Abstract
It was only with the establishment of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (IMT), that the international community became capable of copping with the question of individual criminal responsibility after the committing of atrocities on the international plane. Efforts were made to establish individual criminal responsibility during the inter-war period through the Versailles Treaty of 28 June 1919 by holding German Emperor Wilhelm II of Hohenzollern responsible for the “supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties” and other “persons accused of having committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war”. These efforts, however, did not fall on fertile soil. The major powers focused on ensuring the future peace of Europe and therefore neglected holding individuals criminally responsible. The Netherlands did not surrender the Kaiser for trial and the Leipzig trials conducted under German law proved ineffective. According to Triffterer, the sovereignty of the national States were not shaken to their very foundations by World War I, thus maintaining the status quo and the assumption that states and not individuals were to be held internationally accountable. Efforts to establish an International Court of Criminal Justice were thwarted when in 1920 a Committee of the Assembly of the League of Nations considered the idea to be “premature”. The sanctions available to the international legal order at that time were still restricted to collective sanctions, while penal sanctions were generally not considered: international treaties addressed states, not individuals. Thus, within public international law, conceived historically as a horizontal legal order regulating inter-State relations, the individual would not come within its legal sphere. Generally, when organs of a State committed a violation of international law, international law only permitted sanctions addressed to the state itself, as the sanctions available only concerned collective responsibility. The individual was not within the focus of public international law, although two exceptions should be mentioned: piracy and slavery. A pirate, due the threat he poses to the safety of the high seas, has been considered an outlaw for centuries, a hostis humani generis. Consequently, each state, whether affected by the acts of the pirates or not, had the right to bring them to justice. The interest to prevent piracy was economically driven as the major trading powers needed to secure trade on the high seas. In contrast, the prohibition of the slave trade was a humanitarian endeavour and early attempts of an international court to suppress slave trade provide an important precursor to later developments.
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Notes
- 1.
Treaty of Peace with Germany (Treaty of Versailles), 28 June 1919, 11 Martens Nouveau Recueil (3d), Arts. 227 and 228.
- 2.
M. C. Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law (2003), 403.
- 3.
The 1919 Commission on the Responsibilities of the Authors of War and on the Enforcement of Penalties has established a list of 895 alleged war criminals; only 12 were tried with 6 being convicted to serve sentences ranging between 6 months to 4 years. Cf Bassiouni (supra note 2), 402; A. Cassese International Criminal Law (2008), 317.
- 4.
O. Triffterer, Dogmatische Untersuchungen zur Entwicklung des materiellen Völkerstrafrechts seit Nürnberg (1966), 10.
- 5.
Cf. Lord Phillimore, An International Court and The Resolutions of the Committee of Jurists, 3 British Yearbook of International law (1922–23), 84.
- 6.
See Art. 3 of the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 36 Stat. 2277, 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 3) 461: “A belligerent party which violates the provisions of the said Regulations shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces.” See, however, Lauterpacht who argues that “[t]here ought to be no doubt that these provisions refer to the responsibility of the State as a whole, and that they were not intended to exclude the responsibility of individuals or the customary right of States to punish enemy individuals for the violation of rules of war.” H. Lauterpacht, The Law of Nations and the Punishment of War Crimes, 21 British Yearbook of International Law (1944), 65.
- 7.
H. Kelsen, Collective and Individual Responsibility in International Law with Particular Regard to the Punishment of War Criminals, 31 California Law Review (1943), 533–4.
- 8.
Kelsen (supra note 7), 534ff; L. Oppenheim, 1 International Law (1995), 609. Cf A. de Gentili, De Iure Belli (1612), Book I, Chapter XXV (Carnegie translation 1933), 124; The crime of piracy has also been criminalized in international treaties: The Nyon Arrangement, 14 September 1937, 181 L.N.T.S., 135; Agreement Supplementary to the Nyon Agreement, 17 September 1937, 181 L.N.T.S., 149; The Convention on the High Seas, 29 April 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 82; Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/122.
- 9.
