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Results-Based Agri-Environmental Schemes for Delivering Ecosystem Services in the EU: Established Issues and Emerging Trends

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Book cover Agricultural Law

Part of the book series: LITES - Legal Issues in Transdisciplinary Environmental Studies ((LITES,volume 1))

Abstract

Several agri-environmental schemes have been implemented in the last 20 years in Europe. In general, such measures are designed to encourage farmers to protect and enhance the environment through managing agricultural activity, by rewarding farmers for the service of implementing agri-environment commitments. In recent years, the European Union is showing an increasing interest for identifying more cost-effective means of paying for ecosystem services. An option under consideration is the implementation of results-based schemes, where farmers are rewarded not for performing activity-based standards but for achieving set environmental outcomes. From early 1990s, results-based schemes have slowly been increasing in number and scope, even if the majority remains located in northwestern Europe. The paper is aimed at increasing the legal understanding of results-based agri-environmental scheme for the delivery of ecosystem services. It explores the legal emerging concept of results-based measures and the issues that arise when they are put into practice. In conclusion, the paper distils what can be learned in terms of scaling up the implementation of results-based agri-environmental measures for the enhancement of ecosystem services in the EU.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This brief story-telling is built on the introductive thoughts in Salzman (2005). In this case, imitation is the sincerest expression of flattering.

  2. 2.

    Gretchen Daily emphasised that a first cognizance dates at least back to Plato that wrote about the services of soil retention more than 2500 years ago. See Daily (1997).

  3. 3.

    A first articulation of the concept of ecosystem services can be found in the idea of land ethic elaborated by Aldo Leopold in 1949. See Leopold (1949).

  4. 4.

    A series of paper started to discuss how ‘functions of nature’ serve human society. See, among others, King (1966), Helliwell (1969), and Westman (1977). However, the term was only coined in 1981 by Ehrlich and Ehrlich that capitalised on the previous literature. See Ehrlich and Ehrlich (1981). For a general overview of the historical elaboration of the concept, see Gómez-Baggethun et al. (2010).

  5. 5.

    See Ehrlich et al. (1977) and Ehrlich and Mooney (1983). On the linkage between ecosystem services and environmental services, see, inter alia, Pesche et al. (2013).

  6. 6.

    See Sagoff (2002) and Schroter et al. (2014). See also Boyd and Banzhaf (2007).

  7. 7.

    See Vihervaara et al. (2010). For example, see the EU research project ‘Pegasus. Public Ecosystem Goods and Services from land management – Unlocking the Synergies’. The project received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 633814, for the period March 2015–February 2018. See Dwyer et al. (2015).

  8. 8.

    For a comprehensive overview of the economic debate on ecosystem service, see Farley (2012); Kumar (2010) and Gómez-Baggethun et al. (2010). See also Jones et al. (2016).

  9. 9.

    In the past several scholars have pointed out the need for foundational work in this field, particularly in the American legal literature. See, for example, Kysar (2001), Ruhl (1998), and Salzman (1997). See, also, Ruhl and Salzman (2007), p. 22; Tarlock (2014). For the European context, see the recent publication by Kistenkas (2014).

  10. 10.

    Among others, this fast-moving debate is shown by the very recent call for contributions for the Special Issue on Legal Aspects of Ecosystem Services, promoted by the academic journal Ecosystem Services published by Elsevier. The Special issue, first of its kind, is intended to fill the gap in the academic legal literature that shows a relevant lag in embracing the concept of ecosystem services. See Mauerhofer and Kistenkas (2015). See, also, Costanza and Kubiszewski (2012).

  11. 11.

    The Millenium Ecosystem Assessment [hereafter, MEA] was set up by the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 2000. The MEA involved a wide range of stakeholders, include the private sectors, NGOs and academics to provide an integrated assessment of the consequences of ecosystem change for human well-being and to explore the available options for conserving ecosystems. The findings are contained in five technical volumes and six synthesis reports. For access the materials, see the MEA website at http://www.millenniumassessment.org/en/Index-2.html. Accessed 4 July 2015.

  12. 12.

    See Hassan et al. (2005), p. 27.

  13. 13.

    See Hassan et al. (2005), p. 27.

  14. 14.

    Provisioning services are the products that we obtain from ecosystems, such as food, fibre, fresh water and genetic resources. While, air quality maintenance, climate regulation, water purification are some of the services that we receive from the regulation of ecosystem processes, thus defined as regulating services. Conversely, the services that are essential for the production of all other ES are called supporting services. These may include primary production and soil formation. The last category of cultural services encompasses the non-material benefits that we obtain from ecosystems ‘through spiritual enrichment, cognitive development, reflection, recreation, and aesthetic experiences’. See Hassan et al. (2005), p. 29.

