Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

USA, Global Capitalism and “Drawing China Out”

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
China's Rise in the Age of Globalization

Part of the book series: Palgrave Studies in Economic History ((PEHS))

Abstract

“Drawing China out” and integrating China into the international system has been the hard core of US–China policy since Nixon in the early 1970s. It was only after the end of the Cultural Revolution that such a grand strategy started to function with the onset of China’s “reform and opening.” The USA alternated inducement with coercion to foster China’s deep integration, allowing China to bandwagon with the liberal order whereby to achieve export-led high growth, on the condition that it relinquish economic nationalism. However, the USA has never intended to make China another Germany or Japan in economic or strategic terms. The strategy paid off as evidenced by China’s unprecedented opening to global capitalism and its entrenched dependencies on global capitalist system politically and economically.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Dai Chaowu (2010), “U.S. ‘Trade Liberalization’ Policy and China’s ‘Reform and Opening’ (1969–1975),” shixue yuekan (History Studies Monthly), No. 2.

  2. 2.

    Chen Jian of Cornell University gave high evaluation on Mao’s role. “The Great Transformation: How China Changed in the Long 1970s,” LSE Public Lecture, 22/01/2009. http://www.lse.ac.uk/website-archive/newsAndMedia/videoAndAudio/channels/publicLecturesAndEvents/player.aspx?id=92

  3. 3.

    Chen Jian (2001), Mao’s China and the Cold War, Chapel Hill & London: The University of North Carolina Press, p. 278.

  4. 4.

    Michael Yahuda (2003), The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific (2nd and revised ed.), New York: Routledge, p. 180.

  5. 5.

    Deng’s Works, vol. 3, p. 274.

  6. 6.

    Paul Kennedy (1987), The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, NY: Random House, p. 609, note 18.

  7. 7.

    Yahuda (2003), p. 73.

  8. 8.

    “The Little Known ‘43-Plan,’” China News Week, 13/02/2012. http://focus.news.163.com/12/0213/21/7Q61AE8800011SM9.html

  9. 9.

    Pyle, K (2008), Japan Rising, p. 211.

  10. 10.

    Benjamin Schwarz (1996), “Why America Thinks It Has to Run the World,” The Atlantic Monthly, June, pp. 92–102.

  11. 11.

    John Ikenberry (1992), “A World Economy Restored: Expert Consensus and the Anglo-American Postwar Settlement,” International Organization, 46:1, pp. 289–321.

  12. 12.

    Randall B, Woods (2000), “The Trials of Multilateralism: America, Britain, and the New Economic Order, 1941–1947,” in From War to Peace, ed. Paul Kennedy and William I. Hitchcock, Yale, p. 122.

  13. 13.

    Geir Lundestad (1986), “Empire by Invitation: The United States and Western Europe, 1945–1952,” Journal of Peace Research, 23:3, September, pp. 263–277.

  14. 14.

    Schwarz (1996), pp. 92–102.

  15. 15.

    Marc Trachtenberg, The Making of a Political System: The German Question in International Politics, 1945–1963, ed. Kennedy and Hitchcock, Yale 2000, p. 117.

  16. 16.

    Harper (1997), “The Dream of Democratic Peace—Americans are Not Asleep,” Foreign Affairs, 76:3, May/June, pp. 117–121.

  17. 17.

    Pyle (2008), Japan Rising, p. 211.

  18. 18.

    Diane B. Kunz (2000), The International Financial System and the Nation-State, ed. Kennedy and Hitchcock, p. 221.

  19. 19.

    Stuart Corbridge (1994), “Bretton Woods Revisited: Hegemony, Stability, and Territory,” Environment & Planning, A1994, v. 26, pp. 1829–1859.

  20. 20.

    Robert Kagan, “No Time to Cut Defense,” Washington Post, 3/02/2009; Robert Kaplan, “Where’s the American Empire when We Need It?” Washington Post, 2/12/2010. Cited from Paul K. MacDonald and Joseph M. Parent (2011), “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment,” International Security, 35:4, Spring, pp. 7–44.

  21. 21.

    Susan Strange (1987), “The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony,” International Organization, 41:4, pp. 551–574.

  22. 22.

    Odd Arne Westad (2007), The Global Cold War, p. 50.

  23. 23.

    Nolan (2001), China and Global Economy, p. 99.

  24. 24.

    Michael Mastanduno (1997), “Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and US Grand Strategy after the Cold War,” International Security, 21:4, pp. 49–88.

  25. 25.

    “Excerpts from Pentagon’s Plan: Prevent the Re-emergence of a New Rival,” New York Times, 8/03/1992. http://www.nytimes.com/1992/03/08/world/excerpts-from-pentagon-s-plan-prevent-the-re-emergence-of-a-new-rival.html?pagewanted=all

  26. 26.

    “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?” Robert Zoellick, Deputy Secretary of State Remarks to National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, 21/09/2005. https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/d/former/zoellick/rem/53682.htm

  27. 27.

    Richard Nixon (1967), “Asia after Vietnam,” Foreign Affairs, 46:1, October, pp. 111–125.

  28. 28.

    David Shambaugh (2005), “The New Strategic Triangle: U.S. and European Reactions to China’s Rise,” The Washington Quarterly, 28:3, Summer, pp. 7–25.