Cf. J.S. Martinez, Antislavery Court and the Dawn of International Human Rights Law, 117 Yale Law Journal (2008), 550ff.
- 10.
E. van Sliedregt, Individual Criminal Responsibility in International Law (2012), 4 with further references.
- 11.
Cassese (supra note 3), 28–31 referring inter alia to the Lieber Code, the Hague Codifications of 1899 and 1907 and further to national prosecutions.
- 12.
Kelsen (supra note 7), 536.
- 13.
H. Kelsen, Peace through Law (1944), 81.
- 14.
A. Verdross, Völkerrecht (1937), 298: “Eine Bestrafung ist aber ausgeschlossen, wenn die Tat nicht aus eigenem Antrieb beganfgen wurde, sondern ausschließlich dem Heimatstaat zugerechnet werden kann.” Cassese (supra note 3), 29 (footnote 36) however argues that both, Kelsen and Verdross, are simply wrong.
- 15.
Cf Cassese (supra note 3), 28; R. K Woetzel, The Nuremberg Trials in International Law with a Postlude on the Eichmann Case (1962), 36ff.
- 16.
Cf Inter-Allied Commission, Punishment for War Crimes, signed at St. James’s Palace, London, 13th January, 1942, as printed in: History of the United Nations War Crimes Commission and the Development of the Laws of War (1948), 89ff; The Moscow Declaration of 1st November 1943, printed in: History of the United Nations War Crimes Commission and the Development of the Laws of War (1948), 107f.
- 17.
See US Supreme Court, Ex parte Quirin et al. (1942) 317 U.S. 1; at 27–28: “From the very beginning of its history this Court has applied the law of war as including that part of the law of nations which prescribes, for the conduct of war, the status, rights and duties of enemy nations as well as enemy individuals.” See also Fujii v. State of California, 217 Pac. (2d) 481 and Oyama v. State of California, 332 US 633. War crimes trials were also held in the Soviet Union, c.f. K.H. Lüders, Strafgerichtsbarkeit über Angehörige des Feindstaates, Süddeutsche Juristenzeitung, 1946, 217–28 with further references.
- 18.
United Nations War Crimes Commission, History of the United Nations War Crimes Commission and the Development of the Laws of War (1948), 29 (emphasis added).
- 19.
Ibid; cf. US Supreme Court, Ex parte Yamashita (1946) 327 U.S. 1.
- 20.
Kelsen (supra note 13), 81.
- 21.
Defeat of Germany: Assumption of Supreme Authority by Allied Powers, Declaration signed at Berlin 5 June 1945, 60 Stat. 1649 as cited in C. I. Bevans, Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America 1776–1949, Volume 3 Multilateral 1931–1945 (1969), 1140.
- 22.
Nuremberg Charter as annexed to the Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis (London Agreement), 39 American Journal of International Law Supplement (1945), 257ff between the United States of America, the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which consequently was ratified by 19 other States.
- 23.
Art. 6 Nuremberg Charter (supra note 22). Those three categories of crimes are also contained in the Tokyo Charter, Art. 5 as annexed to the Special Proclamation by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, 19 January 1946, Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America 1589.
- 24.
IMT Nuremberg, Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Vol. 1 (Nuremberg, 1947) (“Blue Series”), 223.
- 25.
Ibid.
- 26.
IMT Nuremberg Judgment, Vol. 1, 218.
- 27.
C. Burchard, The Nuremberg Trial and its Impact on Germany, 4 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2004), 800ff with further references. See also Sect. 3.5, Nullum Crimen Sine Lege and the IMT Nuremberg and the IMTFE Tokyo, p. 24.
- 28.
UN GA Res. 95 (I), A/RES/95 (I).
- 29.
UN GA Res. 177 (1947), A/RES/177 (II).
- 30.
International Law Commission, Principles of International law Recognized in the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1950), Vol. II, para 97, which were, however, not approved by a General Assembly resolution.
- 31.
E. Greppi, The Evolution of Individual Criminal Responsibility under International Law, International Review of the Red Cross, Volume 81, Issue 835 (1999), 531ff; A. Cassese, Affirmation of the Principles of International law Recognized by the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal (2009), 1ff available at: http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/ga_95-I/ga_95-I.html (last visited 16 June 2017).