  15. 15.

    For a comprehensive analysis, see Lele et al. (2013), Fisher et al. (2009), and Schroter et al. (2014).

  16. 16.

    See, inter alia, Costanza (2008), Fisher et al. (2009), TEEB (2010), Wallace (2007), and Haines-Young and Potschin (2010, 2011).

  17. 17.

    In this regard, the contribution of the Italian legal doctrine is fascinating. The environment is understood in threefold perspective in regard of the agriculture: (1) as a limit in the exercise of agricultural activities, (2) as form of agriculture in terms of environmental constraints on the agri-forestry land, and (3) as a product shaped by agricultural activities with regard to the services provided. See Francario (1988).

  18. 18.

    See FAO Statistics, available online at www.faostat.fao.org. Accessed 4 July 2015.

  19. 19.

    It is essential, however, to not underestimate the potential for management to deliver agricultural ‘disservices’, including loss of biodiversity habitat, nutrient runoff, water sedimentation and hypertrophication, and pesticide pollution. See Power (2010). For a comprehensive ecological overview, see, among others, Zhang (2007). See also Balvanera et al. (2016).

  20. 20.

    See Hassan et al. (2005), p. 27. Through a well-balanced management, agro-ecosystem processes may provide (1) supporting services, such as soil quality regulation, pest control, pollination and genetic diversity needed for future agricultural use; (2) regulating services, including water quality control, climate regulation and carbon storage, flood control; and (3) cultural services, that is scenic beauty, education and recreation. See Power (2010). See also Pardy (2003).

  21. 21.

    At an international level, one of the major points of reference is in the Convention of Biological Diversity that, in 1992, first acknowledged the value of conservation practices in maintaining ecosystem services. It addressed the challenge of developing an ecosystem approach towards natural resources management. See Convention on Biological Diversity [1992] 1760 UNTS 79. See, also, Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Decision V/6 on the ecosystem approach, principle 5; and Decision VII/11, adopted in 2004, on the ecosystem approach. According to the literature, the Convention attempted to reach an optimum between ecological principle and social economic reasons. For an analysis of the Convention, see, ex multis, Morgera (2015), Morgera (2016), de Lucia (2015), Voigt (2013), Daniel et al. (2014), and Postiglione (1999). More recently, this resulted in the adoption of the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020, where the Parties to the Convention agreed ‘to take effective action to halt the loss of biodiversity in order to ensure that by 2020 ecosystems are resilient and continue to provide essential services, thereby securing the planet’s variety of life, and contributing to human well-being, and poverty eradication’. Specifically, they adopted the Aichi Biodiversity Targets that includes a number of targets for agricultural ecosystems. See Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Decision X/2: ‘The Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets’, adopted in October 2010, para 12. As a party to the Convention of Biological Diversity, the European Union has considered ecosystem services protection as a central point of its biodiversity strategy for the period up to 2020. Its focal target is ‘halting the loss of biodiversity and the degradation of ecosystem services in the EU by 2020 and restoring them in so far as possible, while stepping up the EU contribution to averting global biodiversity loss’. See European Commission (2013) and Cooper et al. (2009). For a general overview, see the recent contribution of Platjouw (2016) in which she analyses the legal development of the ecosystem approach in EU. See, in more general terms, Platjouw (2013) and Dickson and Edwards (2004).

  22. 22.

    For a comprehensive overview of the concept of multifunctional agriculture, see Cardwell (2004) and Albisinni (2000). See, also, Buia and Antonucci (2015).

  23. 23.

    See, in particular, Cardwell (2004).

  24. 24.

    See Van Huylenbroeck et al. (2007). This research is also considered in Vanni (2014).

  25. 25.

    According to OECD, ‘the existence of multiple commodity and non-commodity outputs that are jointly produced by agriculture and the fact that some of the non-commodity outputs exhibit the characteristics of externalities or public goods, with the result that markets for these goods do not exist or function poorly’. See OECD (2001), p. 13.

  26. 26.

    See OECD (2008), p. 7.

  27. 27.

    See OECD (2008), p. 6.

  28. 28.

    This definition was first adopted in Barkmann et al. (2004). Among others, the definition was cited in Casini et al. (2004), Van Huylenbroeck et al. (2007), and Vanni (2014).

  29. 29.

    See Vanni (2014), p. 6.

  30. 30.

    See Van Huylenbroeck et al. (2007), pp. 10 et seqq.

  31. 31.

    See Van Huylenbroeck and Durand (2003) and Wilson (2008).

