Simple Infeasibility Certificates for Attack Trees
We introduce infeasibility certificates, compact and easily verifiable proofs that no profitable attacks exist in the considered system model. We introduce computational methods for generation and validation of such proofs using an enhanced weight reduction technique. A new method for obtaining adversarial expenses by approximating an interval within which this value resides, is an interesting approach to tackle NP-complete tasks and allows to obtain values that require extensive computations in reasonable time.
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