- 32.
Burchard (supra note 27), 800ff.
- 33.
M. P. Scharf, Seizing the “Grotian Moment”: Accelerated Formation of Customary International Law in Times of Fundamental Change, 43 Cornell International Law Journal (2012), 454–5, however he generally acknowledges problems determining customary international law via General Assembly resolutions (pp. 447–448). Nevertheless, the International Court of Justice also has recourse to General Assembly resolutions as evidence for customary international law: see Scharf in footnote 50 referring inter alia to Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. US), ICJ Reports (1986), 14; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports (1996), 254–255; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports (2004), 171; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda), 45 ILM 271, 308–309. For the importance of General Assembly when determining customary international law, see Sect. 7.6, UN Resolutions.
- 34.
See for example: Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), 3 May 1993, UN Doc S/25704, para 35 (SG Report on ICTY); Reference to both, the GA Resolution 95 (I) and the Nuremberg principles as formulated by the ILC can be found in various instances of case law: R. v. Finta, Supreme Court of Canada (1994) 1 S.C.R. 701; Israeli Supreme Court, Eichmann Case; European Court of Human Rights, Kolk and Kislyiy v. Estonia, Application Nos. 23052/04 and 24018/04, Decision on Admissibility, 17 January 2006; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadić, IT-94-1-T, Trial Chamber, Opinion and Judgment, 7 May 1997, para 623. Cf. Scharf (supra note 33), 455.
- 35.
Cf. International Law Commission, Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind with commentaries, Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1996), Vol. II, Part 2, Art. 2 Individual Responsibility (1996 ILC Draft Code), 19.
- 36.
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia UNSC Res 827 (1993) (25 May 1993), Arts. 2 and 3 (ICTY Statute); Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda UNSC Res 955 (1994) (8 November 1994), Art. 4 (ICTR Statute); Statue of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 2178 UNTS 138, UN Doc. S/2002/246 (2002), Appendix II, Arts. 3 and 4 (SCSL Statute); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2187 UNTS 90 (1 July 2002), Art. 8 (ICC Statute).
- 37.
Art. 5 ICTY Statute, Art. 3 ICTR Statute, Art. 2 SCSL Statute, Art. 7 ICC Statute.
- 38.
Art. 5 ICC Statute.
- 39.
Cf. Resolution RC/Res.6, Depositary Notification C.N.651.2010 Treaties-8, ICC, Assembly of State Parties, 11 June 2010, Annex I. For an overview of the drafting process see K. Schmalenbach, The Crime of Aggression Before the International Criminal Court, in: Liber Amicorum Rüdiger Wolfrum, Coexistence, Cooperation and Solidarity Vol. II (2012), 1259ff; see also S. Barriga, C. Kress (eds.), The Travaux Préparatoires of the Crime of Aggression (2012).
- 40.
Art. 4 ICTY Statute, Art. 2 ICTR Statute, Art. 6 ICC Statute.
- 41.
R. Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress (1944), 79, who assembled the Greek word genos (race, tribe) and the Latin word cide (killing).
- 42.
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948, 78 UNTS 277 (entered into force 12 January 1951). According to Simma and Paulus the Genocide Convention takes a unique position among international treaties since Article VI establishes the “truly international legal character of the crime”. B. Simma and A.L. Paulus, The Responsibility of Individuals for Human Rights Abuses in Internal Conflicts: A Positivist View, in 93 American Journal of International Law (1999), 308 (emphasis in original).
- 43.
See e.g. G. Boas, The Difficulty with Individual Criminal Responsibility in International Criminal Law, Stahn/van den Herik (eds.), Future Perspective on International Criminal Justice (2010), 502.
- 44.
Cassese (supra note 3), 4.
- 45.
Bassiouni (supra note 2), 685.
- 46.
S. R Ratner, The Schizophrenias of International Criminal Law, 33 Texas International Law Journal (1998), 251.
- 47.