  32. 32.

    See Vanni (2014), p. 7.

  33. 33.

    Along this perspective it is possible to locate a number of new farming approaches that are acquiring increasing policy relevance and attracting the interests of academia. Among others, it is worthwhile to mention the sustainable intensification of crop production and smart climate agriculture. Regarding the sustainable intensification, see, among others, FAO (2011, 2013a, b), Campbell et al. (2014), Garnett and Godfray (2012), Godfray (2015), and Godfray and Garnett (2014). Regarding climate-smart agriculture, see, among others, FAO (2013a, b) and Adler (2013).

  34. 34.

    See, inter alia, Berkes et al. (2002) and McGinnis and Ostrom (2014).

  35. 35.

    See McGinnis and Ostrom (2014). Compare, mutatis mutandis, with the critics contained in the recent contribution by Oto Hospes, according to him the current the concept of agroecosystems neglects ‘the role of legal orders and social fields in defining benefits, services, values’. Moreover, the concept shows to be ‘reductionistic in leaving out the interconnectedness between agroecosystems and plural legal orders [...]’. See Hospes (2015), pp. 47 et seqq.

  36. 36.

    This four key principle were applied in CGIAR’s Water, Land and Ecosystems (WLE) programme, by building on the research carried out by Walker and Salt. See CGIAR Research Program on Water, Land and Ecosystems (2014) and Walker and Salt (2006).

  37. 37.

    See Fischer et al. (2015), p. 146. See, also, McGinnis and Ostrom (2014) and Heemskerk et al. (2003).

  38. 38.

    Notwithstanding the essential role played by ecosystems in providing vital benefits to people, the law encounters several challenges in protecting and enhancing them. According to James Salzman, these factors may be articulated in three main reasons: ignorance, institutions and immature market. The first aspect is not only linked to the fact that people take ecosystem services for granted—thus, ignoring the source of the services we depend on—but also in acknowledging that the practices we use are causing degradation in the provision of ecosystem services. The institutional obstacle consists in the misalignment of the political jurisdictions with ecologically significant areas, which may translate in the separation of costs and benefits derived from ecosystem services across different jurisdiction. This might be the case of different perspective among upstream and downstream political stakeholders in considering the value of upstream forest conservation relating to water quality. The third obstacle, identified by Salzman, concerns the ‘immature mature’ for ecosystem services, despite their value for the general welfare. Ignorance and the obstacle to the creation of the market are closing related factors in the Salzman’s view. See Salzman (2005). Compare with Kochan (2015), and, mutatis mutandis, Noe and Alrøe (2015), pp. 31 et seqq.

  39. 39.

    See Ruhl et al. (2007), p. 13.

  40. 40.

    See Garmestani and Benson (2013), Garmestani et al. (2013). Compare with the interesting perspective of ‘Agroecological Law’ contained in Monteduro (2015), pp. 57 et seqq. See, also, the systematic literature review of adaptive governance scholarship for the period 2005–2014 in Karpouzogloua et al. (2016).

  41. 41.

    The American legal literature is a pioneer within this debate. See, among others, Garmestani and Allen (2014), Garmestani et al. (2013), Arnold and Gunderson (2013), Humby (2014), and Ruhl (2011).

  42. 42.

    PES is only one of the instruments among which public authority can choose in designing public policy aimed to ecosystem services protection. In most of the case, a policy mix is, however, operated. James Salzman emblematically describes a toolkit of five basic strategies, called ‘Five P’s’. The toolkit consists in Prescription, Penalty, Persuasion, Property rights, and Payment. See Salzman (2005).

  43. 43.

    See Rowcroft et al. (2011), p. 30. See, also, Nsoh and Reid (2013); McCauley (2006).

  44. 44.

    See Engel et al. (2008). See, also, Mauerhofer et al. (2013), Page (2012), and Baranzini et al. (2008). Compare with Huseby (2015).

  45. 45.

    See, among others, Sattler and Matzdorf (2013).

  46. 46.

    See Derissen and Latacz-Lohmann (2013). See, also, Rowcroft et al. (2011).

  47. 47.

    See Muradian (2010) and Rowcroft et al. (2011).

  48. 48.

    See Perrot-Maître (2006).

  49. 49.

    See Muradian (2010).

  50. 50.

    See Greiber (2009), p. 6.

  51. 51.

    See Wunder (2005), p. 3.

  52. 52.

    See Wunder (2005), p. 3. For an overview of the use of command-and-control regulations in environmental policy, see, for example, Goulder and Parry (2008). On the distinction between command-and-control regulation and incentive-based regimes, see, for example, Baldwin (1997).

