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Parliamentary Groups and Institutional Context

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Abstract

In this chapter, the functioning of parliamentary groups is analyzed. In the Spanish case, it has been found that there is high parliamentary discipline, which is supported by the members of all the parties and parliaments, as well as by citizens. However, this does not necessarily translate into a vertical functioning of the parliamentary groups. The parliamentary groups are headed by the veterans within the group, but the mere fact of holding a position in the party does not have a significant effect on the degree of influence in the parliamentary group. In general terms, the power of the parliamentary groups is concentrated in the professional politicians who have developed their career within the parties, preventing professionals from other fields from accessing positions of power. At the same time, women have fewer probabilities than men of accessing positions of leadership in the parliamentary groups.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Some authors, however, distinguish between party cohesion and party discipline . Cohesion would refer to the “majority direction of the vote of a parliamentary fraction and to the percentage of legislators that are removed from this”. Party discipline would refer to “legislators’ compliance with the stance of the party leader or the parliamentary fraction” (Casar 2000, p. 196).

  2. 2.

    For a more in-depth analysis of the subject see chapter 5 “Recruitment and selection”.

  3. 3.

    The Constitutional Court Judgement (STC) 5/1983, of 4 February, states that “the representatives give effectiveness to the right of citizens to participate and not that of any organisation such as the political party”, adding that “the right to participate corresponds to the citizens, and not to the parties; that the representatives elected are representatives of the citizens and not of the parties…”. Likewise, the STC 10/1983, of 21 February, warns that the function constitutionally attributed to parties is that of “acting as an essential channel” and expressly rejects, contrary to the Constitution, the theory that the parties and not the candidates are those who receive the mandate from voters, stating that the representatives represent “the whole electoral body”, without parties being able to end this relationship between representatives and the electoral body. For an analysis of this subject see Santaolalla (1986).

  4. 4.

    This variable takes the value of 0 for those MPs who state that they did not have a career before entering politics.

  5. 5.

    In chapter 5, “Recruitment and selection” the relation between organic positions in the parties and the creation of electoral lists is analyzed.

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Jaime-Castillo, A.M., Martínez-Cousinou, G. (2018). Parliamentary Groups and Institutional Context. In: Coller, X., Jaime-Castillo, A., Mota, F. (eds) Political Power in Spain. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-63826-3_7

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