M. Boot, Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes. Nullum Crimen Sine Lege and the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (2002), 14; R. D. Sloane, The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment: The Limits of the National law Analogy and the Potential of International Criminal Law, in 43 Stanford Journal of International law (2007), 40.
- 48.
C. J. M. Safferling, The Justification of Punishment in International Criminal Law – Can National Theories of Justification be Applied to the International Level, 4 Austrian Review of International & European Law (2000), 153.
- 49.
G. Schwarzenberger, The Problem of an International Criminal Law, in: G.O.W. Mueller and E. M. Wise (eds.), International Criminal Law (1965), 35; see also Cassese (supra note 3), 7–9 referring to “conflicting philosophies” of international criminal law and public international law.
- 50.
G. Manner, The Object Theory of the Individual in International law, 46 American Journal of International Law (1952), 428ff; R. Higgins, Rethinking the Conceptual Thinking about the Individual in International Law, in 4 British Journal of International Studies (1978), 2ff.
- 51.
PCIJ, Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions Case (Greece v. United Kingdom), 1924 PCIJ (ser. A) No. 2 (30 August 1924), Judgment, 12: “a state is in reality asserting its own rights, its right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law”; S. Vattel, The Law of Nations (1916), 136: “Whoever ill-treats a citizen indirectly injures the state, which must protect that citizen”.
- 52.
Cf. Dissenting Opinion Nielsen, Mexico-United States General Claims Commission, International Fisheries Company (USA) v. Mexico, July 1931, 4 Reports of International Arbitral Awards, 728: “International law contains no penal provisions forbidding acts on the part of either individuals or corporations, and no rules of any kind imposing any obligations except obligations binding on states.” The reliance on the domestic legal order in order to enforce international criminal law is referred to in the legal literature as the “indirect enforcement model”. Cf. Bassiouni (supra note 2), 29f; Safferling (supra note 48), 143f.
- 53.
H. Triepel, Völkerrecht und Landesrecht (1899), 329: “[S]o ist es undenkbar, daß eine ‘Norm’ des Völkerrechts vom Einzelnen übertreten werde. Delikte des Individuums, ‘Verbrechen gegen das Völkerrecht’ giebt es nicht. Weder gegen ‘allgemeines’ Völkerrecht, noch gegen ‘Staatsverträge’ kann sich das Individuum verfehlen.“ And further at 333: “Denn was der Staat befiehlt, gilt es zu wissen. Gegen sein Gebot, nicht gegen das des Völkerrechts sündigt der Unterthan.“
- 54.
Triepel (supra note 53), 111.
- 55.
H. Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (1967 as translated by Knight), 324–328. He considers that the establishment of tribunals commences the centralization of international law.
- 56.
Trial of the major war criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Vol. 1 (Nuremberg, 1947), 223.
- 57.
Individual criminal responsibility does, however, not displace State responsibility, as a double attribution to individuals as well as States is possible. See for instance ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, 26 February 2007, ICJ Reports 2007, 43. Compare also van Sliedregt (supra note 10), 5–7 with further references.
- 58.
P.K. Menon, Individuals as Subjects of International Law, Revue de Droit International 1992, 319. K. Ipsen, Völkerrecht (2004), 96. “Legal personality” or “subjectivity of law” is associated with the capacity of possessing rights and/or duties, cf. I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (2008), 57; M.N. Shaw, International Law (2008), 195.
- 59.
See also advisory opinion of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the Re-Introduction of the Death Penalty in the Peruvian Constitution Case, 16 Human Rights Law Journal (1995), 14.
- 60.
Kelsen (supra note 55), 327.
- 61.
J. Crawford, The ILC Adopts a Statute for an International Criminal Court, 89 American Journal of International Law (1995), 406. See on the question of the ius puniendi at the supranational level without a sovereign, K. Ambos, Punishment without a Sovereign? The Ius Puniendi Issue of International Criminal Law: A First Contribution towards a Consistent Theory of International Criminal Law, 33 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (2013), 293ff.
- 62.