  29. 29.

    http://www.64memo.com/b5/1571.htm

  30. 30.

    The dissident Fang had taken refuge in the American embassy in Beijing. Eventually China expelled him and he came to the USA.

  31. 31.

    This letter was issued on June 20, 1989, the same day he announced a series of sanctions against China. http://www.64memo.com/b5/1571.htm

  32. 32.

    Winston Lord (1989), “China and America: Beyond the Big Chill,” Foreign Affairs, 68:4, Fall, pp. 1–26.

  33. 33.

    Yahuda (2003), pp. 256–257.

  34. 34.

    Cited from Mastanduno (1997), p. 71: footnote 75.

  35. 35.

    Mastanduno (1997), p. 71.

  36. 36.

    US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick pointed out in 2005, “For fifty years, our policy was to fence in the Soviet Union while its own internal contradictions undermined it. For thirty years, our policy has been to draw out the People’s Republic of China. As a result, the China of today is simply not the Soviet Union of the late 1940s … Chinese leaders have decided that their success depends on being networked with the modern world.” “Wither China: From Membership to Responsibility?” Robert Zoellick, Deputy Secretary of State, Remarks to National Committee on US–China Relations, September 21, 2005.

  37. 37.

    Robert D. Hormats, et al. (2001), “Task Force Report: Beginning the Journal—China, the United States, and the WTO,” Report of an Independent Task Force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations.

  38. 38.

    Fu Bo (2003), “China Hides Its Intentions Again,” Le Monde Diplomatique, March.

  39. 39.

    Li Lanqing (2008), Breaking the Siege, p. 58.

  40. 40.

    Wu Guangxiang (2008), “Journey of Peace to Japan, Deng Xiaoping Made Up His Mind to Launch Reform and Opening,” dangshi zongheng, No. 8.

  41. 41.

    Regarding Deng’s obsession with the “Singapore Model,” please see special report on China Business Daily, 20/05/2011. http://www.cb.com.cn/opinion/2011_0520/211293.html; “Lee Kwan Yew’s Intercourses with Five Generations of Chinese leaders,” Wenweipo (Hong Kong), 23/03/2015. http://news.wenweipo.com/2015/03/23/IN1503230015.htm; Liang Heng (2008), “Deng Xiaoping’s Modest Apology Moved Lee Kwan Yew,” Party Construct (dangjian), No. 10.

  42. 42.

    Zhao Kejin, “The Fact Is the US Is No Worse Than Other Great Powers,” Global Times, 18/01/2012. http://world.huanqiu.com/roll/2012-01/2367088.html

  43. 43.

    General Liu Yazhou listed the first and third factors in his speech titled “Belief and Ethics (xinnian yu daode)”: http://military.china.com/zh_cn/hostory2/03/11027561/20070731/14251621.html; or http://www.chinathintank.cn/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=5242

  44. 44.

    Yahuda (2003), p. 85.

  45. 45.

    Deng’s Works, vol. 3, p. 3.

  46. 46.

    Deng’s Works, vol. 3, pp. 104–106.

  47. 47.

    There is a famous debate in 1974 when Deng was called back by Mao to preside over economic rectification. Deng conflicted with the Gang of Four very soon on whether China should rely on itself to build ships or mortgage ships from world market at much cheaper cost. The Gang of Four asserted that the “mortgaging” argument was a traitorous behavior and labeled it as a “slavish comprador philosophy” (yangnu zhexue). This is the famous “Fengqinglun Incident” during the Cultural Revolution. This event added to Deng’s resentment of developmental Maoism in its entirety, prompting his rejection of self-reliance in the post-Mao era.

  48. 48.

    The fourth episode of River Elegy: New Era, 1988.

  49. 49.

    Xie Xuanjun, one of the authors of River Elegy disclosed this information at a public lecture in Beijing Foreign Studies University in August 1988.

  50. 50.

    Cheng Yinghong (2011), “The Racist Views in Contemporary China,” Beijing Cultural Review (wenhua zongheng), No. 4.

  51. 51.

    Drifte (2003), From Balancing to Bandwagoning? p. 30.

  52. 52.

    Deng’s Works, vol. 3, p. 296.

  53. 53.

    Kang Xiaoguang (2002), “An Analysis of China’s Stability in the Next 3–5 Years,” Strategy and Management, No. 3.

  54. 54.

    Zhang Ruizhuang (2001), “Peace and Development is Not Main Theme of Contemporary World,” Strategy and Development, No. 1.

  55. 55.

    Many development studies scholars in one very famous Chinese university are even unclear of what a “developmental state” is. An interview with an insider, 10/07/2013, Beijing, China.

  56. 56.

    Liu Ji, “The Choice of Sino-U.S. Relations in the 21st Century,” Zaobao (Singapore), 23/10/1997.

  57. 57.

    William Overholt (2005), China and Globalization—Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, RAND, released on May 19, 2005.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK

    Jianyong Yue

Authors
  1. Jianyong Yue
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2018 The Author(s)

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Yue, J. (2018). USA, Global Capitalism and “Drawing China Out”. In: China's Rise in the Age of Globalization. Palgrave Studies in Economic History. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-63997-0_6

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-63997-0_6

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-63996-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-63997-0

  • eBook Packages: Economics and FinanceEconomics and Finance (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation