Abstract
Under the Koizumi administration (2001–2006), history problems caused a dramatic deterioration in Japan’s relations with China and South Korea. The Japanese prime minister not only obstinately visited the controversial Yasukuni Shrine on a yearly basis, but he also failed to mitigate East Asian countries’ concerns over Japanese history textbooks. The chapter examines to what extent the institutional tools provided by the central government reforms helped Koizumi to resist pressure from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) backbenchers and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) bureaucrats. It is argued that the extraordinarily strong, though direct and unintended, influence of the prime minister on Japan’s foreign policy could be to a great extent attributed to the idiosyncratic character of Koizumi, but it is the institutional factors that explain why the head of government was in a position to maintain this aberration from the realist theory over several years. Until the 1990s, the prime ministers quickly conformed with external pressures whenever their ideologically motivated initiatives encountered strong resistance abroad. It is the new institutional setting that facilitated Koizumi to play one veto player off against another and thus display a more assertive posture regarding history issues throughout his whole term in office.
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Notes
- 1.
There have been some attempts to rationalize Koizumi’s behavior on the grounds of domestic political survival strategy. For example, Mong (2017: 96–103) indicated that through the continuous homage to the shrine Koizumi sought support from such influential politicians as Nihon Izokukai Chair Koga Makoto. While this interpretation has some explanatory value until 2005, it fails to acknowledge that since 2005 it was Koga who became one of the leaders of the anti-Koizumi movement. As described later in this chapter, Koga was in fact criticizing Koizumi for not displaying sufficient flexibility towards their neighboring countries.
- 2.
The recommendations were not compulsory, which was not sufficiently explained to China and South Korea. For a comprehensive analysis of external and domestic determinants of the decision-making process on the 1982 textbook crisis, see: Rose (1998).
- 3.
For example, change in the composition of the LDP educational tribe was one of the reasons for the modification of the directives regarding authorization of history textbooks at the beginning of the 1980s. In 1976, a group of liberal members of that zoku defected from the LDP and established a separate party: the New Liberal Club. In their absence, the educational tribe was dominated by the “hawks” who steered the textbook screening directives to the right, thus provoking the diplomatic crisis in 1982. See: Yuasa (1986: 155–157), Uchida et al. (1981: 191–193).
- 4.
Apart from Nakasone’s right-wing inclinations, also his political calculations explain the visit to Yasukuni in 1985. Due to hospitalization of former Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei—a powerful faction boss who supported the government—Nakasone tried to strengthen his power base in the party by appealing to right-wing politicians. See: Mong (2017: 56–59).
- 5.
For instance, Miyazawa Kiichi promised to visit Yasukuni during the LDP presidential election in 1991. Due to his moderate convictions and out of fear that the visit would endanger Emperor Akihito’s journey to China in 1992, however, he waited almost 2 years to secretly fulfill the vow. See: Mong (2017: 36).
- 6.
For example, Prime Minister Nakasone revealed that he ceased visiting Yasukuni out of concern that this problem could be used against CCP Secretary-General Hu Yaobang, with whom he had established a strong interpersonal relationship. See: Nakasone (2004: 137).
- 7.
In the 1980s, the Tanaka/Takeshita faction created a “general mainstream” in the LDP and its leaders—Tanaka Kakuei and subsequently Takeshita Noboru—acted as “shadow shoguns” behind prime ministers.
- 8.
Despite praising Koizumi for his visits to Yasukuni, such influential “hawks” in the LDP as Kamei Shizuka or Hiranuma Takeo were still very critical of his economic policies or “despotic” leadership style. Other right-wing politicians, such as former Prime Ministers Mori Yoshirō (Koizumi’s factional boss) and Nakasone Yasuhiro explicitly suggested that Koizumi should behave more responsibly and avoid further deterioration of relations with China. See: Hiranuma (2005: 59–184), Kamei and Namikawa (2003: 28–158), Iokibe et al. (2007: 281–282), and Nakasone et al. (2005: 126–127).
- 9.
Uchiyama (2007: 176–182) called Koizumi a “prime minister full of pathos” who never abandoned his beliefs, even if they were against his political interests.
- 10.
The Bush administration became more vocal on expressing its dissatisfaction regarding Koizumi’s visits to Yasukuni since 2005. See: Lai (2014: 129).
- 11.
In 1993, CCS Kōno Yōhei apologized to the former “comfort women,” mainly Koreans, who had been forced to serve as sexual slaves for the Imperial Army. In 1995, in turn, Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi issued a statement that contained explicit apologies for the war of aggression.
- 12.
Koizumi did not sign under donation to the shrine as prime minister, and he did not enter the main building. One of the reasons for the simplification of rituals was the fact that the Osaka Court ruled in September 2005 that the head of government could not emphasize his official status when participating in religious activities. See: Shimizu (2006: 14–15), Yomiuri Shinbun Seijibu (2006: 291).
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Zakowski, K., Bochorodycz, B., Socha, M. (2018). History Problems Under the Koizumi Administration. In: Japan’s Foreign Policy Making. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-63094-6_4
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