Global Economic Governance Since the Global Financial Crisis

  • Jonathan Luckhurst


This chapter analyzes consequences of decentralizing authority for the shifting organizational framework of the global economic architecture. It indicates that relative strategic decline of the United States has further accelerated since the GFC. Organizational effects have been evident in formal and informal contexts. The G20 became the most crucial informal forum for decentralizing authority, though the BRICS forum also contributed significantly to this process. New IFIs also have significantly contributed to this decentralizing authority, by constituting alternative organizational platforms, especially for leading developing states to have greater influence. These new organizational contexts of global economic governance also contributed to decentralizing international authority on core policy principles, norms, and practices, thus undermining the organizational influence of the Bretton Woods institutions and the Washington Consensus.


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© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jonathan Luckhurst
    • 1
  1. 1.University of GuadalajaraGuadalajaraMexico

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