Abstract
Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was founded on a peculiar policy consensus that revolves around two core beliefs: ‘stable money’ and ‘sound public finances’. Sebastian Diessner studies, through the lens of Peter Hall’s (1993) policy paradigms and the three orders of policy change, how this consensus has evolved throughout the eurozone crisis. Previous scholars have either attested a complete ‘lock-in’ of the eurozone’s paradigm or a ‘breakdown’ of the very same. In contrast, the author argues that, despite apparent modifications and transformations, the eurozone’s dominant policy paradigm has ultimately remained robust. This raises questions about the future viability of eurozone macroeconomic governance.
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Notes
- 1.
For the sake of brevity, the focus of this section is on the expanding body of literature dealing with responses to the financial and economic crisis, while, needless to say, the study of ideas and politics in European economic and monetary cooperation can be traced back much further. Early intriguing accounts include, for instance, Ludlow’s (1982) longue durée view of the politics behind the establishment of the European Monetary System and Garrett and Weingast’s (1993) construction of the EU’s Internal Market. A concise summary of different works is also provided by McNamara (1998, Chap. 3).
- 2.
- 3.
Studies on EU-level responses to the financial crisis, by contrast, tend to be merely collections of different national crisis responses, for the notable reason that responsibility for emergency measures such as fiscal stimuli ‘was left almost entirely in the hands of the member states’ (Cameron 2012, as quoted in Schelkle 2012b: 146). EU-level action in the form of the so-called European Economic Recovery Plan was, on the whole, far from coordinated and constituted little more than a smaller top-up to what member states had already decided to be their fiscal stimuli (ibid.).
- 4.
A variant of this argument is offered by Schelkle and Hassel (2012) who assert that while EMU ’s policy consensus is indeed persistent, it is not limited to Euro Area policy-making and rather forms part of the mainstream macroeconomic consensus known as the ‘new neoclassical synthesis’ (Woodford 2009).
- 5.
Indeed, Kuhn’s seminal work on The Structure of Scientific Revolutions was written precisely as an attempt to distinguish the natural from the social sciences (2012[1962]: x).
- 6.
Note that this type of paradigm is distinct from the notion of an overarching paradigm that ‘usher[s] in a new era’ of approaching policy problems (such as, for example, the common perception of Keynesianism or neoliberalism ): A policy paradigm typically dominates a specific policy field , while an overarching paradigm may prove broad enough to encompass a number of different policy fields (Hall 2013b: 191; Béland and Cox 2013: 193).
- 7.
As Berman (2013: 217) notes succinctly, we can indeed say that the ideational research agenda has expanded ‘to the point where it now includes everyone from constructivists to rational choice theorists’.
- 8.
We can understand why ideas are central to macroeconomic policy -making if we bear in mind the fundamental uncertainty about the workings of the macroeconomy : As policy -makers face difficulties to collect and properly interpret macroeconomic data as well as to find an agreement over what constitutes the ‘correct’ macroeconomic policy path for an uncertain future, their shared beliefs indeed become a guiding principle for policy (McNamara 1998: 57). Issing (2006: 3), for instance, recalls that the creation of the ECB ’s monetary policy strategy at the outset of EMU was perceived by officials as occurring in ‘a situation of extreme uncertainty’.
- 9.
- 10.
For an insightful application to the Eurpean case, however, see Schelkle and Hassel (2012).
- 11.
This does not rule out that it may be embedded in and display traits of a more encompassing ideational framework such as neoliberalism , ordoliberalism or monetarism (Schmidt and Thatcher 2013; Fitoussi and Saraceno 2004, 2013). Note also that Jones (2013) arrives at a similar conclusion regarding EMU ’s policy paradigm , but he draws the distinction between encompassing policy paradigms and a ‘more partial framework of ideas’, which I consider less pronounced and intelligible than the notion of a specific policy paradigm (Jones 2013: 149).
- 12.
In this context, my case selection is consistent with general principles of ‘critical case study’ design with regard to hypothesis-testing (Gerring 2007; Rohlfing 2012). The case of fiscal surveillance reform represents a ‘most likely’ case due to its relatively high probability of confirming the hypothesis, in contrast to the non-standard monetary policy case whose probability is comparatively low, thus constituting a ‘tough test’ for my hypothesis of non-third order change (Eckstein 1975; Rohlfing 2012: 84; Levy 2008). In analogous terms, we could also speak of an ‘easy’ and a ‘hard’ case for my proposition (cf. McKeown 1999; Van Evera 1996).
- 13.
Noticeable justifications range from functional-economic pressures to complete the single market in the face of increased capital mobility (Padoa-Schioppa et al. 1987; Eichengreen and Frieden 1998; Moravcsik 1998; Collignon and Schwarzer 2003) to the ideational hegemony of monetarism and neo-liberalism (Moss 2004) to combinations of both (McNamara 1998; 1999). Others invoke reasons beyond the macroeconomic realm, such as geo-strategic considerations of tying a recently reunified Germany to the West Katzenstein (1997) (Jones 2013: 145).
