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After the WTO: Rise or New Dependency?

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China's Rise in the Age of Globalization

Part of the book series: Palgrave Studies in Economic History ((PEHS))

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Abstract

Globalization has had a twofold effect on China’s economic development after its WTO entry, by stimulating a Ricardian growth miracle but inhibiting China’s catching up. “Growth without development,” which characterizes China’s model of development, did not make China another Germany or Germany, but rather reinforced its dependent development. China’s peaceful rise rhetoric precisely highlighted its developmental quagmire in the age of globalization, and hence its inability to challenge the “fundamental order of the international system.” The unholy alliance between Chinese crony capitalism and global capitalism, nonetheless, has made any effort of the regime to seek an “alternative” extremely difficult.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Edward Steinfeld (2010), Playing Our Game—Why China’s Rise doesn’t Threaten the West, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 25.

  2. 2.

    Interviews with youthful officials within the central and local bureaucracies from June 2006 until March 2008.

  3. 3.

    Chen Fang (1997), The Wrath of Heaven (tiannu), Hohhot: yuanfang chubanshe (Chap. 17), p. 283.

  4. 4.

    Yu Keping (2007), “Democracy is a Good Thing (minzhu shige haodongxi),” Study Times (xuexi shibao), No. 367. http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/49150/49152/5224247.html

  5. 5.

    Hu Jintao’s speech addressed to Yale University on April 21, 2006. People’s Daily, 24/04/2006. http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/news/1199378.htm

  6. 6.

    Wu Bangguo, “juebuneng zhaoban xifang gao duodang lunliu zhizheng (We will Never Practice Western Multi-party System),” CCTV.com, 9/03/2009. http://news.cctv.com/china/20090309/102808.shtml

  7. 7.

    “The Central Propaganda Department of the CCP Explains Six Fundamental Questions Concerning the Construction of the Core Socialist Value System,” People’s Daily, Jan 5–Feb 16, 2009. http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/40557/145802/

  8. 8.

    Kang Xiaoguang (2002), “An Analysis of China’s Political Stability in the Next 3–5 Years,” Strategy and Management, No. 3.

  9. 9.

    Sun Liping et al. (1998), “The Mid-Term and Long-Term Trends and Hidden Danger of the Transformation of China’s Social Structure,” Strategy and Management, No. 5.

  10. 10.

    Taishi Jian, “A Comment on Wen Tiejun’s Recent Speech in Fujian,” huaxia dianzibao, No. 122, 1/12/2006. http://www.huaxiabao.org/article.asp?IssueId=122&ArtNb=1

  11. 11.

    Jiang Xun, “Chinese Peasants Become Shareholders and Appeal for Land Revolution,” Asia Weekly, No. 11, 15/03/2008. http://www.yzzk.com/cfm/Content_Archive.cfm?Channel=ag&Path=385827171/11ag1a.cfm

  12. 12.

    New Beijing Daily (xinjingbao), 9/01/2010. http://news.xinhuanet.com/house/2010-01/09/content_12780512.htm; In 2010, land revenues further increased by 70.4% to 2.7 trillion yuan. Southern Weekend, 11/01/2011. http://www.infzm.com/content/54397

  13. 13.

    New Beijing Daily (xinjingbao), 9/01/2010. http://news.sohu.com/20100109/n269465598.shtml

  14. 14.

    A most typical example is the high-speed train development. “Behind the Fall of Liu Zhijun (Minister of Railway),” China Business Daily (zhongguo jingyingbao), 19/02/2011. http://www.cb.com.cn/1634427/20110219/185888.html

  15. 15.

    Sun Liping (2002), p. 365.

  16. 16.

    Yue Jianyong and Chen Man (2008), “What Caused the Inflation?” Modern China Studies, No. 1.

  17. 17.

    Song Fufan, “Deng Xiaoping Rethinks of China’s Path of Development in His Late Years,” Study Times (xuexi shibao), 29/06/2009. http://dangshi.people.com.cn/GB/138903/141370/9562577.html

  18. 18.

    Yan Jijian (2010), “The Causes and Solutions to Mass Incidents,” Theory Guide (lilun daokan), No. 5.

  19. 19.

    Sun Liping, “The Chinese Society is Racing towards Decadence,” 21ccom.net, 10/01/2010. http://new.21ccom.net/plus/view.php?aid=7550

  20. 20.