  53. 53.

    See Wunder (2005), p. 3.

  54. 54.

    See Greiber (2009), p. 6.

  55. 55.

    See Greiber (2009), pp. 6 et seqq.

  56. 56.

    See Wunder (2005), p. 3.

  57. 57.

    Establishing a baseline is considered a crucial aspect in addressing ES loss and degradation. Indeed, there is no means to determine a change in ES delivery without first establishing a baseline to compare against. See Salzman (2009). See, also, OECD (2010).

  58. 58.

    For a comprehensive discussion of this aspect, see Sommerville et al. (2009); Kerr et al. (2014); Greiber (2009), pp. 53 et seqq.

  59. 59.

    See Engel et al. (2008).

  60. 60.

    See Engel et al. (2008) and Rowcroft et al. (2011).

  61. 61.

    See Forest Trends et al. (2008).

  62. 62.

    See, inter alia, OECD (2010).

  63. 63.

    These principles are also based on the UN Food and Agricultural Organisation’s definition of PES as ‘voluntary transactions where a service provider is paid by, or on behalf of, service beneficiaries for agricultural land, forest, coastal or marine management practices that are expected to result in continued or improved service provision beyond what would have been provided without the payment’. See FAO (2007).

  64. 64.

    Relevant literature maintains that agri-environmental schemes ‘filled a lacuna’ within the Common Agricultural Policy. Indeed, the initial CAP was largely focused on remunerating agricultural production. No public intervention was established to support the delivery of ecosystem services. This resulted in the damage of valued landscape and habitats in return for farming intensification being incentivised by the production signals under the CAP. The integration of environmental consideration into EU policy was recognised by the Treaty of the European Union. See, among others, Jack (2009), p. 109; Cardwell (2004); Isoni (2015), pp. 185 et seqq. For a discussion of the PES concept in the EU agri-environmental scheme, see Saunders (2015).

  65. 65.

    See Council Regulation (EEC) No 797/85 of 12 March 1985 on improving the efficiency of agricultural structures, OJ [1985] L 93.

  66. 66.

    See Council Regulation (EEC) No 2078/92 of 30 June 1992 on agricultural production methods compatible with the requirements of the protection of the environment and the maintenance of the countryside, OJ [1992] L 215. At the time, the EU Commission stated that the strategy on the introduction of environmental aspects in the CAP is that ‘farmers should be expected to observe basic environmental standards without compensation. However, wherever society desires that farmers deliver an environmental service beyond this base-line level, this service should be specifically purchased through agri-environmental measures’. See European Commission, Directions towards Sustainable Agriculture, COM (99) 22 Final, 28. At this regard, it is worth mentioning an interesting research area concerning the critical discourse analysis of EU agricultural commissioners on Common Agricultural Policy. See Erjavec and Erjavec (2009, 2015) and Erjavec et al. (2009).

  67. 67.

    At this regard, it is worth mentioning an interesting research area concerning the critical discourse analysis of EU agricultural commissioners on Common Agricultural Policy. See Erjavec and Erjavec (2009, 2015) and Erjavec et al. (2009).

  68. 68.

    For a comprehensive analysis of the introduction of cross-compliance and the greening components in the CAP, see Jack (2015), pp. 127 et seqq; Baldock (2015); Scaramuzzino (2015); Bianchi (2003); Russo (2007).

  69. 69.

    See, among others, Jack (2009), p. 109.

  70. 70.

    It is worth mentioning that an increasing body of literature is discussing PES schemes developed outside the scope of EU Common Agricultural Policy. In most of these cases, self-organised private is operated in which ecosystem service beneficiaries contract directly with the providers via localised exchange arrangements. Two cases are regarded as emblematic in the literature: the Exmoor Mires project in England, and Vittel mineral waters scheme in France. It shows the existing potential for designing PES schemes beyond the CAP. On this aspect, see Jack (2015), pp. 145 et seqq. See, also, Forest Trends et al. (2008). For the Exmoor Mires project, see, for example, Couldrick (n.d.). For the Vittel case, see Perrot-Maître (2006).

  71. 71.

    See Jack (2009), p. 109.

  72. 72.

    See Council Decision 2006/144/EC on Community strategic guidelines for rural development (programming period 2007–2013), OJ [2006] L 55. See, also, Jack (2009), p. 109. See, also, Regulation 1305/2013, Art. 28(5).

  73. 73.

    See Österreichisches Institut für Raumplanung (2012) and Kantor Management Consultants (2012).

  74. 74.

    See European Commission (2005).

  75. 75.

