Abstract
Among the values that modulate scientific prediction there are ethical values. This chapter clarifies the ethical factors that modulate prediction in the context of scientific activity and science as activity. To do this, two perspectives of analysis are considered: (a) the endogenous ethics, which is oriented towards scientific activity by itself; and (b) the exogenous ethics, which analyses science as an activity connected with other activities (social, cultural, political, economic, ecological, etc.).
The starting point is the study of Rescher’s ethics of science, which gives primacy to the internal perspective. This leads to going more deeply into the exogenous perspective, which is also important for the problem of prediction. After that, the research is oriented towards the reflection about the problems posed by the relation between scientific prediction and ethical values. Thus, the repercussions on scientific prediction of the ethical limits of science are considered first. Second, the study of the ethical values of scientific prediction is developed from the dynamic viewpoint, which deals with the evaluation of the aims, processes, and results of the research. In this regard, the differences between basic science, applied science, and the application of science must be taken into account.
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“Anthropology” here might refer to social anthropology , so the goal of ethics is not merely the description of social uses and traditions.
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Regarding this issue, the pragmatic aspect of his thought prevails, insofar as it goes from the actions to the subjects of those actions. He thinks of the person as one who unifies the processes, which are developed in the “personhood ,” which makes the features of that entity possible. In effect, he maintains that “once we conceptualize the core ‘self’ of a person as a unified manifold of actual and potential process—of action, and of capacities and dispositions to action (both physical and psychic)—then we have a concept of personhood that renders the self or ego experientially accessible. (After all, experiencing itself simply consists of such processes.),” Rescher (1994, p. 178). On the concept of “personhood ” in Rescher, see Moutafakis (2007, ch. 2, pp. 63–83; and ch. 6, pp. 139–160). An analysis of the concept of “person” is in Gonzalez (1983).
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The Kantian influence is highlighted here. As Rescher admits, “this aspect of the present account is thoroughly Kantian. The governing idea of Kant ’s moral theory is that of universality; that when an action is wrong or right it is so always and for everyone,” Rescher (1997b, p. 167).
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On the characteristics of ethical consequentialism there is an influential paper by Elisabeth Anscombe (1958).
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On the theoretical framework of the ethics of science, see Gonzalez (1999b, pp. 147–151).
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These are the three steps that configure the internal dynamics of scientific research. Cf. Gonzalez (2012, pp. 8–9).
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The external dimension is addressed by Rescher in several publications; of note is Rescher (1996).
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It should be emphasized that each one of those steps poses ethical questions. From this perspective, science should not be reduced to “general” ethical problems, since there are specific problems within each one of those realms (basic, applied, and of application). Ethics of science must be able to go in depth into each one, taking into account how these realms are interrelated. In this regard, ethics is not reduced to the structural dimension of scientific research, since it also affects the dynamics over time. Thus, there are ethical factors in the historicity that have to do with the relation of the agent with the context (natural, social, or artificial) and other factors that deal with the historicity of the very relations among the researchers (for example, in the research centers). Gonzalez, Personal communication , 2.1.2015.
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The view of truth as an ethical value appears in philosophers like Karl Popper . On this topic, see Martinez Solano (2005, pp. 282–294).
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A good example of the combination of these factors is provided by John Worrall when he analyzes clinical trials. See, in this regard, Worrall (2006).
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Ethical problems that have to do with the publication, dissemination, and authorship of the research results are analyzed in Resnik (1998, pp. 96–121).
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This means that, in this regard, agents’ historicity is twofold: the relations between the researches have features of variability over time that make those relations different from the relations between the agents and the context (natural, social, or artificial). Frequently, the relations of the former case are intense and revisable, possibly to a larger extent than in the latter case. This type of variability can be seen in the changes in the groups of research and in the internal dynamic of the research centers. History of science selects the representative actions of both types of historicity , insofar as they are important for the development of the scientific activity . Gonzalez, Personal communication , 2.1.2015.
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In Rescher’s approach, the cognitive content of basic science as such (that is, considered by itself) is not susceptible of ethical evaluation. Ethical evaluation appears when basic science is seen as related with human activity (where ends, means, and results with their consequences are at stake).
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This projection has been clear during the last decades in the realm of communications (for example, between the signal theory and mobile telephony devices). But this feature does not involve reducing technology to applied science or considering that technology is a pure application of science . The relation between science and technology was emphasized in chapter one of this book, and it is described by Rescher as two legs of the same body (1999a, p. 100).
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This can be seen in the successive international meetings on climate change, where the meeting in Río de Janeiro (1992), Kyoto (1997), Copenhagen (2009), and Paris (2015) can be highlighted.
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The concept of “intentionality ” is understood as a feature of a human activity, a feature which is developed in the action of an agent or a group of agents, so it is not equivalent to “intention” as a simple mental act (and, therefore, unobservable). On this issue, see Elskamp (1986).
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The problem of how historicity can be compatible with objectivity is analyzed in Gonzalez (2008b).
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Niiniluoto is a philosopher who has insisted especially on the autonomy of science as a characteristic feature of what science is or should be. In his judgment, “the community of investigators ceases to be a scientific community if it gives up—or is forced to give up—this principle of autonomy,” Niiniluoto (1984, p. 6). On the concept of “autonomy,” see Gonzalez (1990, pp. 100–104 and 108–109, 2015, pp. 25–28) and O’Neill (2003).
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Rescher considers that autonomy is a defining feature of science. In his judgment, “the acceptability of the scientific proposals is an issue that should be completely resolved at the level of internal considerations to scientific endeavor. A ‘science’ subject to external criteria of correctness is simply not worthy of that name,” (1999a, p. 115). The search for a balance between the autonomy of science and the limits due to ethical issues is a main concern in the recent literature on the ethics of science. See, for example, Douglas (2007, pp. 126–131).
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This is expressly accepted by Rescher. In his judgment, “one very pervasive problem at this institutional level is the classical issue of pure, or basic, versus applied, or practical, research. This problem is always with us and is always difficult, for the more ‘applied’ the research contribution, the more it can yield immediate benefits to man; the more ‘fundamental’, the deeper is its scientific significance and the more it can contribute to the development of science itself,” (2006b, p. 204).
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On the problems related to the prediction of future science, see Rescher (2012a).
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On how historicity is compatible with objectivity , see Gonzalez (2008b).
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Gonzalez, Personal communication , 2.1.2015.
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This kind of problems is also frequent in professional practices (for example, when several physicians disagree about the best way of treating a patient).
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Guillán, A. (2017). Analysis of Prediction from Ethics of Scientific Research. In: Pragmatic Idealism and Scientific Prediction. European Studies in Philosophy of Science. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-63043-4_9
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