    Yu Jianrong, “Safeguard the Bottom-Line of Social Stability,” a speech addressed to Beijing Lawyers’ Association, 26/12/2009. http://www.chinaelections.org/newsinfo.asp?newsid=169507

  21. 21.

    He Qinglian (2003), “China’s Changing of the Guard: A Volcanic Stability,” Journal of Democracy, 14:1, January, pp. 66–72.

  22. 22.

    Yu Jianrong, “Safeguard the Bottom-line of Social Stability,” a speech addressed to Beijing Lawyers’ Association, 26/12/2009.

  23. 23.

    “zhongguo caifu kuaisu xiang shaoshuren jizhong (China’s Wealth Concentrated rapidly into Small Number of People),” Liaowang Weekly (Outlook), 13/02/2010. http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/10977869.html

  24. 24.

    Economic Reference News (jingji cankaobao), 21/05/2010.

  25. 25.

    Jinghua shibao, 10/12/2012. http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2012-12-10/075225771850.shtml

  26. 26.

    The Chinese government decided to elevate the starting point of individual income taxation to 3,500 yuan per month on July 1, 2011. Economic Reference News (jingji cankaobao), 1/07/2011. http://www.jjckb.cn/2011-07/01/content_318835.htm.This implies that only 24 million people would be covered under the new regulation. Cheng Xiaonong argued that the starting point of the taxable income usually stands for the low income line. The 24 million taxable people accounts for just 3% of the 800 million working population. This is the most convincing evidence for what caused underconsumption. http://biweekly.hrchina.org/article/1141 (this hyperlink carrying Cheng’s analysis no longer exists). Based on “2013 figures from China NBS, CNPolitics, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research, US Bureau of Labor Statistics, US Department of Defense,” Goldman Sachs claimed, “Today’s China consumer market is dominated by a relatively narrow middle class. Less than 2% of workers earn enough even to pay income tax. 11% of China’s population can be considered middle class,” whose “average daily spending was just $7 as opposed to $97 of US consumers.” http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/macroeconomic-insights/growth-of-china/chinese-consumer/

  27. 27.

    Xiong Chuandong, “How Deep is the Bottomless Pit of the ‘Costly Stability,’” Guangming Guancha, 13/06/2010. http://www.chinareform.net/2010/0611/17888.html

  28. 28.

    “weichi wending, zhongguo baoan yusuan zengfu chaoguo junfei (Maintaining Stability, China’s Budget growth on Public Security greater than on Defense),” 6/03/2010. http://www.afinance.cn/new/gncj/201003/257419.html

  29. 29.

    Leslie Hook, “Beijing Raises Spending on Internal Security,” Financial Times, 6/03/2011.

  30. 30.

    Sun Liping, et al. (2010), Tsinghua University Research Group, “To Realize Long-Term Stability through Institutionalized Expression of Interest,” Leaders (lingdaozhe), No. 33, April.

  31. 31.

    “Consulting China’s Economy,” Caijing, Issue 143, 3/10/2005.

  32. 32.

    Robert Sutter (2003), “Why does China Matter?” The Washington Quarterly, 27:1, (Winter 2003–2004), pp. 75–89.

  33. 33.

    Ren Zhongping, “A Great Choice on the Destiny of Modernization—On the Transformation of the Mode of Economic Development,” People’s Daily, 1/03/2010.

  34. 34.

    Yu Yongding, “A Different Road Forward,” China Daily, 23/12/2010. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2010-12/23/content_11742757.htm

  35. 35.

    Cited from Di Yingqing, “A Discussion with Long Yongtu,” China and the World (online), No. 12, December, 1999. http://chicagoguangzhou.com/zgysj/99/zs9912a.htm#2

  36. 36.

    Cui Zhiyuan (1999), “Expanding Domestic Demand is a Deep Revolution,” Dushu, No. 4.

  37. 37.

    Roundtable Discussion in December 1999, Beijing.

  38. 38.

    Gordon, G. Chang (2001), The Coming Collapse of China, London: Arrow.

  39. 39.

    For instance, by the end of 2002, the non-performing loans of the four state banks posted at 26.1%, despite that 1.4 trillion yuan had been transferred to the State Asset Management Companies (AMCs), which brought down the NPL ratio by 10 percentage point (Yue and Chen 2003, pp. 83–89).

  40. 40.