    See European Commission (2005). See, also, Wildlife Link (1995), p. 6.

  76. 76.

    For this reason, agri-environmental scheme has been traditionally classified in two broad categories: broad brush versus deep and narrow schemes. Broad schemes, also defined as entry level, encompass a wide land area and require modest commitments in return for a relatively small payment, thus attracting a large number of participants. Conversely, narrow schemes target ‘site-specific environmental issues’, by requiring more demanding commitments and providing substantial payment in return. These lasts are deemed to provide a significant intervention in protecting and enhancing ecosystem services through the introduction of management practices. See European Commission (2005) and Kantor Management Consultants (2012).

  77. 77.

    On the qualification of farmer and land manager for the purpose of agri-environmental scheme, see Carmignani (2007).

  78. 78.

    For a detailed overview of the discussion, see Jack (2009), pp. 109 et seqq; Jack (2015), pp. 141 et seqq; Carmignani (2008); Adornato et al. (2011), pp. 567 et seqq. Even though it is less recent than the previous references, see also Adornato (1999).

  79. 79.

    See Germanò and Rook Basile (2014), p. 364.

  80. 80.

    See Germanò and Rook Basile (2014), p. 364. See, also, Adornato et al. (2011), p. 591.

  81. 81.

    See Sect. 2.1 above.

  82. 82.

    See Germanò and Rook Basile (2014), p. 364.

  83. 83.

    See, also, Adornato et al. (2011), p. 591.

  84. 84.

    See, inter alia, Adornato et al. (2011), p. 591.

  85. 85.

    Ibid.

  86. 86.

    See Adornato et al. (2011), p. 592.

  87. 87.

    On the concept of ‘incomplete contracts’, see, among others, Williamson (1979), Hart and Holmstrom (1987), and Baker and Krawiec (2006). See, also, Bellantuono (2000), Bellantuono (2001), and Granieri (2007).

  88. 88.

    See Polman and Slangen (2007). See, also, Falconera and Saunders (2002).

  89. 89.

    See Polman and Slangen (2007). Compare, mutatis mutandis, with Hirokawa and Porter (2013).

  90. 90.

    It is interesting to note the suggestion of Paul Ferraro in using ‘screening contract’ and ‘procurements action’. See Ferraro (2008). Furthermore, this may result in failing to attract the most valuable lands in terms of ecosystem services potential. Agri-environmental contract may target the ‘wrong’ farmers, thus providing an adverse selection. See Polman and Slangen (2007) and Latacz-Lohmann and Schilizzi (2005). Indeed, a greater incentive to adopt agri-environmental commitments is placed on farmers with a low potential for delivering high quality ES, than farmer with high ES potentials. A farmer who has already adopted a low-input farming practice has a greater incentive in enter an agri-environmental contract than a farmer with a high-input farming method. This is due to the comparatively higher changes to current farming methods that the high-intensity farmer should adopt. In the past, several evidences are been provided on different EU Member States. See, for example, Hodge (1991) and Whitby (1994). Similarly, Jack takes into consideration environment rates in agri-environmental schemes against the amount of high nature value land within individual Member States. See Jack (2015), pp. 127 et seqq. Excluding Finland, Austria and Slovenia, less than 10% of high nature value land was enrolled. See European Commission (2013). According to Jack, the findings suggest that Member States failed to use agri-environmental schemes in protecting ecosystem services protection and targeting environmental priorities. See Jack (2015), pp. 127 et seqq. This is due to poor design by Member States, and the co-funding rate required by the European Union. The Court of Auditors, for example, has found that in some cases national agri-environmental programmes had not sought to address environmental pressures that had specifically been identified in the own national rural development. See Court of Auditors, ‘Is Agri-Environment Support Well Designed and Managed?’, Special Report 7/2011 (Publications Office of the European Union, 2011), para 30. See, also, Jack (2012).

  91. 91.

    James Salzman, on the same line, recognises three broad categories, which headline may be: (1) holdout and free riders, which is framed in collective action problem; (2) rent-seeking, in which potential providers channel the funds to themselves and to increase further their funding; (3) moral hazards that may encourage undesirable behaviour. See Salzman (2005).

  92. 92.

    See Latacz-Lohmann and Schilizzi (2005), p. 5. See, also, Fraser (1995, 2002, 2004).

  93. 93.

    See Latacz-Lohmann and Schilizzi (2005), p. 5.

  94. 94.

    See Rowcroft et al. (2011), pp. 18, 30.

  95. 95.

    Ibid. See, also, Greiber (2009), p. 6.

  96. 96.

    See, mutatis mutandis, Carmignani (2008).

  97. 97.

