Feuer, “From Political Islam to Muslim Democracy,” Foreign Affairs, Jun 2016.

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    Ibid.

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    R. Ghannouchi, “From Political Islam to Muslim Democracy The Ennahda Party and the Future of Tunisia,” Foreign Affairs, Jun 2016.

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    M. Somer, “Conquering versus democratizing the state,” op. cit., p. 13.

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Şar, E., Telek, A. (2017). Rethinking Secularism as a Political Principle in the Middle East: From Negative to Positive Understanding and Perception of Secularism. In: Tomaszewska, A., Hämäläinen, H. (eds) The Sources of Secularism. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65394-5_13

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