    “Chen Xiwen: Around 20 million migrant workers lost their jobs due to global financial crisis and went back to the countryside,” News Briefing by the State Council’s Information Office, 2/02/2009. http://www.china.com.cn/economic/txt/2009-02/02/content_17209939.htm

  41. 41.

    China News Networks, 15/12/2008. http://news.cnfol.com/081215/101,1277,5207566,00.shtml

  42. 42.

    Yue Jianyong, “Going out of the Pitfall of ‘Technologyless Industrialization,’” Nanfengchuang, No. 1, 1/01/2009.

  43. 43.

    “CASS Expert Chen Naixing: 40% SMEs Go Broke in Crisis,” Dongfang Daily, 12/06/2009. http://www.dfdaily.com/node2/node27/node119/userobject1ai173466.shtml

  44. 44.

    The Social Blue Paper 2010 issued by CASS asserted, “Our Country will be the First Nation to Step Out of the Financial Crisis and into a New Growth Stage,” renminwang, Beijing, 22/12/2009. http://npc.people.com.cn/GB/14840/10628150.html

  45. 45.

    “Different Data on Unemployment Rate Arouse Dispute,” China Economic Weekly (zhongguo jingji zhoukan), 7/04/2009.

  46. 46.

    Wen was quoted as saying, “I know there is an unemployed population of 2 million in the US, which makes the government very anxious. But the figure for the Chinese government when it comes to providing jobs to our people is 200 million, and there’s a huge gap between urban and rural areas.” See report “Wen upbeat on US relations despite strains,” China Daily, 23/02/2010. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-03/23/content_9625455.htm

  47. 47.

    Niall Ferguson, “Not Two Countries, But One: Chimerica,” 4/03/2007. http://www.niallferguson.com/Site/FERG/Templates/ArticleItem.aspx?pageid=95

  48. 48.

    cpc-news (online), 25/02/2009. http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64093/64103/8870435.html

  49. 49.

    People’s Daily, 6/03/2010.

  50. 50.

    In 2009, China’s GDP reached US $4.7 trillion, about 8% of the world GDP, but China consumed 18% of the world’s energy, 44% of steel and 53% of cement. Zhang Xiaoqiang and Ma Xiuhong on the State Council’s New Policy on FDI on April 14, 2010. http://financial.people.com.cn/GB/11368944.html

  51. 51.

    People’s Daily, 1/03/2010.

  52. 52.

    Xinhua, Beijing, 3–5/02/2010.

  53. 53.

    People’s Daily, 15/03/2010.

  54. 54.

    Second Meeting of the U.S.-China Strategic & Economic Dialogue Joint U.S.-China Economic Track Fact Sheet. http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg722.htm

  55. 55.

    The official Liaowang Weekly (Outlook) quoted an investigation report of a Western Chamber of Commerce in Beijing that some restrictive measures taken by the Chinese government that precluded foreign investors entering some robust market areas have aroused mounting dissatisfaction of the MNCs in China. “China Readjust Policy on FDI, FIEs’ Era of Extra-National Treatment is Over,” Liaowang Weekly (Outlook), 25/04/2010.

  56. 56.

    “A Set of Opinions on Taking Better Advantage of Foreign Investment of the State Council,” Source: The General Office of the State Council, 13/04/2010. http://financial.people.com.cn/GB/11368944.html

  57. 57.

    Second Meeting of the U.S.-China Strategic & Economic Dialogue Joint U.S.-China Economic Track Fact Sheet.

  58. 58.

    “Wen Jiabao: RMB Revaluation by 20% will Incur Severe Unemployment,” jingji guanchawang, 23/09/2010. http://www.eeo.com.cn/Politics/international/2010/09/23/181542.shtml

  59. 59.

    Zhang Xiaoqiang, “Vice-Minister of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) on China’s New FDI Policy,” 14/04/2010. http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/113689944.html

  60. 60.

    AmCham-China’s 2010 Business Climate Survey. http://users.cla.umn.edu/~erm/data/sr486/govdocs/AMCHAM2010.pdf

  61. 61.

    “The FIEs are the Main Creators and Beneficiaries of China’s Trade Surplus,” The Legal Daily, 14/04/2010. http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/bm/content/2010-04/14/content_2112297.htm

  62. 62.

    George J. Gilboy (2004), “The Myth behind China’s Miracle,” Foreign Affairs, 83:4, July/August, pp. 33–48.

  63. 63.

