A Brief Note on Gödel, Nagel, Minds, and Machines

Chapter
Part of the Outstanding Contributions to Logic book series (OCTR, volume 13)

Abstract

This note is a brief comment on Feferman’s Gödel, Nagel, Minds, and Machines. It emphasizes the need to expand proof theory and use its formal tools for the analysis of the informal proofs of mathematical practice. Natural formalization is seen as one important step toward providing what Feferman called for, namely, “an informative, systematic account at a theoretical level of how the mathematical mind works that squares with experience”.

Keywords

Mechanist thesis Mechanism and mind Computability Natural formalization Theory of proofs 

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyCarnegie Mellon UniversityPittsburghUSA

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