N. Jareborg, Criminalization as Last Resort (Ultima Ratio), 2 Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law (2004), 524–525, referring to C. Roxin, Strafrecht: Allgemeiner Teil I: Grundlagen. Der Aufbau der Verbrechenslehre (1997), 11–30. Those “Rechtsgüter” are inter alia human life and dignity, physical and sexual integrity, protection of property etc.
- 63.
D. Robinson, A Cosmopolitan Liberal Account of International Criminal Law, 26 Leiden Journal of International Law (2013), 134.
- 64.
Bassiouni (supra note 2), 31, who considers that ICL presupposes the existence of an implied social contract (at p. 690); for a rationale of ICL on basis of Kant see K. Gierhake, Begründung des Völkerstrafrechts auf der Grundlage der Kantischen Rechtslehre (2005).
- 65.
Compare for instance ICJ, Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion 28 May 1951, ICJ Reports (1951), 23; ICTR, Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR-97-32-T, Trial Chamber, Judgment and Sentence, 1 June 2000, para 48; Prosecutor v. Nzabririnda, Case No. ICTR 2001-77-T, Trial Chamber II, Sentencing Judgment, 23 February 2007, para 56; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadić, IT-94-1, Appeals Chamber, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, para 57; Prosecutor v. Erdemović, IT-96-22-T, Trial Chamber, Sentencing Judgment, 29 November 1996, para 27.
- 66.
P. Gaeta, International Criminalization of Prohibited Conduct, in Cassese (ed), The Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice (2009), 66. Cassese (supra note 3), 11, who also believes that a universal interest to punish these crimes is necessary for the notion of international crimes; S. Glaser, Droit international pénal conventionnel (1970), 16: “L’ensemble des règles juridiques, reconnues dans les relations internationales, qui ont pour but de protéger l’ordre juridique ou social international (la paix sociale internationale) par la répression des actes qui y portent atteinte; ou, en d’autres termes, l’ensemble des règles établies pour réprimer les violations des préceptes du droit international public.” Triffterer (supra note 4), 178: “Im Gegensatz zu den Weltverbrechen ist nicht entscheidend, daß die Handlungen wegen der meistens über die Grenzen eines Staates hinausreichenden Begehungsweise nur durch die Zusammenarbeit aller Staaten wirksam bekämpft werden können. Vielmehr verletzen diese Verbrechen Rechtsgüter der Völkerrechtsordnung, denen wegen ihres besonderen Wertes für die Staatengemeinschaft der stärkste Schutz verliehen wird, den eine Gemeinschaft gewähren kann, der Schutz durch das Strafrecht.”
- 67.
Listed by the ICTY Trial Chamber as the tribunal’s objectives in the Erdemović Sentencing Judgment, para 58. See also the various versions of the ILC Draft Codes on Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind. The Rome Statute in its preamble declares that “such grave crimes threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world”.
- 68.
K. Ambos, Möglichkeiten und Grenzen völkerstrafrechtlichen Rechtsgüterschutzes, in F. Neubacher and A. Klein (eds.), Vom Recht der Macht zur Macht des Rechts? (2006), 111; see also O. Triffterer, Bestandsaufnahme zum Völkerstrafrecht, in Hankel, Stuby (eds.), Strafgerichte gegen Menschheitsverbrechen (1995), 209: “Die dogmatischen Grundlagen des Völkerstrafrechts erlauben nur den Schutz eigenständiger Rechtsgüter der Völkergemeinschaft und ausnahmsweise einen subsidiären Schutz für in erster Linie den staatlichen Rechtsordnungen anvertraute Rechtsgüter, wenn deren Verletzung typischerweise unter Beteiligung des Staates geschieht und diese daher gerade gegen die Staatsmacht selbst geschützt werden müssen.”
- 69.
M.A. Drumbl, A Hard Look at the Soft Theory of International Criminal Law, in: L.N. Sadat and M.P. Scharf (eds), The Theory and Practice of International Criminal Law: Essays in Honor of M. Cherif Bassiouni (2008), 2.
- 70.
Bassiouni (supra note 2), 1.
- 71.