    Yılmaz Akyüz, “Export Dependence and Sustainability of Growth in China and the East Asian Production Network,” Research Paper 27, April 2010. http://www.southcentre.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1326%3Aexport-dependence-and-sustainability-of-growth-in-china-and-the-east-asian-production-network&catid=142%3Aglobal-financial-and-economic-crisis&lang=en

  64. 64.

    According to Hu Chunli, deputy director of the Research Institute of Industrial Economy and Technology Economy under the NDRC, the profitability of China’s manufacturing industries as a whole was 5–6%, while profitability of the high-tech industries was only 2–3%. “How China’s Manufacturing Industries Break Besiege of Foreign Capital?” http://www.ca800.com/news/html/2005-4-5/n21679_0.htm

  65. 65.

    Steinfeld (2010), p. 105.

  66. 66.

    Eric Ng, “Vehicle Policy Raises Threshold for Entry into Crowded Sector,” SCMP, 2/06/2004; David Murphy, “Cars: Driving Ambitions,” Far Eastern Economic Review covered dated 27/05/2004.

  67. 67.

    Gao Liang, “waizi zaihua binggou ji guojia anquan xingshi (Foreign M&As in China and the Situation of National Security),” Global View, No. 283, 9/03/2010. http://www.globalview.cn/ReadNews.asp?NewsID=20647

  68. 68.

    Su Fenyong (2009), “How Many Lessons are Needed for China’s Equipment Manufacturers to Become Clever enough to Cope with Foreign M&As?” Electric China (dianqi zhongguo), No. 12.

  69. 69.

    “How China’s Manufacturing Industries Break Besiege of Foreign Capital,” http://www.ca800.com//05/4-5/n21679.asp

  70. 70.

    Wang Sirui, “Experts Warn against International Gap of China’s Manufacturing,” diyi caijing ribao, 23/11/2005; Xu Kuangdi (president of the Chinese Academy of Engineering), “The Current Situation and Challenges of China’s Manufacturing Industries,” China Development Observation webpage, the Development and Research Center of the State Council, 26/04/2005. http://www.chinado.cn/ReadNews.asp?NewsID=299

  71. 71.

    The SAIC report shows that absolute monopoly has been established by the FIEs in computer operating system, soft packaging products, photosensitive materials, meridian tires and mobile phones, while in light industry, chemical industry, pharmaceuticals, and machinery and electronics, FIEs’ products had captured more than one third of the market share. 21st Century Business Herald, 16/05/2004.

  72. 72.

    “Constructing an Innovative State,” http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2006-01/12/content_4043283.htm

  73. 73.

    Xinhua, 17/11/2012.

  74. 74.

    Nanfengchuang, 28/08/2006.

  75. 75.

    Xinhua-net article written by Zhu Jidong, “Why Foreign M&As Go Ahead against the Will of the People?” 4/09/2008. http://xinhuashe2007.home.news.cn/blog/a/01010000294003E77224FD9B.html

  76. 76.

    Xinhua, Beijing, 30/11/2009.

  77. 77.

    “China’s Drive for ‘Indigenous Innovation—A Web of Industrial Policies,’” APCO Worldwide 2010. https://www.uschamber.com/report/china%E2%80%99s-drive-indigenous-innovation-web-industrial-policies

  78. 78.

    The Financial Times, 28/05/2009.

  79. 79.

    China Economic Weekly, 15/06/2009; Also China Youth Daily commentary, 16/06/2009: “The 4-Trllion Buy-Local is Not Trade Protectionism,” http://www.chinanews.com/cj/cj-plgd/news/2009/06-16/1735157.shtml. A good example of such reverse discrimination was the Ministry of Agriculture public procurement of instruments in 2015, of which 97.8% were imports, only 2.2% were domestically made products. China Science News (zhongguo kexuebao), 10/06/2015. http://news.sciencenet.cn/htmlnews/2015/6/320588.shtm

  80. 80.

    “How the Government Procurement should Avoid ‘Discrimination against the Local Products’?” People’s Daily (overseas edition), 1/07/2009. http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrbhwb/html/2009-07/01/content_286089.htm

  81. 81.

    Notice of Ceasing to Implement Measures for Management of Budgets of Government Procurement of Indigenous Innovation Products (issued by the Ministry of Finance, 23/06/2011). http://gks.mof.gov.cn/redianzhuanti/zhengfucaigouguanli/201106/t20110628_567649.html

  82. 82.