- 14.
An exhaustive review of the elaboration and adoption of this policy paradigm —including the role played by the ‘epistemic community ’ of central bankers, business people and politicians in facilitating both—will have to give way to a more focused description of the paradigm ’s major elements here, due to delimitations in size. For illuminating sources, nonetheless, see Verdun (1999) and especially Collignon and Schwarzer (2003).
- 15.
Despite the frequent claim that the European Central Bank was modelled after the German Bundesbank , the ECB arguably displays a higher degree of independence due to the fact that revising its statutes requires difficult revisions of the European Treaties (while changing the Bundesbank mandate merely requires a legal act passed by simple majority in the German Bundestag) (De Grauwe 2012).
- 16.
Beyond this, a more thorough discussion of the technical functioning of all three instruments (including the precise settings determined for each) is omitted here, since it would neither particularly further my argument nor sensibly fit the limited size of this chapter.
- 17.
One could add to the two key tenets presented here a number of auxiliary ideas and assumptions, which are not treated in more detail precisely due to their auxiliary nature. These are, for instance, the idea of efficient financial and local-factor markets (following from the role that is ascribed to financial markets in assessing governments’ budgetary positions) (Schelkle 2013; Jones 2013) as well as the shared belief in the necessity of structural reforms to be implemented by national governments (due to the fact that the rule-based agreement on EMU did not identify a role for aggregate demand management in the case of economic shocks, thus leaving the burden of adjustment to be borne by governments via supply side oriented measures) (Dyson and Featherstone 1999: 784–785; Sapir et al. 2004; De Grauwe 2006). The latter aspect raises additional questions about whether the terms of the consensus are in themselves logically consistent, i.e. whether both fiscal consolidation and entrenching reforms can sensibly be pursued at the same time. Compare, for example, Mabbett and Schelkle (2007) with Buti, Röger and Turrini (2009).
- 18.
Charles Goodhart (1998: 410) aptly referred to this strict separation as an ‘unprecedented divorce between the main monetary and fiscal authorities’.
- 19.
- 20.
See also Collignon’s contribution in this book.
- 21.
- 22.
Although the TSCG consists of a total of six titles, its integral third title, the ‘Fiscal Compact ’, commonly serves as pars pro toto for the entire treaty. References to the TSCG in this chapter therefore specifically mean title III.
- 23.
For an overview, see European Commission (2017).
- 24.
See Council Regulation 1177/2011; Regulation 1173/2011.
- 25.
See Regulation 473/2013; Council Directive 2011/85.
- 26.
In this vein, the Commission has defined a scoreboard of various statistical indicators with upper and lower alert thresholds. These indicators range from current account balances, total private and public sector indebtedness, to real effective exchange rates, house prices, and unemployment rates.
- 27.
- 28.
It is acknowledged that the ECB deployed a number of other significant policies throughout the crisis, not least the frequently discussed Securities Markets Programme (SMP) (Schelkle 2014). The latter is not covered explicitly here since OMT constitutes, in effect, an unlimited version of SMP and can thus be seen as both fully implying and moving beyond it, which ultimately makes for a stronger case.
- 29.
For a recent publication that focuses entirely on the policy settings of ECB bond-buying programmes, see Lombardi and Moschella (2015).
- 30.
See Claeys (2014: 6–8) for a review of empirical evidence.
- 31.
Concerning the now discontinued securities markets programme (in combination with LTRO ), commentators have also spoken of a ‘quasi-fiscal’ role for the ECB (Schelkle 2014).
- 32.
The counter-argument is that a central bank cannot ‘default’ as long as it has the monopoly to issue money and as long as additional issuances do not impinge on its promise to preserve price stability (see, inter alia, De Grauwe and Ji 2013).
- 33.
An indication of just how central the requirements of the TSCG were in the view of the ECB may be president Draghi’s postulation of a ‘new fiscal compact’ in his very first hearing in front of the European Parliament (ECB 2011b) and on a number of other occasions at the very beginning of his tenure (Schelkle 2014).
- 34.
See Spörer in this volume for a discussion of the ESM .
- 35.
Note, however, that the crucial difference between a theoretical ‘Grexit’ and the actual ‘Brexit ’ is that the former is squarely about removing the monetary hard budget constraint , while the latter implies extricating oneself from all aspects of the union’s governance structure.
- 36.
See Dyson (2014: 275–276).
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Diessner, S. (2017). On Paradigms and Public Goods: Has the Eurozone Crisis Changed the Economic Paradigm of EMU?. In: Collignon, S. (eds) The Governance of European Public Goods. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-64012-9_4
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Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-64011-2
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-64012-9
eBook Packages: Economics and FinanceEconomics and Finance (R0)