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Mapping Climate Justice

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Abstract

This chapter maps international climate change mitigation and adaptation regimes in order to derive fair climate stability implementation strategies. Based on insights on the current endeavor to finance climate change mitigation and adaptation around the globe, a three-dimensional climate justice approach will be introduced to share the burden of climate change fair within society. First, climate justice within a country should pay tribute to the fact that low- and high-income households share the same burden proportional to their dispensable income. Secondly, fair climate change burden sharing between countries comprises of argumentations that those countries benefiting more from a stable climate should also bear a higher burden of climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts. Thirdly, climate justice over time is proposed in an innovative climate change burden sharing strategy. Innovative compensation schemes to share the burden of climate change with bonds help weight the burden of climate change more equally between today’s and tomorrow’s society. Deriving respective policy recommendations for the wider climate change community is aimed at ensuring to share the burden but also the benefits of climate change within society, between countries and over time in an equitable and fair way.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.The New School & Columbia UniversityNew YorkUSA

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