    This aspect was observed in early times; see Hodge (2000), pp. 216, 240. Cf. Wilson and Hart (2001).

  98. 98.

    This factor is complicated by the criteria of additionality set out in the EU law, which requires that payments should be based on the additional cost that land managers have occurred or the income have forgone in implementing agri-environmental commitments. See Regulation 1305/2013, Art. 28(6). This requirement further reflects the conditions under the GATT Agreements on Agriculture. See 1994 GATT Agriculture Agreement, Annex 2, para 12(b). Taking no account of the value of the delivered ecosystem services, agri-environmental scheme, however, limits its effectiveness in addressing environmental targets. Areas with high environmental value have unsurprisingly limited agricultural productivity, thus being subject to farm abandonment due to the low income obtained. See Jack (2012).

  99. 99.

    On this aspect, see, among others, Latacz-Lohmann and Schilizzi (2005), p. 6 et seqq.

  100. 100.

    See FAO (2007).

  101. 101.

    Jack describes a policy cohesion issue between the requirements of cross-compliance and the greening component within agricultural production policy and the requirements under the agri-environment scheme within rural development policy. According to the author, the separation does not exist in practice. This results, for example, in farmer in one Member States receiving agri-environmental payment for commitments that are considered cross-compliance requirements in others. See Jack (2015), pp. 127 et seqq.

  102. 102.

    On this aspect a fascinating and well-developed literature exists. See, among others, Wilson and Hart (2001).

  103. 103.

    On this, see Cardwell et al. (2003). See, also, Cardwell and Smith (2013).

  104. 104.

    See Burton and Schwarz (2013).

  105. 105.

    These aspects are widely explored in literature and concern fundamentally the issues of environmental benefits, the cost-effectiveness of the schemes and the ability to promote long-term cultural change. For the first element, it is worthwhile to note that ecological research has found that environmental outcomes are often poor in term of both targeted species protection and general biodiversity. See, for instance, Kleijn and Sutherland (2003). For the second aspect, see Green (2004) and Quillérou and Fraser (2010). On the cultural change issues, see Burton and Paragahawewa (2011).

  106. 106.

    See Burton and Schwarz (2013).

  107. 107.

    See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, The CAP towards 2020: Meeting the food, natural resources and territorial challenges of the future, COM [2010] 672 final, 11.

  108. 108.

    See European Network for Rural Development and European Commission (2010).

  109. 109.

    For example, a recent online platform has been established by the European Union with the aim of capitalise the findings in the area of research, particularly on biodiversity. See the website at ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/rbaps/index_en.htm. Accessed 4 July 2015.

  110. 110.

    See, on a more general level, Kistenkas (2014).

  111. 111.

    See Schwarz et al. (2008), Klimek et al. (2008), and Groth (2009).

  112. 112.

    See Höft et al. (2010), Latacz-Lohmann (2010), and Lockie and Carpenter (2010).

  113. 113.

    See Gerowitt et al. (2003), Oppermann (2003), Höft and Gerowitt (2006), and Matzdorf and Lorenz (2010).

  114. 114.

    See Haarena and Bathkeb (2008).

  115. 115.

    See Burger (2006).

  116. 116.

    See Zabel and Holm-Müller (2008) and Zabel and Roe (2009).

  117. 117.

    See Burton and Schwarz (2013), p. 630. See, also, White and Hanley (2016).

  118. 118.

    Ibid. See, also, Schwarz et al. (2008).

  119. 119.

    See Burton and Schwarz (2013), p. 637.

  120. 120.

    See Keenleyside et al. (2014), p. 1.

  121. 121.

    See, also, Allen et al. (2014), pp. 6 et seqq.

  122. 122.

    Ibid.

  123. 123.

    See Burton and Schwarz (2013), pp. 636 et seqq.

  124. 124.

    Ibid.

  125. 125.

    See Schwarz et al. (2008).

  126. 126.

    See Mayrand and Paquin (2004).

  127. 127.

    See Oppermann (2003).

  128. 128.

    See, for example, Wittig et al. (2006).

  129. 129.

    See, among others, Matzdorf and Lorenz (2010).

  130. 130.

    See, for example, Musters et al. (2001).

  131. 131.

    See Buckingham et al. (1998).

  132. 132.

    See Oppermann (2003).

  133. 133.

    These factors include ‘i) the broader history and level of ambition with agri-environment implementation to date; ii) socio-cultural issues, such as capacity and experience within the Managing Authorities; iii) varying levels of mutual trust between farmers and Managing Authorities; iv) resistance from land managers, due to concerns about non-payment if results are not achieved for reasons beyond their control and v) concerns about potentially higher operating costs (although this latter concern is also true of moving to more tailored and targeted management-based schemes). Understanding and overcoming these barriers will be critical in developing results-based approaches further in the EU’. See Allen et al. (2014).

