Abstract
European integration has generated a large range of European public goods over the last half-century, but the administration of these public goods is dysfunctional. While traditional theories of republicanism postulate communitarian identities, our notion of Republic is derived from the concept of public goods (res publica) which belong to all citizens who are affected by their externalities. The early phase of European integration was characterized by club goods, the euro has generated a new group of common resource goods, which require a centralized government for their efficient provision.
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Notes
- 1.
For my previous work see: (Collignon 2003); (Collignon 2004); (Collignon, Bundesrepublik Europa? Die demokratische Herausforderung und Europas Krise, 2007); (Collignon, Three Sources of Legitimacy for European Fiscal Policy, 2007); (Collignon 2008); (Collignon and paul 2008). See also: (Bogdandy, Die europäische Republik, ApuZ 36/2005, pp. 21–27, 2005); (Bogdandy, Konstitutionalisierung des europäischen öffentlichen Rechts in der europäischen Republik, 2005)); (Bogdandy 2004)).
- 2.
According to Eurobarometer 73 (August 2010), 23% of European citizens consider the EU to be a waste of money, 21% associate the EU with bureaucracy , and only 19% associate the EU with democracy , see http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb73/eb73_first_en.pdf (22.10.2011).
- 3.
See (Joerges 2005). In a Rawlsian perspective of justice as fairness, one would model this by saying different nations are presented with different choice sets, and individuals would have to choose from these choice sets behind the veil of ignorance. The unfairness is then a consequence that they do not have access to the same choice sets.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
For the formal model see (Cooper and John 1988).
- 7.
This distinction was made by (Scharpf 1999).
- 8.
- 9.
- 10.
(Skinner, From the State of Princes to the Person of the State, 2002, p. 38ß): “The community must retain ultimate sovereignty , assigning its rulers and magistrates a status no higher than that of elected functionaries. These officials must in turn recognize that they are mere agents or ministeri of justice, charged with the duty of ensuring that the laws established by the community for the promotion of its own good are equitably enforced.”.
- 11.
See (Collignon 2003) for a full discussion.
- 12.
I use the concept of holism in the sense of (Popper 1995).
- 13.
(Gröschner 2004), § 23, endeavours to show a continuity of republicanism from Aristotle to Cicero . However, (Wesel 2010, p. 99) stresses that the similarity between Athens and Rome is purely extrinsic: “[T]he Greeks gave us the scientific philosophers that established the basis for European humanities and natural sciences. The Romans gave us the lawyers that developed their legal system in a way that the Greeks could never do due to the collective decision-making of their citizens in their courts.” The difference between Aristotle and Cicero is important for another reason related to B. Constant’s distinction between ancient and modern forms of freedom in his famous discourse of 1819 (Constant 1816). Modern freedom based on individual rights is a renaissance development, invoked by Cicero but not by Aristotle; see (Tuck 2003). A. von Bogdandy (2005, p. 26) refers to the modern conception of the republic when he writes that “a republican understanding of the European Union cannot be built on republican theories that follow the conception of a ‘stronger’ and ‘narrower’ community . The European Republic can form a liberal democratic community, but certainly not a communitarian community”.
- 14.
For reasons which will become clear soon, my translation varies from the conventional “a commonwealth is the property of a people ”. The Latin res stands first of all for items, things, goods, affairs.
- 15.
"Est igitur, …, res publica res populi, populus autem non omnis hominum coetus quomodo congregatus, sed coetus multitudinis iuris consensu et utilitatis communione sociatus”, (Cicero 2006, p. 64); my translation is slightly at variance with Keyes. Utilitatis communione sociatus may also be translated as Welfare.
- 16.
Already Machiavelli stressed that “cities have never managed to increase their acquired rights or prosperity unless they were in a state of liberty ” (perché si vede per esperienza le cittadi non avere mai ampliato né di dominio né di ricchezza, se non mentre sono state in libertá) (Machiavelli 2000, p. 139).
- 17.
As Hobbes (1996, pp. 139, Chap. XX) so elegantly put it: “He cannot be Accused by any of his subjects, of Injury: He cannot be punished by them: He is Judge of what is necessary for Peace; and Judge of Doctrines: He is Sole Legislator; and Supreme Judge of Controversies; and of the times and Occasions of Warre and Peace: to Him belongeth to choose Magistrates, Councellors, Commanders, and all other officers, and Ministers; and to determine of Rewards, and Punishments, Honour and Order.” Hobbes would have felt at home in the European Council !
- 18.
For a discussion of holism, hierarchies and individualism , see (Popper 1995); (Dumont 1986). Concerning state authority , (Isensee 2004) says they have “two faces: inwardly facing—effective and organised sovereign authority, internal sovereignty ; outwardly facing—legal independence , external sovereignty”. According to this interpretation, states are sovereign rather than their citizens. See also (Grimm 2009). I will discuss the inconsistency of the principle of state sovereignty with the Republic later.
- 19.
Republican writers “make no … distinction between the powers of states and the powers of communities over which they rule. On the contrary, the whole thrust of republican theory is towards an ultimate equation between the two. This undoubtedly yields a recognizable concept of the state , one that many Marxists and exponents of direct democracy continue to espouse. But it involves a repudiation of the most distinctive element in the mainstream theory of the modern state: the claim that it is the state itself, rather than the community over which it holds sway, that constitutes the seat of sovereignty .” Skinner (FN 10), p. 386.