See e.g. ICTY, Prosecutor v. Furundžija, IT-95-17/1-T, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 10 December 1998, para 183: “The general principle of respect for human dignity is the basic underpinning and indeed the very raison d’être of international humanitarian law and human rights law; indeed in modern times it has become of such paramount importance as to permeate the whole body of international law.”
- 72.
G. Fletcher and J.D. Ohlin, Reclaiming Fundamental Principles in the Darfur Case, 3 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2005), 541.
- 73.
See Robinson (supra note 63), 127ff.
- 74.
D. Robinson, The Identity Crisis of International Criminal Law, 21 Leiden Journal of International Law (2008), 944.
- 75.
Robinson (supra note 63), 128; Fletcher and Ohlin (supra note 72), 539ff; much of the criticism came as a reaction to the jurisprudence of international criminal tribunals in relation to the joint criminal enterprise doctrine or the application of command responsibility: cf A. M. Danner and J. S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93 California Law Review (2005), 75ff; M. E. Badar, “Just Convict Everyone!” – Joint Perpetration: From Tadić to Stakić and Back Again, 6 International Criminal Law Review (2006), 293ff; K. Ambos, Joint Criminal Enterprise and Command Responsibility, 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2007), 159ff.
- 76.
Robinson (supra note 63), 128–9 referring inter alia to M.A. Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment and International Law (2007), 24–39; M. Osiel, The Banality of Good: Aligning Incentives against Mass Atrocity, 105 Columbia Law Review (2005), 1752–5. See, however, H. Jäger, Hört das Kriminalitätskonzept vor der Makrokriminalität auf?, in F. Neubacher and A. Klein (eds.), Vom Recht der Macht zur Macht des Rechts? (2006), 59ff, opposing the possibility that there should be two separated criminal concepts, one for macro-criminality and one for “normal” criminality, whereas the former would be a trimmed-back version.
- 77.
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadić, IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 15 July 1999, para 191.
- 78.
Drumbl (supra note 76), 24: “A paradigm of individualized culpability may well be suitable for deviant isolated crimes, although some criminologists challenge this premise. This same paradigm, however, is all the more ill fitting for crimes committed by collectivities, states, and organizations.”
- 79.
ICTY, Tadić Appeals Chamber Judgment, para 186.
- 80.
See G. Fletcher, Collective Guilt and Collective Punishment, 5 Theoretical Inquiries in Law (2004), 163ff; cf. Gierhake (supra note 64), 175ff referring inter alia to H. Jäger, Makroverbrechen als Gegenstand des Völkerstrafrechts, Hankel/Stuby (eds.), Strafgerichte gegen Menschheitsverbrechen. Zum Völkerstrafrecht nach den Nürnberger Prozessen (1995), 325ff.
- 81.
Robinson (infra note 87), 116.
- 82.
IMT Nuremberg Judgment (supra note 24), 223.
- 83.
See Drumbl (supra note 76), 38.
- 84.
See in this regard the references in supra note 57.
- 85.
By this analogy it is claimed that ICL receives its legitimacy; see for example ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kupreškić, IT-95-16, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 14 January 2000, paras 848f; Erdemović Sentencing Judgment, para 58; for the legal literature, both accepting and rejecting a domestic analogy, see G. Werle, Völkerstrafrecht (2007), 40 (footnote 182).
- 86.
This distinction is also made by H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (1968), 80–83.
- 87.
D. Robinson, The Two Liberalisms of International Criminal Law, Stahn/van den Herik (eds.), Future Perspective on International Criminal Justice (2010), 116 referring to G. Fletcher, Basic Concepts of Criminal Law (1998), 43: “We may use objects as means; but we must respect human beings as subjects, as ends in themselves” thereby articulating a “rejection of deterrence as a sufficient rationale for punishment”. Originally that idea stems from Kant and his ‘Formula of the End in Itself’, see I. Kant, The Moral Law (1948) as translated by Paton, 96.
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Rauter, T. (2017). State Responsibility and the Criminal Liability of the Individual. In: Judicial Practice, Customary International Criminal Law and Nullum Crimen Sine Lege. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-64477-6_2
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