  134. 134.

    See Sattler and Nagel (2010).

  135. 135.

    On this aspect, see Matzdorfa et al. (2008).

  136. 136.

    So far, no sufficient attention has been paid on the fact that results-based payment are not likely based on income forgone and additional costs occurred by land managers, thus potentially in a state of non-compliance with the WTO requirements. See Hasund and Johansson (2016); Siebert (2010) and Schwarz et al. (2008).

  137. 137.

    See Sect. 3.1 above.

  138. 138.

    For example, see the results-based MEKA-B4 programme in place in Baden-Württemberg (Germany) between 2000 and 2014. See Russi et al. (2016) and Burton and Schwarz (2013).

  139. 139.

    Cf. Greiber (2009), p. 45.

  140. 140.

    The ‘cooperation for grassland bird protection’ (‘Gemeinschaftlicher Wiesenschutz’) scheme, implemented in various regions of Schleswig-Holstein, involves only verbal agreements. Specific management requirements are agreed verbally between the farmer and the contact person at the beginning of the bird breeding season. Martina Bode, Kuno e.V. (personal communication, interview).

  141. 141.

    Cf, mutatis mutandis, Greiber (2009), pp. 45 et seqq.

  142. 142.

    Cf. Greiber (2009), pp. 46 et seqq.

  143. 143.

    See Sect. 2.2 above.

  144. 144.

    Cf. Greiber (2009), pp. 6 et seqq.

  145. 145.

    See Keenleyside et al. (2014). Cf. Salzman (2009), pp. 25 et seqq.

  146. 146.

    See Keenleyside et al. (2014).

  147. 147.

    See Allen et al. (2014).

  148. 148.

    Cf. Salzman (2009), pp. 25 et seqq.

  149. 149.

    Mutatis mutandis, the case of Bavaria Brewery in the province of North-Brabant, in Netherlands, provide useful insights in this vein. Even if it is not a results-based scheme, the initiative in this case is largely taken by the private stakeholders. The case concerns one brewery, a network of about 70 farmers and other stakeholders, including the regional water board, the municipality and the province of North-Brabant. There are similar cases on freshwater management in other areas in the Netherlands. See van der Heide and Polman (2016).

  150. 150.

    Cf. Greiber (2009).

  151. 151.

    See Franks (2008), Franks and Mc Gloin (2007a), and Franks and Mc Gloin (2007b). Even if there are less recent, it is interest to confront with Renting and van der Ploeg (2001) and Wiskerke et al. (2003).

  152. 152.

    Article 28(2) of the EU 1305/2013 provides that ‘agri-environment-climate payments shall be granted to farmers, groups of farmers or groups of farmers and other land-managers who undertake, on a voluntary basis, to carry out operations consisting of one or more agri-environment climate commitments on agricultural land to be defined by Member State’. See Regulation (EU) No 1305/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005, OJ [2013] L 347/487. On the contrary, the repealed Regulation 1698/2005, under article 39 (2), limited only to farmers the option for granting agri-environmental payments. See Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005 of 20 September 2005 on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), OJ [2005] L 347/487.

  153. 153.

    In policy there is a variety of term that are used to refer to the mentioned act of transferring, such as to compensate, to reward, to incentivise, etc. Notwithstanding the fact that they are used in an interchangeable way in practical situations, significant difference exists. Cf. Russi et al. (2016), p. 70.

  154. 154.

    Cf. Greiber (2009), pp. 6 et seqq.

  155. 155.

    See Keenleyside et al. (2014), p. 6.

  156. 156.

    See Keenleyside et al. (2014), p. 15.

  157. 157.

    See Keenleyside et al. (2014), pp. 18 et seqq.

  158. 158.

    For the 2014–2020 period, Rural Development Programmes are required to explicate how an agri-environment-climate scheme can be expected to deliver an environmental benefit, by proving any suitable evidence. See European Commission (2013).

  159. 159.

    See Keenleyside et al. (2014), p. 9.

  160. 160.

    See Keenleyside et al. (2014), p. 10.

  161. 161.

    In this vein, it is worth mentioning the case of a number agri-environment cooperative in the Netherlands that have continued to operate a form of results-based meadow bird agreement since the previous scheme under European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development was terminated in 2004. See de Lijster and Prager (2012).

  162. 162.

    On this, Prager (2012, 2015), Reed et al. (2014), and Prager et al. (2012).