- 20.
Q. Skinner (2009) shows that the concept of “state “derived from the concept of vested rights in the Renaissance .
- 21.
Hobbes makes this clear in his distinction between ‘right ’ and ‘law’: “RIGHT consiteth in liberty to do, or to forbare; whereas LAW, determineth, and bindeth to one of them: to that Law, and Right, differ as much, as Obligation and Liberty; which in one and the same matter are inconsistent” (Hobbes 1996, pp. 91, Chap. 14).
- 22.
Art. 20 TFEU; see also (Haratsch et al. 2010, S. RN 725).
- 23.
In microeconomical theory, this means that in a two-dimensional world of price and quantity, the demand curve for private goods will horizontally intersect the quantity axis, whereas public goods will vertically intersect the price axis. See (Samuelson 1938).
- 24.
- 25.
See (Hobbes 1996) and also (Hume 1978 [1740], pp. 534–539) who derives government from externalities : “Two neighbours may agree to drain a meadow, which they possess in common; because it is easy for them to know each other’s mind; and each must perceive, that the immediate consequence of his failing in his part, is, the abandoning the whole project. But it is very difficult, and indeed impossible, that a thousand persons should agree in any such action; it being difficult for them to concert so complicated a design, and still more difficult for them to execute it.”.
- 26.
(Ostrom 1990) has claimed that “an external actor”, i.e. a government is not the only solution governing the commons, provided insiders can make binding commitments. However, the point of what I call common resource goods is precisely that such commitments cannot be made because of strategic substitutabilities as described by (Cooper and John 1988).
- 27.
This was envisaged and even desired by neofunctionalists from the very beginning, see (Haas 2004).
- 28.
See (Collignon and Schwarzer 2003) for further details.
- 29.
See (Collignon 2003) for a full development of this argument.
- 30.
Rawls has argued that principles of justice should be universally acceptable, but this requires still some form of deliberation for their practical implementation. The European Union is institutionally deprived of such deliberation process.
- 31.
(Bundesverfassungsgericht 2009, S. § 249).
- 32.
According to Weber ‘s (1972, p. 28) definition of sovereign rule.
- 33.
- 34.
- 35.
This focus gives republicanism a weak voice in international relations, see: (Onuf 1998).
- 36.
- 37.
“A true Republic … is, and cannot be anything else but, a representative system of the people whereby the people’s rights are looked after on their behalf by deputies who represent the united will of the citizens.“ I. (Kant 1996 [1785]) § 52, III. (Urbinati 2012) has shown that for early republicans representation was a tool to prevent the populist corruption of democracy and allowed correcting policy mistakes.
- 38.
As (Price 1991), a radical English Republican and supporter of American independence wrote: If governments “are subject to no control from their constituents, the very idea of liberty will be lost and the power of choosing representatives becomes nothing but a power, lodged in a few, to choose at certain periods a body of masters for themselves and for the rest of the community ”.
- 39.
This convergence became possible, because accountability for a limited mandate reduced the danger of populist corruption.
- 40.
(Locke 1988, p. 367): “yet, the Legislative being only a Fiduciary Power to act for certain ends, there remains still in the People a Supreme Power to remove or alter the Legislative, when they find the Legislative to act contrary to the trust reposed in them.”.
- 41.
For a discussion of how the European Republic could be better structured, see (Collignon and Paul 2008). (Besson and Martí 2009, S. 28) distinguish between Republican legal theory and jurisprudence and Republican law, which they continue to divide into substantive and procedural Legal Republicanism . In this paper, I focus on the normative basis of a substantive form of Legal Republicanism although I agree with the authors when they write: “Constitutional provisions are crucial from a republican point of view. … A republican lawyer is expected to endorse a strongly democratic theory of legal authority ” (pp. 29–31).
- 42.
- 43.
Art. 1 Para. 1 TEU.
- 44.
To give an example: the Constitutional Treaty was submitted to ratification by national referenda in Spain , the Netherlands , France and Luxemburg. Out of the total 49 329 676 votes, 26 661 082 were in favour of the Treaty and 22 668 594 were opposed. Despite this solid majority of 8.1% in favour of ratification, the Treaty was rejected because in France and the Netherlands local majorities were against.
- 45.
(Sieyès 1789) proclaimed: « La nation existe avant tout, elle est l’origine de tout. » and J.-P. Chevènement (La faute de M. Monnet ; Paris, 2006, p. 65) explained: “Avec la Révolution naissent ensemble le ‘Peuple français’ et la République ‘une et indivisible’”. The paradigm of the European Republic proposed here would require German communitarians to understand that the Bundesrepublik is first of all a republic, and the French souverainists to understand that the Republic can be « une et divisible » . See also (Chopin 2002).
- 46.
(Eriksen 2009) especially Chap. 3.
- 47.
- 48.
Quote from (Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2 BvR 2/08 from 30.6.2009, 2009, p. §1).
- 49.
Art. 3–6 TFEU.
- 50.
For a classification, see also (Haratsch et al. 2010, S. Rn 149–155).
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Collignon, S. (2017). The European Union as a Republic. In: Collignon, S. (eds) The Governance of European Public Goods. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-64012-9_3
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