    “Minister of Commerce (Chen Deming), China’s Indigenous Innovation never linked with trade policy,” Xinhua (Xiamen), 9/09/2010. http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2010-09/09/c_12537031.htm; also “Chen Deming: Access to Chinese Market Not Conditioned on Technology Transfer,” zhongguangwang (Beijing), 9/02/2012. http://china.cnr.cn/gdgg/201202/t20120209_509144668.shtml

  83. 83.

    “China’s Price for Market Entry: Give us Your Technology, Too,” The Wall Street Journal, 26/02/2004.

  84. 84.

    Ibid.

  85. 85.

    Ibid.

  86. 86.

    Dewey & Leboef LLP, “China’s Promotion of the Renewable Electric Power Equipment Industry, Hydro, Wind, Solar, Biomass,” March 2010.

  87. 87.

    “China’s Price for Market Entry: Give us Your Technology, Too,” The Wall Street Journal, 26/02/2004.

  88. 88.

    Dewey & Leboef LLP, “China’s Promotion of the Renewable Electric Power Equipment Industry, Hydro, Wind, Solar, Biomass,” March 2010.

  89. 89.

    Ibid.

  90. 90.

    “The ‘Grown-up’ History of the High-Speed Train,” China Economic Weekly, No. 5 & 6, 14/02/2011. http://www.ceweekly.cn/html/Article/2011021481724704324492.html

  91. 91.

    “Trillion-Debt Qualm of High-Speed Train,” Caijing, No. 4, 2011 (14/02/2011).

  92. 92.

    Mingpao, 19/02/2011.

  93. 93.

    China Business Weekly (shangwu zhoukan), March 2006.

  94. 94.

    Bai Yimin (2008), Mutsui Empire in Action, Beijing: China Economic Publishing House, p. 262.

  95. 95.

    21st Century Business Herald, 23/03/2011.

  96. 96.

    Cited from the 21st Century Business Herald, 23/03/2011. http://www.21cbh.com/HTML/2011-3-24/wNMDAwMDIyODUwNA.html?source=hp&position=focus_xg

  97. 97.

    New Beijing Daily (xiningbao), 14/06/2011. http://www.china.com.cn/economic/txt/2011-06/14/content_22777587.htm

  98. 98.

    “The Big Crumble,” Caixin-New Century (xinshiji), No. 30, 2011 (published on 1/08/2011). http://magazine.caing.com/2011-07-30/100285595.html

  99. 99.

    Ibid. and 21st Century Business Herald, 6/01/2011. http://www.21cbh.com/HTML/2011-1-7/xNMDAwMDIxNDkxNg.html?source=hp&position=focus

  100. 100.

    Testimony of Owen E. Herrnstadt, Director of Trade and Globalization International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers before the US–China Economic and Security Review Commission’s Hearing: “China’s Emergent Military Aerospace and Commercial Aviation Capabilities,” 20/05/2010. Washington, DC.

  101. 101.

    The 2011 US–China Strategic and Economic Dialogue U.S. Fact Sheet—Economic Tract 5/10/2011. Source: U.S. Department of Treasury. https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/TG1172.aspx

  102. 102.

    21st Century Business Herald, 11/01/2017. http://epaper.21jingji.com/html/2017-01/11/content_54451.htm

  103. 103.

    “Guiding ‘Made in China’ towards ‘Created in China’—Recalling 11th Five and Looking forward to 12th Five,” People’s Daily, 27/02/2011. Accounting for more than one fourth of China’s all-nation R&D expenditures, nonetheless, the central yangqi’s R&D outlay declined to 1.41% in proportion to their sales revenues in 2014. The China Youth Daily, 25/07/2016. http://zqb.cyol.com/html/2016-07/25/nw.D110000zgqnb_20160725_2-07.htm

  104. 104.

    Xinhua, 23/02/2016.

  105. 105.

    Caixin, 12/10/2013. http://china.caixin.com/2013-10-12/100590867.html; “Fraud Scandals Sap China’s Dream of Becoming a Science Superpower,” The New York Times, 13/10/2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/13/world/asia/china-science-fraud-scandals.html

  106. 106.

    The Legal Daily, 4/04/2017. http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2017/04-04/8190785.shtml

  107. 107.

    Steinfeld (2010), p. 150.

  108. 108.

    http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjfx/fxbg/t20101123_402685243.htm

  109. 109.

    Yusuf, S and Nabeshima, K (2007), “Strengthening China’s Technological Capability,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4309.