  163. 163.

    Cf. Keenleyside et al. (2014), pp. 13 et seqq.

  164. 164.

    Cf. Greiber (2009), pp. 53 et seqq.

  165. 165.

    See Keenleyside et al. (2014), pp. 13 et seqq.

  166. 166.

    See Sect. 2.1 above. See, also, Karkkainen (2002).

  167. 167.

    See Burton and Schwarz (2013), pp. 633 et seqq. Also, cf. Westerlink et al. (2008) and Aviron et al. (2010).

  168. 168.

    See Westerlink et al. (2008), p. 25.

  169. 169.

    For a comprehensive discussion of relational contract, see, among others, Goetz and Scott (1980) and Macneil (1985).

  170. 170.

    See Goetz and Scott (1980), pp. 1111 et seqq.

  171. 171.

    See, among others, Feinman (2000) and Diathesopoulos (2010).

  172. 172.

    Cf. Allen et al. (2014), pp. 99 et seqq.

  173. 173.

    Ibid.

  174. 174.

    See Keenleyside et al. (2014), p. 18.

  175. 175.

    Ibid.

  176. 176.

    Mutatis, mutandis, see Ayres and Gertner (1989a, b), pp. 91 et seqq.

  177. 177.

    Ibid.; Goetz and Scott (1980), p. 1300. See, on a more general perspective, Schwartz (1994).

  178. 178.

    Cf. Greiber (2009), p. 54.

  179. 179.

    Cf. Burton and Schwarz (2013).

  180. 180.

    See Garmestani and Benson (2013) and Garmestani et al. (2013). Compare, also, with Cumming (2013).

  181. 181.

    See Ostrom (2009) and Liu (2007).

  182. 182.

    See Garmestani et al. (2008).

  183. 183.

    Ibid. See also Chen (2003).

  184. 184.

    See Garmestani and Benson (2013). See, also, Karkkainen (2002). Finally, it is interesting to compare with Simon (2006), pp. 37 et seqq.

  185. 185.

    Cf. Wiskerke et al. (2003).

  186. 186.

    Cf. Karkkainen (2002); Garmestani and Allen (2014).

  187. 187.

    Cf. Gunningham (2009).

  188. 188.

    See Zumbansen (2007) and Grundmann et al. (2015).

  189. 189.

    See Zumbansen (2007), p. 233.

  190. 190.

    Ibid.

  191. 191.

    See van Kersbergen and van Waarden (2004), Zumbansen (2007), and, mutatis mutandis, Williamson (1998). For a comprehensive analysis on the use of term ‘governance’ in literature, see, among others, Burries et al. (2008).

  192. 192.

    See Grundmann et al. (2015), pp. 41 et seqq; Möslein and Riesenhuber (2009), pp. 248 et seqq.

  193. 193.

    Ibid.

  194. 194.

    An increasing literature is debating the relationship between legal research and behavioural sciences. See the recent publication edited by Mathis (2015).

  195. 195.

    For a comprehensive discussion of the concept of ‘adaptive law’, see, among others, Arnold and Gunderson (2013), Walker and Salt (2006), Humby (2014), mutatis mutandis, Baker (2015), Angelo (2008), and Ruhl (2005). In relation to the design of adapting institutions, see Boyd and Folke (2012).

  196. 196.

    See Arnold and Gunderson (2013), pp. 4 et seqq.

  197. 197.

    See Arnold and Gunderson (2013), p. 36. See, also, Humby (2014) that discusses the general features of the law and resilience literature. The author notes that these concepts are gaining increasing attention among legal scholars.

  198. 198.

    For a comprehensive discussion of the concept of ‘reflexive law’, see Garmestani and Benson (2013), Teubner (1983), Scheuerman (2001), Orts (1995), Gaines (2003), and Fiorino (1999).

  199. 199.

    See Garmestani and Benson (2013), pp. 3 et seqq; Teubner (1983).

  200. 200.

    See Nolon (2009), p. 9. See also Tamanaha (1999).

  201. 201.

    See Orts (1995).

  202. 202.

    See Garmestani and Benson (2013) and Teubner (1983).

  203. 203.

    See Fiorino (1999) and Allen et al. (2011). Cf. Dedeurwaerdere (2005).

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Saba, A. (2017). Results-Based Agri-Environmental Schemes for Delivering Ecosystem Services in the EU: Established Issues and Emerging Trends. In: Alabrese, M., Brunori, M., Rolandi, S., Saba, A. (eds) Agricultural Law. LITES - Legal Issues in Transdisciplinary Environmental Studies, vol 1. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-64756-2_5

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