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Towards Covert Channels in Cloud Environments: A Study of Implementations in Virtual Networks

  • Daniel SpiekermannEmail author
  • Jörg Keller
  • Tobias Eggendorfer
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10431)

Abstract

Cloud environments are more and more used by cyber criminals to perform their malicious activities. With the help of covert channels they hide their data transmissions and message exchange. Whereas different techniques of covert channels in common networks are well-known, the existence of covert channels in cloud environments networks is a new topic in information hiding. The virtual environments provide new ways to hide the transmission of information. These environments use virtual networks in the cloud, which separate and isolate logical networks of the different customers. In this paper we present an examination of information hiding in virtual networks. We analyzed VXLAN, STT, GENEVE and NVGRE as the most notable so-called overlay protocols and examined different ways to create covert storage channels. Furthermore, we describe a covert timing channel based on the movement of virtual machines. As a result we propose possible countermeasures of the described covert channels.

Keywords

Virtual network Covert channel Network steganography Information hiding 

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.FernUniversität in HagenHagenGermany
  2. 2.HS Ravensburg-WeingartenWeingartenGermany

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