  110. 110.

    The Legal Daily, 4/04/2017. http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2017/04-04/8190785.shtml

  111. 111.

    “‘Made in China’ Face Five Big Soft Underbellies, Chinese Enterprises Big but not Strong,” The Economic Reference News (jingji cankaobao), 11/10/2010. http://ccnews.people.com.cn/GB/12914512.html

  112. 112.

    Peter Nolan et al. (2010), “Global Competition after the Financial Crisis,” New Left Review, 64, July–August.

  113. 113.

    Gao Liang, “On Globalization, Mental Emancipation and Transformation of Mode of Development,” Hong Kong Fax, No. HK2009–07, 27/10/2009.

  114. 114.

    The Second Nationwide Resource Survey Bulletin on Scientific Research and R&D Demonstrated Our Nation’s Strength and Level, zhongguo tongji xinxiwang, 23/11/2010. http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjfx/fxbg/t20101123_402685243.htm

  115. 115.

    “China’s Patents’ Purity Yet to Be Improved,” zhongguo chanjing xinwenbao, 14/04/2017. http://www.cnipr.com/yysw/zscqycx/201704/t20170414_201930.htm

  116. 116.

    Peter Marsh, “China Noses ahead as Top Goods Producer,” The Financial Times, 13/03/2011.

  117. 117.

    “China’s Industry Security Break Alert Level, Foreign Control Exceed One-Third,” zhongguangwang, Beijing, 30/11/2009. http://news.sohu.com/20091130/n268578182.shtml

  118. 118.

    People’s Daily, 1/03/2010.

  119. 119.

    “Li calls for Deeper Ties with Germany,” The Financial Times, 7/01/2011.

  120. 120.

    The Workers’ Daily, 13/03/2017. http://ah.workercn.cn/14839/201703/13/170313144322829.shtml

  121. 121.

    “China Blinks on Yuan in Late G-20 Deal,” The Wall Street Journal Asia, 21/02/2011.

  122. 122.

    China News Agency, Beijing, 13/12/2010.

  123. 123.

    Xinhuawang, 5/03/2011.

  124. 124.

    “New Foreign Trade Strategy Pursue Global Win-Win,” Outlook (liaowang), 4/01/2011.

  125. 125.

    Xinhua, 14/03/2015.

  126. 126.

    Xinhua, 2/03/2016; Sina Caijing, 21/03/2016.

  127. 127.

    Caixin, 29/06/2017. http://companies.caixin.com/2017-06-29/101107271.html

  128. 128.

    Wu Jinglian, et al. (1999), “Realizing the Strategic Regroupings of the State-Owned Economy,” Working Paper.

  129. 129.

    Xinhua, Beijing, 17/11/2002. http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64569/65444/4429120.html

  130. 130.

    Interview with an informed source at the official think tank, 18/02/2003.

  131. 131.

    Interviews with SOE insiders in December 2003.

  132. 132.

    China Economic Times, 18/12/2003.

  133. 133.

    Shuipi, “What is the Essence of Chinese-style MBO?” China Business Daily, 19/04/2005.

  134. 134.

    Kong Shanguang, “Where did the 5-Trillion Profits of SOEs Go?,” Guangming Guancha, 11/02/2007. http://guancha.gmw.cn/show.aspx?id=3445

  135. 135.

    Interview with a management consultant who spent a whole year in a listed SOE to investigate the efficacy of the SOE management reform, 21/09/2001.

  136. 136.

    Economic Reference News (jingji cankaobao), 8/11/2005.

  137. 137.

    Jack Rodman, “China: NPL Market Report,” Global Nonperforming Loan Report 2006, Ernst & Young, 3/05/2006. This report enraged the Chinese government. Two weeks later, E&Y had to declare to withdraw the report. The Economist, 15/05/2006.

  138. 138.

    Jonathan Richter (2008), “Circumscribing China’s NPL ‘Puzzle,’” Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. http://repository.upenn.edu/wharton_research_scholars/54

  139. 139.

    The Economist, 20/05/2006, p. 78.

  140. 140.

    http://www.pwccn.com/webmedia/doc/633090682731395808_nplasia_newsletter_mar2007_chi.pdf

  141. 141.

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    Jianyong Yue

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Yue, J. (2018). After the WTO: Rise or New Dependency?. In: China's Rise in the Age of Globalization. Palgrave Studies in Economic History. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-63997-0_7

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